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Abstract 
 
Scholars studying Alternative Food Networks (AFNs) have struggled with the question of 
whether these initiatives are a type of entertainment for a few middle class consumers, or the 
part of a political struggle to configure new food system relations. My response is that in 
China, AFNs are both. This research provides an empirically grounded theoretical analysis of 
AFNs, or assemblages of Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) farms, buying clubs and 
ecological farmers’ markets, forming in China’s industrialized regions. AFNs in the global 
north have emerged in liberal capitalist democracies with industrialized food systems 
characterized by private land ownership, declining small farm sectors, consolidated farm to 
retail chains, predominance of supermarket retail, standards and laws to safeguard food safety 
and an active civil society sector. The Chinese context sits in contrast with its unique version of 
‘capitalism with social characteristics’, a commons approach to land ownership, predominance 
of smallholder agriculture and traditional marketing chains, a commitment to domestic food 
security, nascent food safety legislation and a civil society with limited autonomy from an 
authoritarian state that keeps shifting the terrain of what is permitted. In this landscape, new 
food procurement relations that I consider AFNs, have emerged in response to the loss of the 
peasantry and its traditions, environmental crises perpetuated by productivist agriculture 
policies, and a persistent ‘food safety crisis’. These nascent food networks manifest 
contradictory characteristics. I argue that instead of fitting into the ‘either or’ categories of 
conventional and alternative food systems, China’s AFNs need be seen as hybrid systems. This 
research explores 19 AFN cases (CSA farms, farmers’ markets and buying clubs) using 
interviews, site visits, surveys and blog monitoring. It explores these networks using four 
‘lenses’. First, I examine the capitalist and other-than-capitalist relations in these AFN using a 
post-capitalist diverse economies framework. I reveal diverse economic relations in China’s 
AFNs where capitalist and non-capitalist relations co-exist and where the persistence of the 
peasantry, de-peasantization and re-peasantization processes all occur simultaneously. Second, 
I examine the ecological relations in these networks. I argue that in the context of productivism 
associated with strong domestic food security policies, these AFNs demonstrate a mixture of 
traditional and modern production methods. Further, reacting to a widespread distrust of state-
led organic and ecological agriculture institutions, producers and consumers in these networks 
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are forging bottom-up alternatives and constructing their own meaning of ecological and 
organic through reflexive civic process. Third, I look at the interpersonal relations in these 
networks and the degree to which they are relations characterized by trust and reconnections 
between producers and consumers. I examine how re-building trust in the context of China’s 
‘food safety crisis’ proves difficult in these AFNs. Using care ethics theory, I reveal how these 
AFNs can be seen as ‘windows’ through which people can glimpse different kinds of 
reconnections and care ethics, that for many result in hybrid producer-consumer identities that 
complicate market based notions of people who buy and people who supply food. Finally, I 
look at the political relations in these networks and consider they degree to which they can be 
understood as transformative. I argue that these AFNs are beginning to create a space ‘beyond 
the market’ to fill a civil society void and influence broader food system issues and policies. In 
the context of the pervasive uncertainty of an authoritarian state, China’s AFNs are developing 
a repertoire of subtle and often covert ‘everyday resistance’ strategies to challenge hegemony. 
Beyond being ‘simply’ sites of material transactions, these AFNs can be seen as ‘portals’ 
through which people can connect to trans-global food justice movements that have no official 
presence in China. Individualist responses of consumption and collective responses of citizens 
are being transgressed and we can understand AFNs as hybrids of market based initiatives and 
civil society movements. 
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1.0 Contradictions and Paradoxes 
 
Our leader brilliantly displayed his sagely prowess. In place of oppression, he 
ruled with gentleness and millions of people gave him their hearts…. And then 
heaven sent no disaster. The spirits of the hills and rivers were tranquil and the 
birds and beasts, the fishes and tortoises, all enjoyed their lives according to their 
nature. However, the descendants of these kings did not follow their example, and 
great heaven sent down disaster …. When the hungry go without food, the people 
become unruly. 25 Mencius, Book I, Part II, ch. 4, verse 6. 
 
People cannot earn a living farming anymore in China. There is no honour in 
growing food.  CSA operator  
 
In China today we have enough food to eat, but what we have is not safe to eat. 
People are worried about feeding it to their children. It is a new kind of famine. 
Buying club volunteer  
 
The first quote above is an excerpt from the “Mandate of Heaven”, an ancient story 
from the Zhou dynasty (11
th
 century BC), later elaborated by Mencius (4
th
 century BC) and 
taught to every Chinese child since pre-Confucian times. It is a story about what we in the 
global north might call food security, or perhaps even food justice, and the moral authority of 
leadership. As the story goes, a leader’s mandate to rule is given by Heaven,versus a bloodline 
or by the voice of the people. The source of legitimacy to rule is vague (Heaven), but the story 
is clear about how to maintain the legitimacy of leadership. To maintain the “mandate of 
Heaven” the ruler needs to ensure the harvest is secure and the peasantry is satisfied. 
According to the story, food insecurity is a cause for rebellion. Linking governance with 
people’s right to subsistence and food security has remained the basis of Chinese political 
philosophy for over 2000 years. 
 
Consider that, during my lifetime, China has almost miraculously transitioned from 
experiencing the world’s worst famines to becoming the world’s largest food economy 
2 
 
(Morton, 2012) and, as the story goes, the rulers have maintained their mandate of Heaven. But 
now the situation is evolving and many suggest that China is at a crossroads. As detailed in this 
thesis, a food safety crisis has gripped the country for two decades now and the state (despite 
threat of the death penalty for violations) has been unable to address the people’s concerns. 
There is a growing inequality between rural and urban people and millions of rural peasants 
have abandoned all hope of earning livelihoods on the land guaranteed to them and are turning 
to driving taxi cabs in the city or working in factories. This has left old people and children to 
farm in the countryside on land which is both ecologically fragile after several decades of 
being pumped up by synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and politically vulnerable under a state 
hungry for land to fuel its economic growth and meet its food security goals. The social and 
ecological costs associated with China’s transition ‘miracle’ are turning out to be extensive. 
 
The subsequent quotes, from a CSA operator and a buying club volunteer 
interviewed for this research, illustrate the frustrations with a state that seems to be neglecting 
its responsibility to subsistence ethics in the social contract described by the mandate of 
Heaven story. While the meaning of subsistence may have changed to include food quality in 
addition to sufficiency, the symbolism of the mandate of Heaven story remains present in 
examples of urban and rural resistance in present day China (Perry, 2008). Indeed, breaches in 
the ‘social contract’ suggested by the story underpin the emergence of new and diverse forms 
of food procurement relations that I call alternative food networks
1
 (AFNs) which are rapidly 
expanding in China’s peri-urban landscape.  
 
On the surface, this seems like a narrative we know very well. Throughout the global 
north
2
, AFNs have evolved in response to an agro-industrial system that disconnects people 
from food and food producers, resulting in lost traditions, threats to small-scaled producers, 
                                                 
1
 There is some variety in the nomenclature used to describe such initiatives. I am using the term ‘alternative food 
networks’ as equivalent to various terms used in the scholarship including: ‘alternative agro-food networks’ and 
‘alternative food systems’. 
2
 There is no simple way to ‘categorize’ China and its relation to other parts of the world. I use the terms ‘global 
north’ and ‘global south’ to refer to countries grouped together based on  socio-economic and political 
characteristics, not as a  geographic divide. In this dissertation, global north  includes: The US, Canada, Europe 
and Australasia while global south refers to Africa, Latin America and Asia, including China.  I recognize this to 
be somewhat arbitrary. Depending on the ‘development’ indicators used,  China could also be considered part of 
the global north.  Since I use these terms to describe groups of countries rather than specific geographic locations,  
I capitalize neither word.  
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environmental degradation and consumer anxieties about food quality and safety. These 
alternative networks are assemblages of diverse initiatives that include community supported 
agriculture (CSAs), farmers’ markets and buying clubs. The unifying characteristic of these 
components is a focus on more direct connection between producers and consumers and a 
centering of ecological forms of production. However, little examination of the concepts and 
contexts underpinning these ‘alternatives’ has occurred outside of the global north. 
 
AFNs in the global north have emerged in liberal capitalist democracies with 
industrialized food systems characterized by private land ownership, a declining small farm 
sector, consolidated farm to retail chains, predominance of supermarket retail, standards and 
laws ostensibly to safeguard food safety, and an extensive civil society sector organizing and 
advocating for changes in various ways. The Chinese context sits in contrast with its unique 
version of ‘capitalism with social characteristics’, a commons approach to land ownership, 
predominance of smallholder agriculture and traditional marketing chains based on wholesale 
and wet markets, a focus on agricultural productivity to support an obsession with food 
security and increasing meat consumption, nascent food safety legislation, and a civil society 
with limited autonomy from an authoritarian state that keeps shifting the terrain of what is 
permitted. I suggest that much could be gained from research that explores the emergence of 
AFNs in this contradictory and shifting landscape. This research asks, how can we explain the 
recent development of alternative food networks in this remarkably different context, and how 
does this exploration help move forward theorizing on alternative food relations as a global 
phenomenon? 
 
Scholars studying AFNs have struggled with the question of whether these initiatives 
are a type of utopian entertainment for a few middle class consumers or the beginning of a 
political struggle that configures new food system relations (Goodman & DuPuis, 2002). My 
response is that in China, they are both. There are complex motivations behind China’s AFNs. 
Responding to the loss of the peasantry and its traditions, environmental crises perpetuated by 
productivist agriculture policies and a persistent ‘food safety crisis’, AFNs in China manifest 
hybrid and sometimes contradictory relations. These findings help us move beyond the binary 
thinking that can assume ‘alternative’ food networks are posed in opposition to mainstream 
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systems. I argue that China’s AFNs do not clearly ‘fit’ into ‘either or’ categories of 
capitalist/non-capitalist,  modern/traditional,  producer/consumer or global/local. Rather, 
China’s AFNs need be seen as hybrid systems with a ‘yes and also’, or perhaps given the 
research setting, a ‘yin and yang’ nature.  
 
In developing the argument, I begin in Chapter 2 by introducing the concept of AFNs 
and outlining my research approach and methods. Framed within a post-structural, political 
economy approach, I provide an empirically grounded theoretical analysis of CSA farms, 
buying clubs and ecological farmers’ markets that comprise the emerging AFNs in China’s 
industrialized regions. Using mixed methods (interviews, site visits, surveys and blog 
monitoring) I draw on four different theoretical ‘lenses’ (diverse economies, functional 
integrity, ethics of care and everyday resistance) through which I examine the economic, 
ecological, interpersonal and political dimensions of these AFNs. Throughout this analysis, I 
explore how China’s shifting economic, environmental, cultural and political context 
influences and shapes the hybrid forms these AFNs take. 
 
Chapter 3 overviews China’s mainstream food system as the backdrop to the 
emergence of AFNs. I paint a picture of a hybrid system, or what some refer to as a 
‘transitional’ system (McCullough, Pingali & Stamoulis, 2008), that combines elements of 
both traditional and modern food chains, and is changing very fast. I then describe how CSA 
farms, a new type of farmers’ market, and buying clubs have spontaneously emerged and 
become entangled in networked relations that I call AFNs. Here I introduce a typology that 
illustrates the diverse motivations of producers and consumers joining these networks. 
 
Following these introductory chapters, my analysis and argument fall into four parts 
organized into Chapters 4 – 7. Each of these chapters draws on a different theoretical 
perspective as a lens through which the economic, ecological, interpersonal, and political 
dimensions of these nascent AFNs are examined. While interrelated, each of these chapters 
also stands as an independent narrative that weaves together relevant aspects of the Chinese 
context and global north AFN scholarship with my analysis of the data. Figure 1 offers a 
conceptualization of the document’s structure.  
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1.1 Economic Hybrids of Capitalist and Non-Capitalist Forms 
Chapter 4 examines the economic relations in these networks and how they are 
shaped by the commons approach to land and the dual urban-rural citizenship (hukou) of 
China’s agrarian reform process. AFNs are emerging in a context where processes of ‘de-
peasantization’ and agrarian capitalism are beginning and global north scholars have argued 
that market based alternatives like AFNs are inevitably co-opted or mainstreamed by these 
processes. However, following emerging thinking on post-capitalist diverse economies 
(Gibson-Graham, 2008), I recognize the diversity of economic life and argue that these 
emerging AFNs demonstrate hybrid relations, where capitalist and other-than-capitalist forms 
are entangled, and which present opportunities to reproduce the peasantry rather than eliminate 
it. In this Chapter, I detail the ways in which labour relations, market transactions, surplus and 
financing are mobilized in these networks of economic diversity. On one hand, many of the 
CSA farms that comprise China’s AFNs have been established by young urban ‘entrepreneurs’ 
who recognize the opportunities in an emerging market economy and can be characterized as 
pragmatic and instrumental with limited risk sharing with consumers and extensive use of 
waged labour. On the other hand, relations in these networks are complicated by a commons 
approach to rural land that gives control to marginalized villagers and peasants, while 
‘privileged’ urban entrepreneurs seeking to respond to market opportunities need to negotiate 
for it. At the same time, motivated to reduce urban-rural inequities, protagonists in these 
networks are supporting and re-building peasant forms of agriculture which focus on 
livelihoods and re-investment of surpluses into the farm’s ecology. The result is an 
entanglement of capitalist and other-than-capitalist relations in which we see the persistence of 
the peasantry, de-peasantization and re-peasantization processes occurring simultaneously. 
While in many ways the state privileges commercial and entrepreneurial business forms, these 
profit-seeking agricultural firms do not preclude or eclipse other economic forms in China’s 
AFNs. Further, China’s AFNs do not risk being ‘conventionalized’ (Buck, Getz & Guthman, 
1997) because they exist in a landscape where, as a result of land allocation policies, most of 
the farms are small, and petty-traders abound.   
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1.2 Ecological Hybrids of Traditional and Modern Production 
In Chapter 5, I turn to the ecological relations in these networks and the ways in 
which they define and manifest ‘organic’ production approaches in the context of a ‘top-down’ 
approach to ecological sector governance through standardization. The dream of agricultural 
modernization in China follows a model of technologically driven, production-focused 
agriculture driven by an obsession with food security which has forced traditional agriculture 
to the margins. I argue that in this context, AFNs articulate a mixture of traditional and modern 
production methods, knit together in a type of ecological hybridity. Drawing on elements of 
functional integrity, I see the practices in these AFNs to be largely ecological with a focus on 
biodiversity, closed loop systems and de-emphasis of externally sourced inputs. However, the 
absence of some essential practices, such as the use of cover crops, suggests that these AFNs 
are nevertheless influenced by the dominant productivist ideology of the state and associated 
market pressures. Yet at the same time, the CSA operators in these AFNs are trying to adopt 
traditional practices that the state version of ecological agriculture has abandoned. While the 
search to recover lost traditional knowledge is widespread in these networks, it is not 
essentialized. Instead, there is a blending of traditional and modern that illustrates reflexive and 
pragmatic rather than ideologically-driven approaches. Further, reacting to a widespread 
distrust of state-led organic and ecological agriculture institutions, producers and consumers in 
these networks are forging bottom-up alternatives. Producers work to ensure transparency for 
consumers through extensive on-line and on-farm information sharing about their farming 
practices. At the same time consumers in these networks, through buying clubs and farmers’ 
markets, are resisting and reconfiguring state standards by constructing their own meaning of 
ecological and organic based on a reflexive civic process that is geared toward the development 
of ‘participatory certification’.  
 
1.3 Producer-Consumer Entanglements 
Re-connections and trust between consumers and producers are seen as the defining 
criteria of direct marketing AFNs in the global north. But in the context of China’s ‘food safety 
crisis’, trusting the person who grows your food proves difficult. In Chapter 6, I move to the 
level of micro-politics and examine the interpersonal relations in China’s AFNs by using ethics 
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of care theory as an analytic. I argue that, in this context of pervasive uncertainty about food 
quality,  most consumers are drawn into AFNs motivated by distrust of the dominant food 
system versus a desire to establish trust with food producers. Indeed CSA operators, market 
managers and buying club organizers alike explain their challenges regarding establishing 
connections with consumers given their strong suspicions of food relations, making the process 
of deepening the care and trust relations in these networks difficult. This is not to  suggest that 
people don’t care. Rather I argue that people’s motivation to care for themselves and their 
families draws them into an ethics of care for land and food quality versus caring for 
producers. On almost all of the CSAs I visited, operators set aside a portion of the land, 
sometimes as much as one third of the farm, on which members can grow their own food. 
Motivated variously by the desire for quality food, relaxation and/or health, these consumers 
take on the role of producers and thus we see an entanglement of these identities. I argue the 
construction of these ‘weekend farmers’ in these networks complicates the identities of a 
passive consumer and an autonomous producer in the marketplace. These producer-consumer 
hybrids are further evidenced by consumers who enter these networks with the same distrust as 
others, but like what they experience. Over time, they deepen their care relations, cultivate 
informal guanxi networks, and take on active roles in food provisioning, thus further de-
stabilizing the producer-consumer binary. In conclusion, I argue that in this context of 
pervasive distrust in food and food governance, AFNs become ‘windows’ through which 
people can glimpse different kinds of re-connections and care ethics, that for many result in an 
entanglement of producer-consumer identities and a nascent civil society organizing around 
food. 
 
1.4 Hybrids of Market and Nascent Civil Society 
The final ‘lens’ in my analysis explores the ways in which China’s AFNs move 
beyond market relations and work toward transformative change. It would be simplistic to 
suggest that these nascent networks have challenged profound social injustices in their brief 
history. To the contrary, I argue there is a deeply held historical distrust of peasants in these 
networks, aggravated by a cultural discourse about quality and social class (suzhi), that works 
against re-connecting with people who grow food. These AFNs, like their sisters in the global 
north, can be blind to privilege, and their charitable acts, though well intentioned, do little to 
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challenge structural conditions that perpetuate peasant marginalization in China. Yet, by using 
reflexive and inclusive processes, these AFNs are working to create a space ‘beyond the 
market’ to fill a civil society void and find opportunities to have influence on broader food 
system issues and policies. These networks are challenging hegemony every day – but not 
overtly. I reveal how, in the pervasive uncertainty of the authoritarian state, China’s AFNs are 
developing a repertoire of subtle and often covert ‘everyday resistance’ strategies. Techniques 
such as bloggers employing sarcasm in their use of state rhetoric and slogans, buying clubs 
avoiding business registration, farmers’ markets evading bureaucratic requirements, peasants 
pilfering food they believe is rightfully theirs, are all examples of everyday resistance, directed 
at the state, in a context where the boundaries between what is permitted and risky are 
constantly shifting. In addition, I suggest that there are also more open forms of dissent 
circulating in these networks. In particular I argue that on-line communications, particularly 
through the new micro-blog platform called ‘Weibo’ is becoming a central tool of resistance 
for these nascent food citizens. Further, I observe the ways in which these networks are 
actively building linkages and developing heterogeneous alliances. Sheltered by the safety of 
personal connections versus formal organizational linkages, which the state could find 
confrontational, China’s AFNs are drawing support at diverse scales and have established 
networks both within and outside China. AFNs have developed entangled relations with the 
indigenous New Rural Reconstruction movement and this has opened the door for them to 
extend relations with trans -global food justice movements that otherwise have no official 
presence in China.  In this way, whereas the previous chapter suggests AFNs can be seen as a 
window to entangling producer-consumer relations, here I argue this window turns into a portal 
through which people can move beyond these networks and join global spaces of 
emancipation. In these ways, individualist responses of consumption and collective responses 
of citizens are being transgressed, and we can understand AFNs not simply as market based 
networks of food provision, but rather as the formation of nascent civil society movements.  
 
In summary, these four chapters develop the argument that AFNs in China can be 
seen as constructing economic hybrids of capitalist and other-than-capitalist forms, ecological 
hybrids of traditional and modern practices, consumer-producer hybrids and political hybrids 
of market and civil society relations of resistance. As a first account of AFNs emerging in 
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China, I favour breadth over depth in my analysis. Nonetheless, these findings offer an 
opportunity to contribute to theorizing on alternative food networks that resonates beyond its 
limited global north applications. This ‘first look’ at these networks sees state and capital 
dominance matched by possibilities or ‘openings’ that start to reveal how different production 
and consumption might be arranged.  
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2.0 Research Approach and Methods 
 
There is growing consensus that the concept and label ‘alternative food networks’ 
(AFNs), while useful in describing a food phenomena that emerged in the 1990s, may not 
effectively describe the complexities and nuances of diverse food provision and procurement 
systems that have developed since that time (Holloway et al., 2007; Tregear, 2011). There has 
been a suggestion that we need to re-invigorate the scholarship and broaden how we label and 
study them (Maye, 2013). This chapter first lays out a critique of AFNs by problematizing the 
term ‘alternative’. Second, I briefly overview the post-structural political economy approach as 
an over-arching philosophy that guides my analysis. Nested within this analysis, I describe how 
a set of pervasive dualisms in AFN scholarship has prompted the consideration of these 
phenomena as co-constituted along four dimensions - economic, ecological, interpersonal and 
political. I then introduce four ‘lenses’ that I use to focus my literature review and analysis 
along these dimensions. Finally, I describe how I approached fieldwork in China and the 
networked case study approach and data collection methods I used.  
 
2.1 A Diverse Family of AFNs 
AFN has been defined as “a broad embracing term to cover newly emerging 
networks of producers, consumers and other actors that embody alternatives to the more 
standardised industrial mode of food supply” (Renting, Marsden & Banks, 2003, p. 395). A 
considerable scholarship has interrogated their rapid expansion including numerous reviews, 
from various disciplinary perspectives
3
. I think of AFNs as a growing ‘family’ of food system 
relationships, being explored from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives and geographical 
contexts. The ways in which AFNs have been understood (the way the family is defined) varies 
significantly, making it difficult to know ‘whose in and whose out’, or if we are even talking 
about the same phenomena. AFNs have been explored in terms of entrepreneurship (Marsden 
& Smith, 2005), shortened value chains (Ilbery & Maye, 2005), and their contribution to 
economic and rural development (Morgan, Marsden & Murdoch, 2006; Renting et al., 2003; 
                                                 
3
 See for examples: Goodman, DuPuis & Goodman, 2012  and various themed journal issues including:  
International Planning Studies 4(3), 1999, Sociologia Ruralis 40 (2&4), 2000, 41(1), 2001, 42(4), 2002;  Journal 
of Rural Studies 19(1), 2003; Environment and Planning A 35(3); British Food Journal 105 (8), 2003;  
International Journal of Sociology of Food 19(3). 
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Sonnino & Marsden, 2006). Other scholars in the alternative family see things in more 
politicised ways and investigate AFNs as movements of resistance in opposition to a dominant 
regime (Allen, 2008; Bedore, 2010) often focusing on social justice. Other scholars focus on 
AFNs as responses to negative environmental effects of an industrial food supply and focus on 
ecological alternativeness and issues of ‘quality’ food production and sustainable development 
(Marsden, 2012; Higgins, Dibden & Cocklin, 2008; Seyfang, 2006; Sonnino & Marsden, 
2006). Yet another group in this AFN extended family consider themes of scale and look at 
place-based systems and how these networks are embedded in the local (Brown & Miller, 
2008; Chiffoleau, 2009; Feagan, 2007) (Whatmore, Stassart & Renting, 2003), while others 
describe the ways in which relations are extended to distant others (Jaffee, 2007). The diversity 
in this AFN family has been describe as a series of “non identical collective nouns” 
(Whatmore, et al., 2003, p. 389) such as organic networks, fair trade networks, artisanal 
networks, local or regional networks, urban agricultural networks and so on, that are used 
variously to describe family members.  
The primary challenge with the AFN concept is that it lacks inherent normative 
content. In other words, ‘alternative’ is always relative to something else. In both scholarship 
and practice the term is used to distinguish from ‘mainstream’ food relations, making it 
difficult to describe AFNs without using the term ‘alternative’, and thus offering no real 
definition at all, and rendering it unhelpful. Since ‘alternative’ is always relative to a 
‘mainstream’ system, and since that comparator itself keeps changing, what is considered 
‘alternative’ also keeps shifting. As Holloway et al. (2007) describe, “although discourses of 
‘alternativeness’ might be powerful in stimulating challenges to what are felt to be, or 
experienced as, unjust economic relations, “the ‘alternative’ itself is a slippery concept, 
resisting definition and shifting as soon as attempts are made to tie it down” (p. 80). 
 
2.2 Post-structural Political Economy Approach 
Many academic approaches and theories shape the study of alternative  food systems 
and networks, making the field epistemologically and methodologically pluralistic. In this 
section, I describe the evolution of a broad hybrid epistemology in which I situate this research.  
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2.2.1  Rooted in Agrarian Political Economy  
The roots of the agro-food scholarship extend to the 1970s with an understanding of 
the rural as a space of production being transformed within penetrating capitalism. This 
perspective stresses the changing structural and power relations in the food sector, the 
globalisation of food procurement and the unequal relations between capital and 
labour/workers. Today this approach has evolved to inform work on food regimes (Friedmann 
& McMichael, 1989), commodity systems analysis (which has been extended to value chain 
research) (Friedland, 1984), work on the growing concentration of power of the retail sector in 
the global system (Reardon, Berdeque & Timmer, 2005), and global justice movements 
(Borras, 2010). Historically, the approach was critiqued for minimizing the impacts of social, 
spatial and historical contexts and overlooking the role of consumption in agro-food studies 
(Marsden, 1989). More recently, however, it has broadened to engage with post-structural 
theorizing that understands food systems as hybrid relations (Campbell, 2009; Friedmann, 
2009).  
 
2.2.2 Informed by Post-Structuralism 
An epistemological shift that occurred in the social sciences in the 1960s, post-
structuralism is a system of thought that acknowledges how multiple meanings are continually 
being created or constructed and changed, and rejects the idea of a single knowable ‘truth’. 
Whereas the classical political economy view, following Marx, looks to the material aspects of 
food and understands food as a fetishized commodity whose true value is hidden, the post-
structural view, following Durkheim, looks more to the symbolic meaning of food, or food as 
totems that mirror society (Goodman, DuPuis & Goodman, 2012, p. 34). During the 1980s, as 
consumer-led food activism grew, AFN scholarship shifted to post-structural approaches in 
order to better theorize the significance being accorded to consumption and rejected the use of 
classical agrarian theory that assumed consumers as powerless (Goodman et al., 2012, p. 35). 
From the 1990s forward, agro-food scholars have used a broad range of post-structural 
approaches to negotiate the dualisms that pervade alternative food scholarship. These 
approaches understand that alternative food systems are shaped not only by structural and 
material factors, but also by cultural discourse and meanings.  
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2.2.3 A Hybrid Post-structural, Political Economy Approach 
Critiques have been levelled at both the political economy and post-structural schools 
in terms of their application to the study of AFNs. Post-structural research has been criticized 
for privileging culture and discursive analyses and ignoring structural conditions and power 
relations manifest within and between networks, as well as between networks and the political-
economic context in which they are evolving (Marsden, 1989). Increasingly, agro-food 
scholars have noted the importance, for example, of considering state policy (Andree, Dibden, 
Higgins & Cocklin, 2010) and historical agrarian change (Pratt, 2009; Qazi & Selfa, 2005) as a 
backdrop to alternative food networks. This “ontological rapprochement” (Guthman & DuPuis, 
2006, p. 438) which blends these perspectives has helped food system scholars move beyond a 
conceptual divide between research that has focused on agro-food production from a political 
economy perspective and that which has focused on consumption using a cultural theory 
perspective. Such a hybrid approach sees food networks as influenced by an interaction of 
material and structural conditions (class, production) as well as the socio-cultural factors such 
as systems of meaning, values and beliefs (Goodman et al., 2012).  
 
A post-structural political economy approach to AFN research embraces diverse 
theories and analytical tools. In the following section, I describe pervasive dualisms that have 
been characterised in AFN scholarship and introduce four particular analytics (which I refer to 
as ‘lenses’) that I use to capture these hybrid relations in China’s emerging AFNs.  
 
2.3  Dualisms and Hybridity in AFN Scholarship 
The diversity of AFNs has posed a definitional challenge for research with scholars 
lamenting the absence of a coherent definition that can envelop and unite the fragmented 
theoretical and empirical discourse and practices (Tregear, 2011; Whatmore et al., 2003). As a 
result, scholars have unpacked the various characteristics of AFNs along several dimensions, 
and in so doing exposed a set of problematic binaries or dualisms that characterise the field. 
For example, a pervasive producer-consumer dualism underlies much of the AFN discourse 
and a rift lies between studies that focus on the production side of food systems and those that 
draw on consumer practices (Goodman & DuPuis, 2002; Lamine, 2005). It is a divide we need 
to move beyond and scholars conclude that we need to integrate production and consumption 
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activities, or “how we ‘grow food’ and how we ‘know food’” (Goodman & Dupuis 2002, p. 6). 
Similarly, AFN scholarship has drawn on a set of over-simplified dualisms such as traditional-
modern, biodiversity-monoculture, organic-conventional, local-global and so forth  (Blue, 
2009; DuPuis & Goodman, 2005; Ilbery & Maye, 2005).  
 
These and other dualisms have prompted some scholars to consider AFNs as hybrids, 
where we understand ‘both and’ versus ‘either or’ categories (Slee & Kirwan, 2007). Thus 
instead of seeing alternative and mainstream food systems as opposites, this approach sees a set 
of continua where various dimensions of food systems are co-constituted as hybrid forms. In 
this approach, scholars look for the interconnectedness and relationships between things that 
we might initially see as opposites and thus, de-essentialize or de-centre normative concepts. 
Scholars taking this approach have seen for example, how AFNs construct hybrids as they mix 
capitalist and other-than-capitalist economic logic (Ballamingie & Walker, 2013; Andree et al., 
2010; Cameron & Gordon, 2010), blend traditional, organic and productivist ecological 
relations (Egelyng, De Abreu, Li & Fonesca, 2013; Guthman, 2000),  entangle roles of 
producer and consumer (Renting, Schermer & Rossi, 2012), simultaneously embrace local and 
global (Hinrichs, 2003) and/or demonstrate hybrid political forms of market-based individualist 
and civic collectivist politics (Lamine, Darolt & Brandenburg, 2012). In summary, AFNs defy 
simple categorization and need to be understood as diverse, hybridized phenomena, along 
various (economic, ecological, interpersonal and political) dimensions. 
 
This dissertation focuses on this conception of hybridity by looking at the emergence 
of AFNs in China, a context where the conventional posed in opposition to alternative is not so 
clearly capitalist or neoliberal, and where different socio-cultural, historical and ecological 
contexts may shape this emergence differently. Figure 2 summarizes this hybridity, or 
dimensions of ‘alternativeness’ drawn from global north AFN scholarship. Often AFN 
scholarship focuses on just one of these dimensions. However, considering this research is an 
early study of China’s ‘alternative’ food procurement networks,  I favour breadth over depth 
and consider all four of these dimensions, through a set of lenses outlined below, in order to 
reveal the complexity and diversity of these emerging AFNs.  
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Figure 2: Hybrid Relations of AFNs across Four Dimensions 
Source: this author 
 
 
2.4 Research Framework: Constructing Four ‘Lenses’ 
To guide my analysis, I have selected four ‘lenses’ or analytics through which the 
hybrid relations in each of the above four dimensions can be examined. This results in four 
interrelated studies that comprise Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. These dimensions are not as discrete 
as categories might suggest of course. However, separating them, although somewhat artificial, 
develops a useful heuristic device for identifying contradictions and paradoxes relative to 
China’s emerging AFNs. These different lenses are developed in greater detail within each of 
those chapters, but here I provide an initial overview. Each of these lenses is drawn from a 
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different theoretical perspective and each suggests a set of questions and indicators to guide my 
reading of the data. These are summarized in Table 1 and described below.  
 
 
Table 1: Outline of Hybridity Dimensions and ‘Lenses’ 
 
Hybridity 
Dimension 
Analytical Lens Guiding Questions Themes & Indicators 
Economic Diverse 
Economies 
Framework 
(Gibson-Graham, 
2006) 
To what degree are Chinese 
AFNs demonstrating diverse 
and/or hybrid economic 
logics?  
Enterprise Types 
Organization of Labour 
Land Relations 
Types of Transactions 
Financing of Enterprises 
Ecological Functional 
Integrity (Halberg, 
2012; Luttikholt, 
2007) 
 
Co-construction of 
Knowledge 
(Goodman & 
DuPuis, 2002) 
To what degree do the 
production practices in 
Chinese AFNs reflect a 
mutual interdependence of 
human and ecological 
systems? 
 
How do participants in these 
networks conceptualize and 
negotiate the meaning of 
‘organic’? 
Landscape, species and genetic 
diversity 
Closed Loop Systems 
Protection of soil structure and 
biology 
Protection and conservation of 
water 
 
 
Interpersonal Ethics of Care 
(Tronto, 1993) 
In what ways are producers 
and consumers in China’s 
AFNs connecting through 
ethics of care? 
Phases of Care ethics: to care 
about, to care for, to give care 
and to receive care 
Political Everyday, 
resistance 
(Kerkvliet, 2009; 
Scott, 1985) 
In what ways do China’s 
AFNs respond to and/or 
challenge dominant 
relations of power? 
Repertoires of resistance 
(reflexivity, diffused 
contention, evasion, embedded 
activism etc.) 
 
Source: this author, drawing on scholarship cited 
 
2.4.1 Economic Lens: Diverse Economies  
This lens examines the ways in which AFNs in China are producing diverse 
economic relations. Following questions being asked by post-capitalist scholars, I ask, to what 
degree are Chinese AFNs demonstrating diverse and hybrid economic logics? (Gibson-
Graham, 2008; McKinnon, 2010; Pretes & Gibson, 2008). To respond, I use the diverse 
economies framework advanced by Gibson-Graham (2006) which presents a comprehensive 
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way to understand economic relations across capitalist, alternative capitalist and non-capitalist 
fields, and is being seen increasingly by global north scholars as useful in the study of AFNs 
(Ballamingie & Walker, 2013; Cameron & Gordon, 2010; Dixon, 2011; Marsden & Franklin, 
2013). The diverse economies framework helps to reveal “economic difference” (Gibson-
Graham, 2008, p. 624) by looking at five dimensions of economic diversity: transactions 
(market, non-market, alternative market), labour (waged, alternatively compensated, unpaid), 
enterprise type (how surplus is expropriated and/or re-distributed), land relations (private, 
commons) and how enterprises are financed. The framework is drawn from Gibson-Graham’s 
post-structural critique that de-essentializes ‘capitalism’ to see it not as all-encompassing, but 
rather as something that has an “outside” or other-than-capitalist relations (Gibson-Graham, 
2006, p. 20). By unpacking the economic relations in this detail, the diverse economies 
framework helps to dissolve the meta-narrative of ‘capitalism’ that can mask heterogeneous 
economic relations. In this way, it rejects the tendency to evaluate food systems as either 
alternative or mainstream, and instead reveals nuance and diversity.  
 
2.4.2 Ecological lenses: Functional Integrity and Ways of Knowing Food 
Observing that social sciences based AFN research has all too often simplified or left  
ecological relations uninterrogated, scholars are pressing the need to bring ecology and nature 
more fully into the interrogation of alternative systems (Jones et al., 2010; Mariola, 2008). 
AFN scholarship espouses the values of organic and ecological production (DuPuis & Gillon, 
2009; Jarosz, 2008; Marsden, 2012) but details of the farming practices that characterize these 
approaches are seldom elaborated. This vagueness reflects the observation that around the 
world there exists both a formalized ecological sector where practices are defined and codified 
and a more informal sector that lacks consistent definition (Parrot, Olsen & Hogh-Jensen, 
2006). This research embraces a broad view of organic to include production systems where 
there is no formal certification, but that brings with it the problem of definition.  
 
Considering compliance with the Chinese organic standard as a definition of 
‘organic’ is problematic. While the Chinese organic standards (described more fully in Chapter 
5) are clearly codified with a tangible set of ‘rules’ that could be assessed, smaller scale 
producers (such as those interviewed in this research) often don’t pursue certification because 
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of cost, or because it is not seen as necessary for direct marketing. Further, social science 
scholars understand that definitions of ‘organic’ or ‘ecological’ are not ‘out there’ to be 
discovered. Rather these are relational concepts whose meanings need to be negotiated. To 
embrace this complexity, I use two different negotiated meanings of organic to examine 
China’s AFNs. First, drawing on a meaning constructed by ‘experts’, I use indicators of 
functional integrity (Halberg, 2012; Luttikholt, 2007) and ask, to what degree do the 
production practices in Chinese AFNs reflect a mutual interdependence of human and 
ecological systems? Second, I complement this ‘objective’ assessment of farming practices by 
considering the ways in which producers and consumers in these networks are co-constructing 
knowledge and practice standards and deciding what is organic or ecological in these networks 
for themselves, and how this lay definition arises vis-a-vis the state-led construction of an 
organic standard.  
 
2.4.3 Interpersonal Lens: Ethics of Care 
Scholarship that interrogates ideas and practices of untying (disconnecting) and 
retying (re-connecting) to food is only just beginning in China (Klein, 2013; Kleinman et al., 
2011). In contrast, in the global north these concepts have been foundational to AFN 
scholarship for over two decades. The tangible and intangible qualities of connections between 
and among producers, consumers and food production, through local, direct exchange (as in for 
example CSAs, buying clubs, farm shops, farmers’ markets) have been extensively explored 
and contested (Chiffoleau, 2009; Cox et al., 2008; Feagan & Morris, 2009; Feagan & 
Henderson, 2009; Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002; Hinrichs, 2000; Kneafsey et al., 2008). 
This scholarship has typically drawn on the concept of re-embedding economic and social 
relations (Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1944). Multiple perspectives and interpretations have 
been elaborated (Feagan & Morris, 2009; Hendrickson & Heffernan, 2002; Kirwan, 2006) but 
it seems there is little consensus emerging down this path and scholars are revisiting the utility 
of this “almost magical” (Hinrichs, 2000, p. 297) concept of embeddedness in food systems 
research. In the absence of a widely agreed upon theory for investigating the interpersonal 
dimension of AFNs, I join an emerging scholarship (Cox, 2010; Kneafsey et al., 2008) that is 
exploring the application of Tronto’s (1993) theory of care ethics to AFNs. Similar to the 
concept of embeddedness, ethics of care theory understands that economic relations are 
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enmeshed in relations with human and non-human others and focus on a sense of responsibility 
for others. Thus, care ethics challenge ideas of individualism and of a society organized around 
efficiency and competition (Lawson, 2007). However, care ethics are not simply thoughts or 
propositions. Rather care ethics are understood as a set of practices (Lawson, 2007; Tronto, 
2006). In my analysis, I look at the interpersonal relations and practices in China’s AFNs using 
Tronto’s four phases of care: to care about, to care for, to give care and to receive care.  
 
2.4.4 Political Lens: Everyday Resistance  
So what if these networks are based on strong ecological practices and interpersonal 
relations that is ‘care-ful’ and fair? In what ways are AFNs moving beyond instrumental 
market relations to bring about larger scale structural changes? This idea of moving beyond the 
market is reflecting a current line of theorizing in AFN scholarship that sees these networks as 
complex entanglements of market and non-market relations. Scholars have evoked the idea of 
‘food citizenship’ (Welsh & MacRae, 1998) to describe how producers and consumers in 
AFNs move beyond buying and selling food, toward shaping state and/or global policies that 
impact the broader food system. This framing in the global north is based in a long history and 
culture of a civil society distinct from the state and the market. The situation in China is 
remarkably different in that there is no historic separation between the individual and the state, 
and the degree to which a new independent civil society is emerging is contested. To examine 
this question of transformative change in China, I widen the definition of what we have 
typically thought of as ‘resistance’ in the global north and draw on theories of everyday 
resistance (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1985). These “everyday politics” understand people to be 
“embracing, complying with, adjusting and contesting norms and rules regarding authority 
over, production of, or allocation of resources and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle 
expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct” (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 232). Indeed, it is 
a form of resistance typically seen in the context of the pervasive uncertainty of an 
authoritarian state. I use this theory of everyday resistance to reveal the repertoires of 
resistance being practiced by China’s AFNs. 
 
I use this set of four analytics or ‘lenses’ to look across different dimensions of 
hybridity, in order to understand the economic, ecological, interpersonal and political aspects 
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of China’s emerging AFNs. I try to balance critique and optimism in my investigation. The 
next section details my research methods. 
 
2.5 Research Methods 
Much of the global north AFN scholarship is based on single case study research, 
and increasingly scholars have argued the need for research to move beyond considering 
discrete initiatives, toward considering initiatives in networked relations (Chiffoleau, 2009; 
Lamine et al., 2012). This research uses an inter-related multiple case study design that 
considers a cluster of individual initiatives or cases that are assembled into a network or 
system. My interest is in understanding how these initiatives perform when brought together 
into networked relations, versus considering them as discrete case studies. Thus, the network 
becomes the primary unit of analysis. The approach enables empirical examination in real-life 
context and has the advantage of illustrating a variegated food landscape versus one particular 
initiative. This broader view is considered especially useful in situations like this one, where 
little previous research has occurred (Yin, 2009). On the other hand, disadvantages of the 
approach relate to the unwieldy amount of data, especially if qualitative methods are among 
those used.  
 
2.5.1 Types of AFNs Examined 
My focus is on AFNs that address and contest organic and ecological food with a short 
distance between where food is grown and where it is procured. These ‘short chain’ initiatives 
are seen to possess various dimensions of ‘alternativeness’, such as redistributing value to 
small scaled producers and building re-connections between producers and consumers 
(Whatmore et al., 2003). I identified networks in China that are comprised of the three types of 
initiatives most frequently identified as ‘alternative’ in global north scholarship: 
 Community Supported Agriculture (CSAs) is a frequently studied producer-
consumer venture type in alternative food system scholarship (Cox et al., 2008; DeLind, 2003; 
Feagan & Henderson, 2009; Galt, 2013). CSAs focus on building a community of consumers 
(members) around a farm. Members make a payment to the farmer in advance of the growing 
season in exchange for a share of whatever the farm produces, thereby sharing production risk 
with the farmer and eliminating costs of packaging, marketing, and retail.  
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 Farmers’ markets, where consumers buy goods directly from producers, are often 
considered as examples of AFNs in global north scholarship and interrogated as such (Brown 
& Miller, 2008; Feagan & Morris, 2009; Kirwan, 2006; Smithers, Lamarche & Joseph, 2008). 
 Buying clubs are groups of consumers who join together to create their own 
approach to food provisioning where they can source food of their choosing and reject what is 
presented to them by the industrialized food system (Little et al., 2010). Unlike on-line or 
supermarket food procurement that is focused on consumer demand for convenience within a 
for-profit ethic, buying clubs are typically organized by volunteers, who procure food from 
deliberately selected farmers who meet production standards that the consumers have 
developed. The procured food is then divided into individual orders for pick up or delivery.  
 
2.5.2 Data Collection and Analysis  
My research is situated within a larger, SSHRC-funded initiative. Dr. Steffanie Scott 
and a team of doctoral students (Aijuan Chen, Zhenzhong Si and I) at the University of 
Waterloo’s Department of Geography and Environmental Management.  Collectively we have 
conducted over  120 interviews over 15  months of fieldwork from 2011 to 2013. This 
fieldwork spanned 13 provinces and municipalities including Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guangxi, Fujian and Hainan. 
Interviewees were key stakeholders in China’s ecological agriculture sector. Their backgrounds 
ranged from employees and owners of organic and green farms, representatives of organic 
certification bodies, government agencies, consumer associations, NGOs, academics and 
community organizers. This dissertation draws on data that I collected first-hand, with support 
of a translator, as well as data that other team members collected and transcribed for collective 
use. I made two trips to China, in April 2012 and November 2012, each for two weeks, and 
used four different methods to collect data: semi-structured interviews, site visits, a written 
survey (in Chinese) survey and monitoring micro-blogs and listservs. The interview outline, 
survey, and site visit checklist I used are included in Appendix A. During the second trip I 
attended two conferences, the fourth national CSA Symposium in Beijing and the International 
Conference on Sustainability and Rural Reconstruction in Chongqing. Many of the individuals 
I interviewed on my first trip were present at these conferences and this gave me a nice 
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opportunity to ask follow-up questions. Each data collection method is described in further 
detail below. All of these methods were approved by the University of Waterloo’s Office of 
Research Ethics.  
 
2.5.2.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews, in contrast to written surveys for example, are useful at 
uncovering complexities of motivations behind actions (Mullings, 1999). However, completely 
unstructured interviews risk not eliciting information on the themes of interest. There were 
some specific topics I wanted to cover, but at the same time, I wanted to hear respondents’ 
stories. Therefore, I used an interview guide (Appendix A) to help direct the conversation, 
while providing flexibility to probe further where necessary. A second advantage of a pre-
defined interview guide in this situation is that the questions were translated into Chinese and 
provided to respondents at the interview. Interviews were recorded where permission was 
granted, although typically respondents asked that our conversation not be recorded. I spoke 
with people in English if they were comfortable, but most interviews were in Chinese with 
simultaneous translation provided by my co-researcher Zhenzhong Si or occasionally by 
another English speaking Chinese person who was present.  
 
2.5.2.2. Site Visits 
Wherever possible, interviews included site visits, although in a few cases, 
interviews occurred at one of the conferences I attended. Typically, there were at least two of 
us at every site visit. On the farms I visited, I used a simple checklist (Appendix A) to take note 
of the production practices that farm operators spoke to and that I observed.  
 
2.5.2.3 Written Surveys 
On the second trip, I prepared a written survey which was translated into Chinese, 
and distributed these to CSA farms. I recruited the farmers at the two conferences I attended. 
The English and Chinese versions of the survey are in Appendix A. 
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2.5.2.4 Blog and ‘Buzz Mining’ 
  ‘Blog and buzz mining’, where internet posts are used as sources of research data, 
is still considered a new research method in the social sciences (Poynter, 2010). Best practices 
and ethical frameworks are still evolving. Given the conversational nature of blogging, scholars 
have found that monitoring a community’s on-line exchanges can be similar to monitoring in-
person conversations, noting that it can be particularly helpful in understanding the beliefs and 
practices of a particular community.  
  There is an evolving literature around ‘on-line activism’ specific to China. The 
growth of on-line communities, and in particular the use of micro-blogging has exploded in 
recent years (Yang, 2009). During my fieldwork, I learned how extensively AFN participants 
were using these online spaces, so I decided to monitor the ‘Weibo’ posts of 8 bloggers, 
described in Appendix B, for 4 months as supplementary data. ‘Weibo’ is an acronym for a 
networking service in existence since 2009. It is best described as a cross between blogging, as 
we understand it in the global north, and Twitter. The use of Weibo has exploded in the past 
few years and had over 100 million users by early 2011 (Yang, 2013). Weibo posts include 
anything from event promotion and distributing information to more political expression. The 
state censors Weibo for subversive content (Yang, 2013) and bloggers typically use 
pseudonyms to at least partially obscure their identity.  
 
The bloggers I ‘followed’ were all people who were involved in the AFNs I studied 
and included one peasant farmer, CSA operators, buying club volunteers, farmers’ market 
volunteers, and consumers. The blogs were all in Chinese, and they were translated by a 
graduate student at the University of Waterloo. I met most of the bloggers while in China. As 
per the University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics approval (ORE 18011), I sought their 
permission to monitor their blogs, and they consented verbally. Where I did not meet the 
bloggers personally first, I notified them by email that I was a researcher reading their blogs 
and that I might quote them in my reports and asked them to respond if they had any concerns. 
No one expressed any concern about the blog monitoring. 
 
There is a debate in the research ethics literature as to whether blogs and on-line 
discourse should be considered in the public domain, and hence ‘cited’ in the same fashion as 
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press references or other ‘desk research’. Or, should these postings be considered a more 
private form of information sharing and hence subject to the same ethics considerations as 
other in-person types of qualitative data (Poynter, 2010). I treated contributions made in on-
line space the same way as I considered contributions people made in interviews and used 
assigned numeric codes to mask identities.  
 
2.5.2.5 Field Notes and Transcriptions 
Following the ‘verbatim principle’ (Spradley, 1979) I tried to write exactly what was 
said in the voice of the speaker instead of interpreting or generalizing, although sometimes this 
was a challenge given the language difference. The research team tried to reach inter-
researcher agreement when we transcribed our field notes. Those of us present at the interview 
all contributed to a shared transcription and discussed areas of disagreement where they 
occurred. 
 
2.5.2.6 Coding and Analysis 
I used N-Vivo to complete the coding and analysis of the translated interviews upon 
return to Canada. N-Vivo is referred to as a code-based theory building software. Such 
packages assist the researcher in managing the analysis of qualitative data by supplying 
thematic coding to chunks of data and facilitating their clustering into themes (Peace & van 
Hoven, 2010). I generally used an iterative approach to coding that combined ‘a priori’ themes, 
informed by the lenses I discussed above, and those emerging from the data. In this way, data 
were ‘read’ along the four dimensions discussed above for associations and patterns.  
 
2.5.3 Ensuring Research Quality 
In a post-structural approach, in which the researcher is not seeking to discover ‘the 
truth’, the question of research quality is really about the trustworthiness or credibility of the 
data rather than whether the phenomena are adequately measured (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
To this end, triangulation is a key strategy. Triangulation was used in four different ways in 
this study. First, I used theoretical triangulation by examining results using different theoretical 
lenses. Second, I used the multiple data sources outlined above to corroborate each other. 
Third, there were multiple cases or sources interrogated. Finally, there were typically at least 
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two researchers at the interview, and we worked collaboratively on transcripts, thus enhancing 
transparency and accuracy.  
 
2.5.3.1 Respondent Validation 
Reporting back to participants throughout the research process verifies accuracy, 
validates participant’s time, expresses reciprocity with participants and further validates the 
research findings. There are various ways this can be accomplished ranging from showing all 
participants the entire narrative in draft form to only sharing the completed report (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005). I followed a middle ground approach to transparency, where I shared 
preliminary findings with a group of participants and others at the International Conference on 
Sustainability and Rural Reconstruction I attended in 2012. This gave me an opportunity to 
‘float’ ideas and gave participants an opportunity to offer further details or contradict my 
interpretations. In addition, our research team distributed a written summary of findings to 
interviewees. These approaches further strengthen confidence in the conclusions by virtue of 
their having been considered by key participants.  
 
2.5.4 Limitations and Cross-Cultural Challenges 
Qualitative research generally, and case study research in particular, is difficult to 
execute according to definitive plan (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). Decisions taken a priori often 
need to be revisited while in the field. A key aspect of research rigor is the transparency with 
respect to modifications in design and data collection in response to unanticipated setbacks. 
Turner (2010) discusses how socialist rule in three Asian countries, including China, plays a 
substantial part in shaping the experience of fieldwork. This section addresses the challenges of 
gaining entry, interpretation/translation and positionality with regard to the cross-cultural 
aspects of the proposed research. 
 
2.5.4.1 Gaining Entry 
In this research, my access to interviewees was facilitated through linkages between 
the University of Waterloo and Chinese academic institutions along with a lengthy list of key 
informants based on previous fieldwork by colleagues at the University of Waterloo as a 
starting point. From this initial list of contacts, we used a ‘snowball’ approach to identify other 
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key stakeholders in China’s ecological and organic sectors, and to identify initiatives clustered 
into alternative food networks.  
 
2.5.4.2  Interpreter Dynamics 
Research assistants and interpreters drawn from the communities being researched 
are key resources, and it is important to note that their ability to embrace the subtleties of the 
content area as well as how their positionality can impact the research (Scott, 2006; Turner, 
2010). Considering these challenges, this research was enhanced by our team approach, 
wherein two Chinese doctoral students generously translated interviews and materials. Further, 
we were able to discuss findings and meanings together continuously throughout the research 
process.  
 
2.5.4.3 Situatedness, Positionality, Reflexivity 
Drawing on the concept of ‘situated knowledge’ (Harroway, 1988), while I have 
outlined the efforts I have taken to ensure the credibility of this research, I also acknowledge 
that the interpretation I offer here is partial and incomplete. The interpretation I offer is specific 
to me and thus is limited by my positionality.  
    
Researchers speak of entering and leaving the field as though there is a door that 
opens and closes, and we find ourselves in a different place. In reality, transitions are 
complicated and are both shaped by, and in turn shape, our identities. Positionality refers to the 
ways in which relationships are framed while in the field, and how this in turn effects the 
research questions, the inquiry process, content, and interviewee relationship with the 
interviewer, analysis and results. Reflecting on positionality can make the researcher more 
aware of, and attentive to, the power relations in the research process and the resulting impacts 
(Suzuki, 2007). In interrogating my own assumptions and biases that I bring to this research, 
my experience as a small-scale organic CSA farmer worked to my advantage generally. I think 
I was able to connect with AFN participants in fairly open and authentic ways. People were 
always interested in my experiences as an organic farmer running a CSA and selling at a 
farmers’ market as well as in a buying club in Canada. 
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Yet throughout the research, I also became aware of some of my ideological 
presuppositions, or ‘baggage’ that I carry with this identity. In particular, there are two areas 
where I have changed because of the research. First, I have become aware of the way that I 
have viewed organic agriculture in the past from the lens of certification and standards, and the 
different ways of understanding organic that are possible. Interviewing people in China who 
contest the state’s standards and are seeking to construct their own meaning of organic was 
something I was originally resistant about. I spent much time once back in Canada talking with 
other farmers about this theme to try to sort out my views, and in the end, I have emerged from 
the research process with a much more nuanced view of ‘knowing’ as well as growing food. 
Second, I have gained a much more generous understanding of what the dynamics of 
‘resistance’ can look like. Before I began this research, I argued that alternative food as a 
market-based response would always face ‘co-optation’ and that the only solution was to 
strengthen our government’s role in food policies through protest. Indeed, I’ve spent many 
hours writing letters, signing petitions, sending postcards and standing outside meetings with 
placards. I do not discard these strategies, but I have seen other more nuanced approaches to 
resistance in action, and I continue to think about these. I think there is much to learn from 
these Chinese AFNs in this regard, and look forward to trying to indigenize their ‘everyday 
resistance’ strategies here in Canada and add them to my resistance toolbox. 
 
2.6 Researching Four Dimensions of AFNs in China 
This chapter has outlined the ontological and methodological approach of this 
research. I described the evolution of the post-structural political economy approach as an 
over-arching philosophy that guides my inquiry. Nested within this, I outlined how a set of 
pervasive dualisms in AFN scholarship has prompted the consideration of these phenomena as 
co-constituted along four dimensions:  economic, ecological, interpersonal and political. I then 
introduced four analytics or ‘lenses’ that I use to focus my literature review and analysis along 
these dimensions. Finally, I described how I approached fieldwork in China and the networked 
case study approach and data collection methods I used.  
 
With the research approach and methods explained, Chapter 3 describes the 
emergence of AFNs in China’s hybrid food system.  
29 
 
3.0 Emergence of Alternative Food Networks in China 
 
Whether one refers to China’s political economy as socialist, socialism in transition, 
post-socialist or socialism ‘with Chinese characteristics’ (Lim, 2013), the point of departure for 
my analysis is that China is a single-party state in the process of dismantling socialist 
institutions, opening its border to trade and reducing its intervention in markets. Yet at the 
same time, it is a ‘strong state’, maintaining control of socio-economic processes and trying to 
use redistributive mechanisms to address growing inequities driven by a historic concern for 
food and political security and pursuit of social harmony.  
 
This chapter describes the appearance of AFNs in China. Before doing so however, I 
offer an overview of China’s mainstream food system in which these alternatives are emerging. 
Of course, food systems are complex, and in many ways, one can consider the situation in 
China as multiple food systems operating at different spatial and social scales. However, my 
purpose here is to provide context against which I can consider AFNs. To this end, I sketch an 
overview of China’s dominant food system, relying on country-wide information and statistics, 
which I acknowledge masks considerable social and regional variation. I paint a picture of a 
hybrid system, or what some refer to as a ‘transitional’ system (McCullough et al., 2008), that 
combines elements of both traditional and modern food chains, and is changing very fast.  
 
In this chapter’s second section once a general appreciation for the context is 
achieved, I begin the exploration of emerging food procurement alternatives to this mainstream 
system. Before moving to the analytical chapters and dissecting the economic, ecological, 
interpersonal and political dimensions of these alternatives, I use this chapter to describe how 
CSA farms, a new type of farmers’ market, and buying clubs have spontaneously emerged in 
the past five years, primarily in the wealthier more developed areas of China, and become 
entangled in networked relations that I consider to be AFNs.  
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3.1 China’s Food System: A Hybrid of Traditional and Modern 
China has adopted a unique approach to neoliberalism, seeking to combine economic 
and trade liberalization with state authoritarianism (Wu, 2008). During the reform period, 
which commenced in 1978, two central agri-food policies have impacted China’s food 
system’s transition. First, in the early 1980s, China’s collective agriculture system (which had 
been created in the Mao-era) was dissolved and individual farmers became largely autonomous 
decision makers which led the way to a privatized food market (discussed further in Chapter 4). 
Second beginning in the late 1980s, the state began supporting township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) as a main vehicle to absorb ‘surplus’ rural labour and drive economic growth. As a 
result of these combined policies, the economy grew, but agriculture fell from 40% to 11% of 
GDP, and the agricultural workforce fell from over 80% to 38% of the total workforce (Carter, 
Zhong & Zhu, 2012). Today, agricultural development lags behind the rest of the economy and 
farmers’ incomes are increasing only slowly, which has led to a fast growing income gap 
between rural and urban areas (discussed further in Chapter 4). More recently however, and in 
particular since 2004, state policy has re-focused on agriculture and rural development. China’s 
most recent five year plan for example, highlights environmental sustainability and investment 
in agrricultural science and technology, and supports for more integrated food chains through 
co-operatives and contracting between farmers, processors and retailers (OECD-FAO, 2013). 
 
Mirroring changes in the broader economy, China’s food system has been described 
as transitional, or a hybrid of traditional and modern approaches (McCullough et al., 2008). It 
is a food system where a new structure of markets, different from the previous state-organized 
distribution, has partially evolved, but with less consolidation and integration compared to 
fully ‘modernized’ food systems of the global north (McCullough et al., 2008). Figure 3 offers 
a conceptualization of this hybrid system. 
 
3.1.1 Changing Food Consumption Patterns  
In only three decades, China’s food system has moved from one based on rationing 
and grain coupons to one characterized by increasing choice, rising prices (Huang, Wang & 
Qiu, 2012) and growing concerns about food quality and safety (Yan, 2012). China is now the 
world’s largest food and beverage retail market valued at US $607 billion in annual sales 
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(Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). This growth is being shaped by increasing urbanization and the 
emergence of a middle class with changing food patterns. Over the last 30 years, per capita 
spending on food has been rising. Between 2000 and 2010, total spending on food has doubled, 
while food expenditure as a percentage of all expenditures has fallen from 49% to 41% in 
urban areas and from 39% to 36% in rural areas (Cao et al., 2013). Recent marketing research 
suggests China’s food consumers can be grouped into four categories (Garnett & Wilkes, 
2014): 
 Poor – those with incomes below US $6,000 per year, representing less than 10% 
of the population 
 Mass consumers - those with incomes between US $6,000 - $16,000 per year, who 
can afford basic things for a reasonable lifestyle 
 New mainstream – those with incomes between US $16,000 - $34,000  
 Affluent - those with incomes above US $34,000 per year. At present, this group 
comprises about 6% of the population, but is projected to grow to over 50% by 2020. 
China’s food system transition is being accompanied by a nutrition transition and 
economic reforms have resulted in dramatically changed food consumption patterns. Analysis 
of the recent China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) reveals striking trends (Popkin, 
2013):  
 increased consumption of oils and increased frying of food 
 increased consumption of animal-sourced foods, wherein pork remains the most 
common animal-sourced food, but the intake of eggs, poultry and dairy products are all rising 
quickly 
 increased consumption of sugar sweetened beverages, which were non-existent 
prior to 1989, but have recently entered the Chinese diet as global beverage companies have 
expanded markets  
 decreased consumption of grains and legumes 
 increased consumption of food away from home  
 increased consumption of non-traditional foods, in particular confectionary and 
frozen foods 
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Indeed the only truly healthy trend revealed by the CHNS is the reduction in sodium 
intake, resulting from better refrigeration and therefore declining salted fish consumption (Zhai 
et al., 2014). As would be expected given these trends, chronic disease rates such as obesity, 
diabetes, stoke, heart disease are rising in tandem (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014).  
 
Food consumers are generally excited about diversifying food choices, greater food 
availability and moving from season bounded choices regulated by the state (Veek, Yu & 
Burns, 2010). Indeed, there is little evidence of anti-globalization food boycotts, with some 
scholars suggesting that the link between ethics and consumption has not yet made it to China 
(Gerth, 2003). Boycotts of global products or retailers that have occurred
4
 have typically had a 
nationalistic bent, linked to the ways in which the companies have portrayed Chinese traditions 
in their advertising, rather than social, ethical, ecological concerns that characterize boycotts in 
the global north (Dong & Tian, 2009; Nyiri, 2009). However, in recent years, food safety has 
become a focal issue and consumers are pursuing better food quality. Chinese consumers 
understand food safety broadly to include not only food produced under sanitary conditions 
and unadulterated by additives, but also food that is free from environmental pollutants and 
agricultural inputs such as antibiotics and pesticides (Holdaway & Husain, 2014; Yang, 2013). 
This concern with food quality is a significant factor driving the emergence of the alternatives 
that are the focus of this research.  
 
‘McDonaldization’, ‘supermarketization’ ‘walmartizaton’ and other such processes 
that reflect the global experience of bigger, faster, cheaper, homogenized food products, co-
exist with China’s traditional food system. Yet, there is a distinct ‘glocalization’ to their 
presence in China, as these global giants incorporate elements of local culture into their 
practices (Matusitz & Leanza, 2009). What happens when the world’s biggest corporation 
meets the world’s biggest food economy? The numbers are mind-boggling. For example, if it 
were a nation, Walmart would be China’s eighth trading partner (Matusitz & Leanza, 2009). 
The ways in which Walmart has needed to adapt to Chinese food preferences illustrates the 
draw of this market. For example, Walmart has catered to preferences for daily shopping and 
                                                 
4
 Recent nationalistic boycotts have been levelled against Carrefour, Coca-Cola, McDonalds and Starbucks for 
example.  See Nyiri (2009)  for a full discussion. 
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fresh foods by adding extra floor space for perishables, and tanks for customers to fish for 
themselves for everything from frogs and snakes to puffer fish (Matusitz & Leanza, 2009). 
Since consumer preferences are quite regional in China, Walmart does not use central 
purchasing as the fresh foods in each store reflect local cuisine, necessitating sourcing from 
20,000 local farms and processing firms (Matusitz & Leanza, 2009). Further, China is the only 
country in the world where Walmart has been compelled to have a labour union (Chan, 2011). 
It seems that globalization of China’s food system has mixed effects given the strong control 
maintained by the state, as well as strong culturally-driven food preferences and practices. 
Looking at impacts of the reform and ‘opening’ across the food chain can help unpack further 
details. 
 
3.1.2 Food Chain Transition  
Despite making a declining contribution to the country’s overall economy, the 
agricultural output from China’s farmers grew 4.5 times over the reform period (Huang, 2011). 
Two hundred million small scaled farms sell products through a complex system of formal and 
informal mechanisms to bring products from villages to diverse markets and retail formats 
(Garnett & Wilkes, 2014; Huang, 2011). Figure 3 depicts how products are aggregated through 
structures such as dragon-head’ enterprises5, specialty co-operatives and government-run 
wholesale markets. The system is largely unquantified and fragmented (Huang, 2011), but 
recent estimates suggest that one-third of farm households use one of these three formal 
structures, while the remainder rely on uncharted systems of petty-traders, small wholesalers, 
transporters and other intermediaries (Huang, 2011). While the food system remains largely 
traditional, modernized structures and institutions are rapidly evolving. A comparison of the 
horticultural and livestock sub-sectors, for example, demonstrates the hybrid or transitional 
nature of China’s food system and the co-existence of traditional and modern structures. The 
livestock and dairy sectors are achieving greater outputs through farm and processing 
consolidation. These sectors are increasingly relying on imports of feed, primarily soybeans,  
in order to meet growing domestic demands for animal-based foods (Huang et al., 2012). The 
horticultural sector has also increased its productivity, so much so that beyond meeting rising 
                                                 
5
 Typically subsidized firms that hold private contracts with smallholders for specific crops and also usually 
provide necessary inputs to them  (Huang, 2011). 
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domestic demand for fruits and vegetables, China’s small vegetable and fruit farmers produce 
for export. Output of fruits in particular grew almost 30 fold since 1980, relying not on firm 
and farm consolidation, but rather on the complex traditional intermediaries described above 
(Huang et al., 2012).  
 
There are also changes beyond the farm gate in processing. A strong domestic 
processing sector exists, with dairy, bakery and dried processed foods as its leading industries 
(Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). Yet, as with the production sector, the processing sector illustrates 
the contradictions of modern and traditional systems in co-existence. On one hand, agricultural 
processing remains dominated by small firms. In 2007 for example, China’s food processing 
sector included more than 448,000 firms, of which almost 353,000 had fewer than ten 
employees (Holdaway & Husain, 2014). On the other hand, vertical integration and 
consolidation is evident. For example, in 2010, 27 Chinese processing firms had sales over US 
$1.65 billion (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). The most recent Five-Year Plan seems to direct state 
support toward modernizing processes. For example, it seeks to promote large-scale enterprises 
with output values of over US $1.65 billion and includes policies that set minimum sizes for 
livestock processing facilities such as abattoirs (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014).  
 
Foreign direct investment in China (FDI), growing to over US $2 billion in 2010 is 
helping to drive China’s processing sector (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). While this is still small in 
relation to the overall value of the processing sector in China, it illustrates that overseas firms 
are starting to play key roles in agricultural processing (e.g. ADM, Cargill, Bunge and 
Wilmar), food manufacturing (e.g. Nestle, General Mills, Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Danone, 
Heineken), and food services (e.g., Yum! Foods, McDonald’s) (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). 
 
3.1.3 Food Retail Transitions 
The food retail sector in China also illustrates the co-existence of traditional and 
modern structures. While wet markets and traditional marketing chains remain dominant, 
trends suggest that supermarkets are growing faster than elsewhere, with estimates ranging 
between 10% and 30% growth per year depending on the region (Reardon, Timmer, Barrett & 
Berdegue, 2003). In urban areas, consumers make about one-third of their food purchases in 
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supermarkets, which is significantly lower than more developed food economies (Hu, Reardon, 
Rozelle, Timmer & Wang, 2004). However, it is revealing to unpack these sales. In China’s 
largest cities, supermarkets provide most of the processed foods and dairy foods (79% and 60% 
respectively) but only 50% of rice, 46% of meat, 37% of fruits and 22% of vegetables (Garnett 
& Wilkes, 2014). Therefore, while supermarkets are expanding, most consumers still prefer to 
purchase foods, especially meats, fruits and vegetables, in traditional wet markets, where petty-
traders re-sell food purchased from large wholesale markets. Nonetheless, food chains are 
distancing and wet markets are declining in importance (Suk-Ching, 2005), largely because of 
state intervention. In the 2000s the state began to replace state-run wet markets with privatized 
wet markets (Zhang & Pan, 2013) and modern supermarkets in efforts to improve hygiene by 
ensuring public health and labelling standards, adding toilets and washrooms, and upgrading 
storage and display facilities (Zhang & Pan, 2013). It is also interesting to note that modern 
retail approaches frequently embrace traditional styles of vending. Supermarkets and 
hypermarkets
6
, for example, have large produce and seafood sections where consumers can 
closely inspect food as in a market, cater to consumer demand for local cuisine and specialties 
by using local suppliers, and sometimes include market stalls into the design of the store 
(Garnett & Wilkes, 2014).  
 
3.1.4 Global Integration and Food Prices 
China, with 21% of the world’s population but only 9% of the world’s arable land, is 
widely described as essentially food secure (Carter, Zhong & Zhu, 2012; Christiansen, 2009; 
Garnett & Wilkes, 2014; Huang, Yang & Rozelle, 2013). As revealed by the story of the 
mandate of Heaven that began this dissertation, dynasties have risen and fallen based on their 
capacity to achieve harmony through food sufficiency. As an illustration of the central 
positioning of food security, China maintains the largest public reserves
7
 of grain in the world, 
comprised primarily of wheat and rice (Morton, 2012), a sugar reserve (Garnett & Wilkes, 
2014) and a living pork reserve (Schneider, 2011), and manipulates all of these to moderate 
food prices.  
                                                 
6
 The term ‘hypermarket’ typically refers to a large store that combines a food supermarket with a more general 
department store.   
7
 The size of these reserves is the subject of much speculation. In 2007  the state announced it held reserves of  
200 million tonnes,  or 30 – 40 percent of  its total grain production for that year (Morton, 2012). 
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However, in the past 30 years, and especially following accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China has become increasingly integrated with world food 
markets and this has complicated its food security picture. For example, from 1980 to 2010, 
food exports rose from 6% to 24% of GDP, and food imports rose in almost exactly the same 
pattern from 6% to 27% GDP (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). China exports primarily labour-
intensive fruits and vegetables and imports large quantities of land-intensive products primarily 
for animal feed (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). In 2010 alone, China bought almost 50 million 
tonnes of soybeans for livestock feed (Morton, 2012). In addition to soy, China imports 
significant quantities of palm oil, raw sugar, rapeseed, powdered milk and other processed 
foods. China’s strong historical position on food security and its ability to protect itself from 
global price fluctuations are reflected in its National Development and Reform Commission 
report on food security. In reference to the 2008 global food price crisis, the report states, “the 
world food market caught a cold, but China did not even sneeze” (cited in Morton, 2012, p. 
20). When prices began to rise in 2007 the state flew into action. It released grain from its 
reserves, negotiated key future contracts with trading firms in exporting countries, banned 
exports of food and feed, added export taxes to fertilizers to hold onto its supply, provided 
subsidies and insurances to its producers and extended a food price subsidy
8
 to low income 
urban consumers and students (Huang et al., 2013). With these measures, China successfully 
kept domestic prices from rising as much as international prices, with the exception of 
soybeans, where China’s import position, and absence of reserves to release, continue to leave 
it vulnerable to global price fluctuations (Huang et al., 2013). If not a full sneeze, it was at least 
a sniffle, but the state found the tissue fast. 
 
Notwithstanding the state’s intervention, China’s domestic food prices at the end of 
2010 were again up 9.6 %, while consumer prices generally were up only 4.6% from 2009. 
This time, noting that the increase in food costs could be primarily attributed to rising labour 
costs in the horticultural sector, the state responded again with supports for low income 
                                                 
8
 The subsidy varies by region,  but on average,  in March and June of 2008 for example when food prices 
increased,  all university students received a 20 yuan (US $3.20) cash subsidy per month. It is applied whenever 
the consumer price index exceeds 5% for three consecutive months (Huang et al., 2013). 
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consumers and reductions in tolls for trucks carrying produce (USITC, 2011), demonstrating 
again its ability and willingness to maneuver multiple policy leavers to moderate food prices.  
 
3.1.5 A Food System in Transition 
In conclusion, China’s food system can be thought of as a hybrid system, where 
traditional production, processing and retail practices intermingle with modern firms and 
institutions. Diets are shifting to include more animal-based foods, but for the present, 
vegetables and grains are dominant components. Consolidation is evident in the livestock 
sector, but the horticultural sector remains dominated by small farms, and multiple 
intermediary structures (Huang, 2011). Retail remains diversified, and consumers prefer to 
patronize upgraded wet markets for fresh products. The system is increasingly integrated with 
global markets. The state, motivated by strong concern for harmony and food security, has 
demonstrated its willingness and ability to act quickly and decisively to control domestic food 
prices. It is in this contradictory landscape that AFNs have emerged.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Conceptualization of China’s Hybrid Food System 
Source: Adapted from McCullough,  et al., 2008 
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3.2 The Emergence of AFNs  
 The AFNs under study are comprised of three different types of initiatives brought 
into assemblage, and I describe each of these below. As shown in Table 2, 19 initiatives have 
been included in this analysis (15 CSA farms, 2 farmers’ markets and 2 buying clubs). 
Throughout the remainder of my analysis, I refer to these only through code numbers in order 
to mask their identities as promised in my interviews
9
. As shown in Figure 4, these cases are 
widely dispersed across the more industrialized and populated areas China. As an introduction 
to these AFNs, this section provides an overview and tells the story of how CSAs, farmers’ 
markets and buying clubs emerged and became interrelated before interrogating their 
economic, ecological, social and political dimensions.  
 
Table 2: Cases Examined 
 
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) Farmers’ Markets Buying Clubs 
 Urban Operators Rural Operators NGO/University 
Supported 
Beijing Organic 
Country Fair ** 
Chengdu Market ** 
Green League ** 
Green Heartland ** 
Large 
(200 Shares 
and over) 
 Shared Harvest ** 
 Garden of Eden * 
 Little Honeybee * 
 Green Cow ** 
 
 
 Public Rights * Big Buffalo** 
Little Donkey ** 
Anlong Village ** 
Small 
(Under 200 
shares) 
 
 Derun Wu ** 
 Phoenix Commune* 
 Listen to the Creek * 
 GuiPu * 
 Green Arc * 
 Field Wind * 
 Jia Mei * 
 
 
Source: this author 
*Information is drawn primarily from one source – either an interview or a survey  
**Information is drawn from multiple sources – site visits, interviews, surveys, on-line blogs 
 
                                                 
9
 I have not attached an interview date to each  individual quote. As noted  below,  interviews occurred in either 
April or  November 2012.  
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Figure 4: Locations of AFN Cases Studied 
Source: this author 
  
 
3.2.1 Motivations for AFN Initiation - A Typology  
The initiators and organizers, as well as the members or buyers in the CSAs, farmers’ 
markets and buying clubs in these AFNs, are primarily
10
 a group I will refer to using the label 
‘middle class’. However, in doing so, I acknowledge that this is a highly debated and contested 
status in China, with contrasting views on its composition, characteristics, identities and 
political views (Li, 2010). Yet, many of the individuals I interviewed used this term to describe 
themselves and their members or buyers (FCSAB6, BCB1, and FMB1). As detailed in the 
descriptions of CSAs, farmers’ markets and buying clubs that follow, AFN initiators are 
generally young people, born after 1980, and therefore raised after the ‘reform and opening’ to 
the west. So, they never experienced famines, collectivized farms, food rationing or rural 
                                                 
10
 There are some notable exceptions to this that will be highlighted in this thesis.  In particular,  in Chapter 4,  I 
discuss how some of the CSA farmers who would be characterized as rural, peasant farmers are integrated into 
these AFNs to a certain degree. 
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hardship of the Mao era, as their parents likely did. The AFN organizers I interviewed tended 
to be university educated and connected to the world through the internet and often extensive 
personal networks. They are not the wealthiest group of consumers in China, but nor are they 
the poorest. One of the most salient aspects of the CSAs, buying clubs and farmers’ markets 
that comprise China’s AFN movement is that the motivations and ethics of the organizers can 
be contrasted with those of the members or consumers with whom they are trying to forge 
connections. Table 3 offers a typology of China’s AFNs, based on dimensions typically 
addressed in global north scholarship. It illustrates, how motivations and ethics with respect to 
participation in AFNs differ along a continuum of producer-consumer identities.  
 
The initiators of China’s AFNs are driven by diverse motivations. A desire to support 
their livelihood intermingles with more egalitarian motives. They are concerned about the 
marginalization of peasants in rural China, and seek to re-connect with the rural by re-kindling 
lost food and farming traditions, and to re-connect urban consumers with land and food 
production. Primarily urban born, they have limited direct experience with China’s traditional 
peasantry, yet they feel sympathetic with its problems, and see food initiatives as a way to 
assist. Second, AFN initiators are concerned about environmental issues and some work in 
collaborative relations with environmental NGOs. They seem strongly motivated by the 
traditional Chinese pastoral and idyllic imaginaries, and lament the loss of traditions and food 
skills that is accompanying the modernization of the food system. Third, they are concerned 
about the safety of the food supply and see this as a growing ‘crisis’ in China, and a primary 
way to engage with, and broaden the awareness of others. 
 
In comparison however, as shown in Table 3, members and buyers who engage with 
China’s AFNs, most likely share only the concern for food safety with the AFN initiators. Most 
are not particularly motivated by environmental concerns. Nor are they necessarily seeking 
relationships with producers. Nor are they motivated to improve the plight of peasant farmers. 
Indeed as discussed in Chapter 6, many AFN participants distrust China’s peasantry, and it is 
an ongoing challenge for AFN organizers to engage these consumers in broader food justice 
and environmental issues. Yet AFN organizers know their own motives are different from 
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those of many of the other participants in these networks, and as will be detailed, they 
continually act to draw others into deeper connection in the networks.  
A unique feature of the CSA farms in these networks, and one of the ways that ‘self-
interested’ CSA members are drawn into deeper connections, is through the practice of 
‘weekend farming’. Almost all of the CSAs I visited, embraced a type of agri-tourism in which 
they rented plots on the farm to their members who wished to grow their own food. As shown 
in Table 3, the motivations of this group of participants, as with the motivations of AFN 
organizers, extend beyond merely food safety, although they do not have the same broad 
egalitarian motivations as most of the AFN initiators. For this reason, the typology in Table 3 
suggests that there are multiple organizer/initiator identities as well as multiple 
producer/consumer  identities becoming entangled in these networks. The sections that follow, 
take a closer look at the initiation and emergence of CSAs, farmers’ markets, and buying clubs 
that comprise these AFNs. 
Table 3: Typology of China’s AFNs: Motivations for Involvement 
Dimension Motivations
1 
Producer – Consumer Continuum 
  CSA 
Operator 
(N=15) 
Farmers’ 
Market 
Organizers 
(N=2) 
Buying Club 
Organizers 
(N=2) 
‘Weekend 
Farmers’ 
(N=45)
2 
Buyers
3 
Economic Support own livelihood *** * * *  
Affordable food for 
family 
*  * *  
Local economic 
development 
** ** *   
Ecological Food quality/safety/health 
 
*** *** *** *** *** 
Protect the environment *** *** *** * * 
Social Re-connect with 
producers & food 
traditions 
*** *** *** * * 
Re-connect with nature  *** * * *** * 
 Have fun, make friends ** *** * ***  
Political Social justice concerns for 
peasants 
** * *   
Source: modified from Si, Z., Schumilas, T., Scott, S., forthcoming 
1 
Weak (*) – mentioned by 2 of the CSAs or weekend farmers,  1 of the buying clubs or 1 of the markets 
 Moderate (**) - mentioned by at least 3 of the CSAs or weekend farmers 
 Strong (***) – mentioned by more than half of the CSAs or weekend farmers, both of the buying clubs 
or both of the markets 
2 
Based on a secondary analysis of 45 interviews conducted with weekend farmers by Chen (2013a) 
3 
Based on reflections of AFN organizers, newsletter contributions and blog monitoring. 
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3.2.2 Community Supported Agriculture Farms (CSAs)  
One of the difficulties in estimating the number of CSAs in China is that this term is 
being widely used as a branding or marketing label. While doing internet research to locate 
CSA farms to visit, I found that many on-line ordering stores refer to themselves using the 
English acronym CSA. So while this might describe a small-scale farmer who enrolls members 
in a way quite similar to the global north understanding, it could also describe a much larger 
business that aggregates product, that may or may not be ecologically produced, from multiple 
farms and makes this available through quite sophisticated on-line storefront operations. Given 
this confusing landscape, I developed an operational definition of a CSA as an initiative where 
an operator (either a peasant farmer or an urban resident) sells products from land that they 
themselves manage, to an established group of buyers. Thus, I excluded cases where 
consumers ordered on-line from a list of options without direct contact with the CSA operator, 
and with no possibility of visiting the farm. 
 
CSAs began developing in China in 2008, and participants in this research estimated 
there are between 80 – 200 CSA farms today across the country (FCSAB4)11. Even if this is an 
over-estimate, the growth of CSAs has been fast, considering that in Ontario it has taken 30 
years to reach an estimated 200 CSAs (Schumilas, 2011). As further illustration of this growth, 
CSAs in China have held their fifth annual conference with attendance from CSA operators in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Fujian, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Henan, Hebei, Yunnan and 
Guizhou. 
 
There are competing versions of which CSA farm was the first in China. Three of the 
operators I interviewed made this claim. Regardless, it is clear that the CSA approach was 
‘imported’ from the global north versus appearing as an indigenous development. The English 
acronym CSA is typically used in discussion and promotion of the model because the 
translation is not straightforward. The word ‘community’ in Chinese generally refers to a 
location or neighbourhood. So the use of the word (as in Community Supported Agriculture in 
                                                 
11
 I heard vastly different estimates of the number of CSAs in China,  reflecting the uncertainty of exactly what to 
count. 
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English) to denote a community of affiliation, does not translate easily into Chinese, and 
requires much additional explanation. Instead, Chinese CSA operators are using the term shequ 
huzhu nongye which literally translated means ‘peasant in mutual relations with urban 
residents’.  
 
CSAs take remarkably diverse forms in China, and operate as rural peasant-run 
farms, entrepreneur-led urban businesses or not-for-profit projects. The economic dimension of 
these CSAs is examined more closely in Chapter 4. Many of these CSA farms were initiated by 
young, educated individuals, with 11 (74%) of those I interviewed having completed post-
secondary education. This group has been described as China’s ‘new peasants’12. Most 
operators (92%) cite consumer concern for food safety, food quality and health, followed by 
environmental concerns (75%) as motives for starting the CSA. The CSA movement seems to 
draw primarily on the growing numbers middle class consumers in urban areas (Shi, Cheng, 
Lei, Wen & Merrifield, 2011). As one CSA operator explained, membership in these CSAs can 
be summarized as falling into three consumer groups: “wealthy urban white-collar workers, 
managers of companies who buy food as gifts, and pregnant women and parents of young 
children” (FCSAB4).  
 
There is a significant group of NGOs and academics associated with these CSAs. 
They provide advice, workshops and training, as well as extending reputational benefits and 
guanxi (discussed further in Chapter 6). For example, Professor Wen Tiejun, a previous Dean 
of the School of Agronomics and Rural Development at Remnin University and former advisor 
to the state council on rural development, has been a strong advocate of the CSA approach in 
the context of China’s rural development (Pan & Du, 2011; Shi et al., 2011; Wen, Lau, Cheng, 
He & Qiu, 2012). A few NGOs have also been important catalysts for CSAs in China. The 
Hong Kong-based Partnerships for Community Development (PCD) for example, has taken a 
leadership role in starting and promoting CSAs. 
 
                                                 
12
 The term ‘new peasants’ was adopted in the title of the 3rd National CSA Symposium in 2011: “New peasants, 
new city and countryside”. News reports have also described CSAs in China as a ‘new peasant movement’ 
http://www.bundpic.com/2011/06/14788.shtml.   
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Table 4 outlines the sizes and share structures of the CSAs I studied. As shown, the 
size of these operations ranges considerably, making it difficult to refer to a typical case. CSA 
farm sizes range from 1 to 13 acres
13
, producing between 3 – 400 shares or an intensity of 
between 3 – 67 shares per acre. Pricing of shares is typically based on weight of vegetables and 
ranges widely from $2.00 to $10.00 per kg. Most CSAs only sell products grown on their own 
operations with very few products being purchased from other farms for re-sale. Most sell 
produce over a a 26 week season, with a few drawing on extensive greenhouse production and 
storage vegetables for year round sales. All of the CSA cases I examine here use multiple 
channels to distribute their products to consumers in addition to their members, and this results 
in their entanglement with buying clubs and with farmers’ markets. Most (75%) CSAs I 
examined participate in farmers’ markets and almost half (42%) are involved with buying 
clubs.  
 
Table 4: Summary of China’s CSAs (N=15) 
 Range Average Median 
Number of acres 1 – 13 6 6 
Number of shares offered 3 – 400 180 200 
Number of shares per 
acre 
3 – 67 27 25 
Cost per week ($ US) $10 - $60 $32.50 $30.00 
Number of salaried 
workers 
2 – 32 14 12 
Source: this author 
 
On my site visits in April 2012, I observed several typical CSA shares being 
assembled. The season was just beginning on most of these farms, but greenhouses were 
entering full production and shares included many kinds of leafy greens, bok choys, Chinese 
cabbages, mushrooms, and Chinese chives. CSA operators explained that other fruiting 
vegetables like bitter melons, tomatoes, eggplant, as well as root vegetables like potatoes, 
carrots, daikon, onions and garlic would be included in shares later in the season, but that 
always the core content would be the leafy greens popular for stir frying. In addition to the 
                                                 
13
 I will report all acreage in acres (versus Chinese mu) and all monetary figures in dollars (versus Chinese RMB) 
for ease of reference and comparisons. 
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vegetables, most of the CSA farms included eggs, pork and/or chicken as supplemental foods 
that could be added to the share. 
 
While CSA produce is usually delivered to drop spots or homes, consumers remain 
closely linked to the farm and this differentiates these farms from others in the mainstream 
food system. CSA operators interact extensively with their members and try to foster a sense of 
community in diverse ways. All encourage members to visit the farm, contribute to 
newsletters, attend social events, and most see themselves in an educational role. Typically the 
focus of these events and activities is around re-connecting urban consumers to traditional food 
skills and practices through workshops (FCSAB4, FCSAB1).   
 
While each CSA has its own unique mix of products and pricing, and there is 
diversity in sizes and styles, these should not be considered as atomistic farms. Indeed these 
operations are interconnected in multiple ways. I was surprised at the strength of the 
connections among and between CSA operators, farmers’ markets and buying clubs in China, 
especially considering these AFNs are only just beginning to form. Each individual operator 
routinely referenced the others and dozens of media articles and on-line directories list the 
same group of networked farms, markets and buying clubs. Many of the same farm operators 
were present at meetings and conferences I attended. Indeed, I continually had the sense of 
being part of an energetic and inclusive grassroots movement that was thirsty for new 
members, new connections and new information. These connections are perpetuated by the use 
of Weibo micro-blog, where daily on-line postings are used to disseminate information about 
events and activities. Indeed China’s CSAs are interconnected in multiple ways, and their 
connections to the farmers’ markets and buying clubs provide further illustration of this. 
 
3.2.3 Organic Farmers’ Markets 
The type of farmers’ market I examined has only recently appeared in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Chengdu and other large cities. In contrast to traditional ‘wet markets’, where petty-
traders bring products from large wholesale markets to smaller urban markets for re-sale, in the 
markets I studied, farmers sell directly to urban consumers. These markets are promoted 
primarily through social media sites and are attracting thousands of people who come to buy 
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organic food directly from farmers. I included two of these markets, sometimes referred to as 
‘country fairs’, in my research. 
 
The story of how these organic farmers’ markets began in China illustrates the 
interconnectedness in China’s emerging alternative food movement and its linkages to foreign 
NGOs. With growing concerns about food safety in China (discussed in Chapter 6), consumers 
are looking for ways to re-connect with food, and foreign NGOs (notably the Institute for 
Agricultural Trade Policy) have helped to introduce organic farmers’ markets where buyers 
and sellers meet directly as a new option (FMB1). In 2007, Chengdu Urban River Institute, a 
Chinese NGO focused on protecting water resources, in collaboration with Partners for 
Development (PCD), an NGO from Hong Kong, started a new urban farmers market as a way 
to encourage rural peasant farmers to shift to more ecological growing practices. Their vision 
was for a type of farmers’ market where smaller scaled ecological producers and consumers 
could re-connect in direct ways. Ironically, an entrepreneur who identified the profit potential 
in this early attempt shaped the market by introducing large scale organic manufacturers and it 
became impossible for small farmers to compete, and the market lost the form that was 
originally intended (FMB1). 
 
Influenced by this experience, in 2008, several small ecological farms operated by 
urban entrepreneurs on the outskirts of Beijing started to rotate hosting markets on their farms. 
From that experience, three CSAs worked together to launch the first market in association 
with Chinese traditional spring and harvest festivals. These small markets were held only twice 
per year, and were limited to CSA members and immediate networks of the participating 
farms. 
 
In 2010, Zhang Yinghui, a Chinese freelance writer who focuses on green living and 
organic food in Beijing, saw the potential to expand these markets by linking them to other 
artisans. One particular artist, Emi, who lived in Canada at the time (and was indeed the way 
that I first learned of the existence of these organic markets and the associated CSAs) and 
worked at one of the CSAs, saw this potential and began organizing more frequent markets 
which included both farms and artists (Hunt, 2011).   
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Chang Tianle, a Chinese woman working on contract with the Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), joined this fledgling market movement. In particular, Ms 
Chang saw the potential in linking this emerging market movement to the Weibo micro 
blogging system, which was rapidly expanding in urban China at that time. The result was 
explosive, with over 300 consumers following the market posts on the first day of the account 
opening. The market had now clearly moved beyond artist links and initial expatriate visitors, 
to an independent platform, focusing on Chinese consumers. Indeed, in 2012, the Beijing 
Organic Country Fair won two food innovation awards (FMB1). Market operators surmise that 
receiving these awards, both considered quite prestigious in Beijing, means that: “The majority 
of the society and even up-class level cannot ignore this grass root activity. Of course, this 
honor doesn’t only belong to Beijing market, but also it belongs to all the small-middle farmers 
and the consumers who support them all over the country” (FMB1).  
 
Today there are farmers’ markets similar to this in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Jinan, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Xian, Changsha, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Kunming. They 
are consumer-led, volunteer operated networks which offer a regular venue through which 
ecological, small scaled and artisanal producers can sell their wares and connect directly with 
consumers. On the day I visited (April 3, 2012), the Beijing market featured vegetables, fruits, 
pickled foods, eggs, milk, chickens, homemade rice wine, cheese, jam, sausage, bread and 
crackers, and non food handcrafted items like soaps. Markets operate at least once a week, 
sometimes more frequently. They do not have a fixed time and location schedule. Rather, they 
advertise their next appearance through Weibo. The market in Beijing works with a network of 
over 100 farms (FMB1) to draw in a wide range of products year round, with an average 40 
vendors at each market. 
The markets do not limit themselves to certified organic products. Their promotional 
material explains their perspective: 
Many of the farmers at Country Fair have not undergone organic certification. 
Domestic ‘green’ and organic standards are complex and receive limited trust and 
recognition among consumers; and obtaining certification is usually expensive and 
difficult. However, the farmers participating in Country Fair all share goals of 
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producing safe, healthy food through cultivation practices that support human and 
environmental wellbeing. At least one of the Country Fair organizers has visited 
each of the farms in attendance. These farmers are our friends, and we trust them. 
(FMB1) 
  
The markets have faced critique from officials with regard to their adoption of the 
‘organic’ language; since the state’s organic, regulation prohibits the use of the term as 
promotion of products that are not certified. Around the country, these markets have been 
shifting their use of the term ‘organic’ given this uncertainty. This touches upon a debate 
within China’s AFNs about certification and standard setting processes, and is discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
 
Both the markets I examined were initiated in order to reconnect producers and 
consumers around ecological production.  For example, the mission statement of the Beijing 
market states: 
Our mission is to support sustainable agriculture and rural-urban mutual aid to 
create a platform for exchange and education and a space to buy safe, healthy 
food. We hope to support farmers who are already growing organic, and to 
encourage other farmers who might be interested in making the transition. By 
bringing the rural bounty to our urban environment, we hope to help connect 
people with their food beyond the kitchen table directly to the earth and people that 
tend it. (FMB1) 
 
  In Beijing, the market organizers also spoke about a vision for ecological 
sustainability,  and while the term ‘food sovereignty’ was never referenced, they also talked 
about the marginalization of peasant farmers and their desires to build stronger urban-rural and 
consumer-peasant connections. However, they recognize that in present day China, consumers 
are motivated by food safety concerns and not these “larger more philosophical themes” 
(FMB1), referring to my questions about peasant marginalization. Market operators believe 
they are strategically using the consumer pursuit of safe food as a “window” through which 
consumers will gradually connect to broader food and environmental justice themes. They see 
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food safety as the entrance into the discussion of environmental and social justice in China but 
clarify that this window “only remains open if the markets can be fun and social places” 
(FMB1). In addition, these farmers’ markets are moving to fill what they perceive to be a void 
in training and extension work. After interactions and visits to hundreds of farms, they saw that 
there is a lack of support for ecological production. One response, in 2012, was to arrange for a 
trainer in ecological approaches to visit from Canada and offer workshops.  
 
The Beijing Farmers Market is the largest of these markets in China and regularly 
attracts between 1000 – 2000 visitors and has sales of US $2,400 - $4,000 at each weekly 
market. Vendors see these markets as important marketing opportunities, hoping to also draw 
customers for CSAs and on-line sales. Vendors do not pay a fee for a booth at the market. In 
order to sustain market operations (space rental, promotion and costs in transportation to visit 
potential vendors), market volunteers make and sell some products at the markets. Proceeds are 
re-invested into market operations as well as charitable and/or educational projects. In Beijing 
for example, the funds raised by the market in 2012 were awarded as scholarships for farmers 
to attend workshops on ecological growing which the market organized. In Chengdu, for 
example, a 10% markup on market sales is used to purchase organic food for low income 
families in the area.  
 
While the organizers feel that there has been remarkable progress in the development 
of this new farmers’ market “platform” (FMB1), they are quick to add that further development 
is constrained by the lack of appropriate regulations and policies in China. For example, for 
each market they organize they need to register with three different government agencies 
(police, community committee and city manager), and an official will attend and report back to 
the government on the market’s activities (FMB1). Both the Beijing and Chengdu market 
organizers felt that the markets are in a “grey zone” (FMB1, FMC1) of government policy and 
hence can be considered politically sensitive. Organizers are cautious to avoid any direct 
confrontation with government rules. For example, one market organizer commented, “we also 
worry that the government will ban the market someday..... Our ‘grey’ status will hamper our 
ability to make our own voice” (FMB1). Market organizers have begun to discuss the need to 
formalize the structure of the market. They feel that the current informal networked structure 
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poses challenges that limit expansion. To date however, the Beijing Organic Market organizers 
are caught by a lack of appropriate institutional structures in the Chinese legal landscape. They 
have rejected the idea of registering as a business, which is the dominant institutional structure 
supported in the current legal framework. Business registration would give them legitimacy 
and “grease bureaucratic wheels” (FMB1). However, in contradiction to the business model, 
the market volunteers want ownership to be shared and profits to be reinvested, and they have 
found registering as an NGO to be an “almost impossible” process that is not likely “worth the 
effort” (FMB1). As a result, the Beijing farmers’ market has been evading bureaucracy by not 
pursuing any official status. It moves its locations each week and partners with other 
organizations that can ‘host’ the market under the auspices of their registration. Market 
locations have included department stores, academic campuses and shopping malls. A face 
book page and Weibo posts announce the market location every week such as,  “Sunday market 
is back at Daystar” with a time, a map, and public transit locations.  
 
3.2.4 Buying Clubs 
The changing landscape of regulation in China, and the associated vulnerability 
grassroots organizers feel, is also reflected in buying clubs that are emerging as part of China’s 
alternative food landscape, as a less formalized platform for connecting producers and 
consumers. In this research, I explore examples of buying clubs in Beijing and Chengdu, which 
source food from CSA farmers in those areas and are entangled in the same networks as the 
farmers markets. In both of these examples, motivated by procuring healthy food for their own 
families, a group of women came together to figure out the kind of food they wanted, and to 
find the farms that would produce it. However, in both cases the buying club is more than 
simply a purchasing group. They also assume an educational role, and as the analysis will 
reveal, have also have adopted an activist stance that is critical of the state-developed organic 
label.   
 
In Beijing, the buying club evolved from a reading club in 2010, when a group of 
mothers became concerned about the quality and safety of food in supermarkets (BCB1). Six 
women decided to work together in a partnership to source organically produced food. They 
source food from farms which they visit and inspect, and use a small rented office space to 
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divide up the goods for delivery. They add a percentage to the fee in order to cover delivery 
and office space, but no one is paid a wage. The second buying club example, in Chengdu, 
dates to 2007, when a group of urban residents met a group of early CSA farmers. As with the 
farmers’ market initiation, NGOs played an important role in the evolution of the buying club. 
The same two NGOs, Chengdu Urban Rivers Association, and Partnerships for Community 
Development, brought farmers and urban consumers together, and they gradually formed a 
buying club. The club delivers food boxes 25 weeks of the year to several hundred members 
(BCC2).   
 
The buying club program operates like a group-purchased CSA share. The organizers 
speak with local farmers to see what is available, and then place and order for their members 
and arrange for delivery. On the day I visited the Beijing buying club, I watched as the 
volunteers divided the produce they had received (numerous kinds of leafy greens, Chinese 
lettuce and cabbage, bok choys, chives and daikon radishes) into shares for their members. 
Members came to pick up their share, and shopped for additional items from a small collection 
of dry goods (organic rice, tea, cooking oils). Some members sat in a quaint reception area to 
enjoy tea and browse a collection of ecological agriculture books, cookbooks, and self-help 
books. At one point, I felt quite nostalgic noticing copies of Diet for a Small Planet, Farmers 
of Forty Centuries, Small is Beautiful and Silent Spring in the collection.  
 
As with the CSAs, and the farmers’ markets, both organizers and members of the 
buying clubs are primarily educated middle-class consumers, motivated by food safety 
concerns and seeking to procure healthy food for themselves and their families (BCC1, BCC2). 
Also similar to the farmers’ markets, both of the buying clubs I interviewed have rejected 
registration as a business, leaving them in that same grey and vulnerable space. One 
interviewee described how they don’t want to refer to themselves as a “typical business” and so 
they like to use the term “social enterprise”, but “it is only words, because there is no 
associated legal framework in China that would permit this kind of registration” (BCB1). 
Indeed, both of these buying clubs operate in a non-capitalist space where profits and 
commissions from food sales are re-invested to fund educational activities and events in their 
communities and in one case to purchase food for residents living on limited incomes. While 
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both buying clubs are grassroots projects started by groups of women interested in safe food, 
their motives have extended to include concerns with social and material wellbeing of their 
communities. These clubs organize activities to build food skills, and volunteers see food as a 
way to promote healthier relations between people. In both examples, the club reinvests any 
proceeds from food sales into social programs. The buying club in Beijing for example uses 
proceeds to fund a drop-in centre and educational workshops for women who are struggling to 
find employment or facing mental health challenges. In Chengdu also, the buying club’s 
activities go beyond food procurement to include a type of collective kitchen teaching program 
they call ‘Mum’s Kitchen’ and a free food program called “Farmers Friend Buffet”.  
 
Buying club volunteers have a keen interest in re-connecting consumers with farmers 
and in both cases organizers spoke about a commitment to organic and ecologically produced 
food. They echo a general distrust of the organic certification system in China and focus on 
ensuring quality of the food they source by visiting and interrogating suppliers directly. Both of 
these clubs organize trips to the farms they source from so their members can meet with the 
growers (BCC2, BCB1). The purpose of these visits is three-fold.  First, they purchase from 
small, sometimes peasant farmers so they can help contribute to smallholder livelihoods 
(BCC2) Second, they want to provide their members with opportunities to connect with 
farmers and traditional farming practices (BCC1, BCC2). Third, these visits are a way of 
informally inspecting the production methods on the farms, which they refer to as ‘conscious 
certification’ (BCC1, BCC2).  
 
3.3 AFNs in the Context of a Transitional Food System 
This chapter has described how alternative food procurement networks are emerging 
into China’s transitioning food system. CSAs, farmers’ markets and buying clubs, initiated by 
a diversely motivated group of primarily young, educated, urbanites, are rapidly expanding and 
creating a space for themselves in the world’s largest food economy. While China’s food 
system remains traditional to a significant extent, modernization is underway. In this context, 
China’s young food activists are also seeking to balance the traditional and the modern. They 
lament the loss of traditions and food skills that is accompanying modernization and are 
motivated to preserve these. They are concerned about the marginalization of peasants in rural 
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China, and seek to re-connect rural and urban spaces. Linked to NGOs and globally-aware, 
they are deeply concerned about environmental issues and see organic production and 
traditional Chinese agriculture as paths forward. At the same time, they are focused on 
pragmatics of distributing quality food to a burgeoning middle class preoccupied with food 
safety. The farm operators, motivated in part by its profit potential, see direct food marketing, 
where consumers and producers can meet directly and build trust, as both  a helpful and 
opportunistic response.   
 
Yet the motives of this small group of innovators and entrepreneurs are not always 
matched by the middle class consumers they seek to engage. Food buyers and CSA members 
share the concern for food safety with the AFN initiators, and some also share the desire to re-
connect to traditions and to land. But these urban consumers are not particularly motivated by 
environmental concerns. Nor are they necessarily seeking relationships or re-connections with 
the peasantry. 
 
With this description of China’s mainstream food system, and the alternatives 
developing in response, I have described the context and set the stage for detailed analysis. The 
subsequent chapters explore how the pragmatics and ethics in these emerging AFNs are 
unfolding across four different dimensions. In each chapter, I draw on a different theoretical 
perspective to explore data from interviews, site visits, surveys and on-line posts in order to 
consider the ‘alternativeness’ of Chinese AFNs. Throughout, I try to take an approach that both 
celebrates and critiques these networks by considering the relevant themes from AFN 
scholarship while situating the analysis within the Chinese context. The next chapter first 
considers the economic relations of these AFNs and also serves to provide further background 
on China’s agrarian reform and modernization processes of the reform period. 
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4.0 The Diverse Economies of China’s AFNs 
 
Much of the news we receive about China focuses on its urban and industrial 
environments. Indeed, in 2011, a milestone was reached when the proportion of citizens in 
China’s cities reached 50% (Hsing, 2010). However, I begin my analysis of AFNs looking at 
agrarian change in rural China. This chapter, the first of four inter-related analyses that seek to 
understand China’s emerging AFNs, looks at the economic relations in these networks. I argue 
that these networks sit in a contradictory place where capitalist and ‘other-than-capitalist’ 
market forms interact. In these AFNs, peasant forms of agriculture exist alongside processes 
we can understand as “de-peasantization” as well as “re-peasantization” (van der Ploeg, 2007). 
To elaborate on this perspective, I begin with an overview of China’s agrarian reforms that 
have shaped AFNs. Here I focus on China’s hukou or dual citizenship system, the de-
collectivization of agriculture, land rights reform and resulting rural-urban inequities. My 
intent is to provide context, necessarily abridged, in which to situate AFNs and introduce three 
different groups of people entangled in the emergence of AFNs in peri-urban China:  urban 
residents, peasants and migrants. I describe how, while processes scholars consider to be de-
peasantization, or loss of self-provisioning economic forms, are underway in China, the unique 
approach to land ownership in China complicates and offers nuance to these processes. I then 
turn to AFNs in the global north and describe how scholars are using the concept of diverse 
and hybrid economies to explore AFNs. Here I expose a central tension in the scholarship that 
sees AFNs in a contradictory space between re-establishing historic agrarian relationships 
(what some refer to as re-peasantization) and becoming co-opted into capitalist space. In the 
last section of this chapter, I draw these two prior sections together and use the diverse 
economies framework (Gibson-Graham, 2006) to interrogate AFNs in China. Here I observe 
that while capitalist commodity relations are evident in these networks, and are perpetuated by 
consumers seeking better quality food for lower prices, we do not see the same path of de-
peasantization that is occurring in China’s dominant food economy. AFNs in China are 
characterized by economic diversity, wherein capitalist relations involving waged labour, 
financial investment and surplus extraction co-exist in exchange relations with peasant 
economies characterized by self-labour, self-provisioning, a focus on livelihoods, and attempts 
to empower the peasantry and build rural-urban connections. China’s commons approach to 
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land tenure features prominently in this analysis, as it has the effect of limiting scale and 
buffering against land consolidation. Rather than being ‘niche’ or ‘fringe’ markets, China’s 
small scale CSA farms are using personal guanxi networks to grow quickly and are 
‘normalized’ in a context where all farms are small. 
 
4.1 Agrarian Change in China 
The ‘reform period’ in China, as it is commonly referred to, began in 1978 when 
Chairman Mao’s former lieutenant Deng Xiaoping took over party leadership and began the 
process of ‘opening’ to global trade and foreign investment and the shift to a market economy, 
which brought with it a period of unprecedented economic growth and improvements to 
livelihoods in both urban and rural areas. In rural China for example, the number of people 
living in poverty has declined from 85 million in 1990 to 36 million in 2009 (Dunford & Li, 
2010). Yet at the same time, China has shifted from being considered one of the world’s most 
egalitarian societies, to one with a widening rural-urban income gap. According toWorld Bank 
(2012) statistics, at .47, China’s Gini coefficient of income inequalityis higher than that of the 
US at .41
14
. Indeed China’s opening and turn toward capitalism has led to questions about the 
fate of rural China and its peasants. 
 
Of course the story of China’s agrarian reform unfolds differently, depending on who 
is telling it (Zhang, 2006). Based on a ‘class-relations’ paradigm, which dominated official 
discourse and policy 1950s to 1970s, exploitation of China’s peasantry led to widespread 
rebellion. However, according to the ‘market school’ which has dominated discourse and 
policy since the early 1980s, Chinese peasants have always been driven by market incentives 
and profit. The reality is that while both rebellious and profit-seeking peasants have likely 
always existed, both movements have been idealized and the truth is that most were, and are 
still, ordinary farmers who are trying to survive under constantly changing, social, political, 
economic and ecological conditions (Zhang, 2006). No matter where one sits on the political 
spectrum, however, there is agreement that changes to China’s system of residency registration 
and land entitlements were transformative. 
                                                 
14
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of income or wealth. A value of 0 expresses total equality and a 
value of 1 maximal inequality,   (World Bank, 2012) 
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4.1.1 Hukou: Differential Citizenship 
During the Mao era, a household registration system or hukou in China divided the 
population into rural and urban citizens by classifying every individual as agricultural or non-
agricultural
15
 (Wang, 2010; Trichur, 2012). In this system, individuals were permitted to move 
‘downward’ to a smaller city, or a rural location, or horizontally to a different city or village of 
similar ‘level’, but not ‘upward’ or to a larger city (Wang, 2010). These restrictions effectively 
closed off the possibility of peasants leaving the countryside to pursue opportunities in urban 
areas as a path out of rural poverty often chosen in agrarian transitions around the world. The 
dual citizenship system persists today, although it has been relaxed. Despite a constitution that 
guarantees universal protection of all citizens, scholars understand hukou as a system of 
differential citizenship, where basic rights such as migration, choice of employment, access to 
education and health benefits are violated (Wang, 2010; Wu, 2010).  Wang (2010)  details how 
urban citizens have access to social benefits such as housing, medical care and public 
education but in comparison, in lieu of these benefits, rural citizens have the benefit of land 
rights. Further, in addition to perpetuating inequalities in terms of social benefits, scholars 
argue that the hukou system is also a tool for social control and is used to maintain lists of 
individuals considered to be threats to domestic ‘harmony’ (Wang, 2010).  
 
Today this dual citizenship system has been relaxed but not eliminated. Citizens are 
now permitted to move freely between and within rural and urban areas, but their citizenship 
and associated benefits and entitlements remain tied to their family’s origin as either urban or 
rural, making the reform period changes largely cosmetic (Wang, 2010). So, while peasants are 
‘free’ to move to urban areas to pursue employment or to establish businesses, they are not 
entitled to the same social benefits (e.g. education, medical care, basic income supports, etc.) as 
urban residents. Instead, their land rights in the countryside remain as their only form of social 
insurance. The hukou system in essence provides that an individual has access to land or social 
benefits - but never both. 
 
                                                 
15
 The hukou system is indeed much more complex and has multiple sub-categories based on the ‘level’ of city for 
example, but for my purpose here this broad differentiation of agricultural and non-agricultural suffices. See 
Wang (2010) for a more thorough discussion of China’s hukou system. 
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4.1.2 Land Reform: From Collective to Household Responsibility 
 While holding firm on the hukou system throughout the reform era, the Chinese 
state has been compelled by civil disobedience in rural areas to change its system of property 
entitlement or ‘land rights’. Collectivization during the Mao era meant that all land and rural 
production was owned by the state. This changed when groups of peasants, starting in Anhui, 
began selling their surplus production to support their livelihoods. The state, observing the 
‘experiment’ noted the increases in productivity when peasants had the incentive of a market, 
and the Mao-era ‘collective responsibility system’ was replaced with the ‘household 
responsibility system (HRS)’ (Whyte, 2010; Huang, 2011). 16   Initially the HRS awarded 
contracts to use land (but not private ownership) to rural households  for 15 years (starting in 
1984) and opened the door for farmers across the country to sell surplus production. 
17
 These 
contracts were later extended in 1993 for 30 years, and then extended  through the Land 
Administration act in 1998 for another 30 years, suggesting that the state has no immediate 
intention to either re-collectivize or privatize land (Whyte, 2010, p. 11). 
 
4.1.3 Peasant and Capitalist Relations 
This change from collective to household production opened the road to agrarian 
capitalist relations and scholars have been exploring how these relations are evolving in the 
unique context of China’s commons approach to land, and how China’s historic peasant form 
of agriculture is being transformed (Huang, 2011; Zhang & Donaldson, 2010). Traditional 
marketing channels through specialty wholesale markets and wet markets, while still a 
significant part of the transitioning food system, are decreasing (Huang, 2011). In their place, 
there is a trend toward consolidated food chains, organized through contracts to farmers with a 
wide variety of enterprises, retailers and dragon head firms (Huang, 2011). This reveals a 
contradictory landscape where the household remains the unit of production (since land cannot 
                                                 
16
 Scholars have observed that this astounding reversal of fundamental policy came about neither through a change 
in government nor through violence.  Rather authorities responded to the “everyday politics” of resistance 
(Kervliet, 2009, p. 231) where farmers pursued their entitlements by drawing on existing state rhetoric and rules. 
This type of resistance is a theme I return to in Chapter 7.  
17
 In general this was the case, although there were exceptions.  For example, in some cases villages refused to 
divide the land and continued to farm it collectively,  and state-operated farms continue to exist for example.  See 
Whyte (2010) and Wright (2013). 
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be consolidated) and, through complex systems of contracting, peasants are moving to 
commoditized food relations and away from self-provisioning (Huang, 2011). 
    
This shift from collective to individual responsibility, propelled by the state’s 
promotion of industrialized agriculture resulted in huge agricultural productivity gains in the 
early reform period (Carter, Zhong & Zhu, 2012), which came at the price of widespread 
ecological degradation (as will be highlighted in the next chapter). This increase in production, 
coupled with off-farm incomes that peasants were now free to pursue, lifted peasant incomes 
by over 30% between 1984 and 1998 and the HRS has been described as a key mechanism in 
bringing millions of poor smallholders out of poverty (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). Under the 
HRS, urban land remains owned by the state but rural land is owned by village collectives. 
These collectives in turn award land use rights, along with the right to transfer or lease the 
land, but not sell the land, to peasant households based on the number of family members. 
However, the central government is able to use a variety of tax levers and a system of 
evaluating the local cadres to influence the local governments’ decisions on land entitlement 
(Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). Legally, land usage rights apply equally to men and women. 
However when women marry, their usage rights become linked to the husband’s family. In the 
event of a divorce, women typically lose land access in the husband’s village, and often are not 
able to regain their natal rights in their family village (Jacka, 2012).   
 
4.1.4 Complicating ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ 
 ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ refers to the process by which wealth is 
concentrated in the hands of a few by dispossessing people of their land and other assets under 
capitalist systems (Harvey, 2004). There is conflicting evidence about whether this 
dispossession is underway in China (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). Arguing that China’s land 
entitlement system contributes to peasant dispossession, Le Mons Walker (2008) notes that 
industrialization and urbanization occurring in the last 30 years, despite state policy awarding 
land use rights for 30 years, have resulted in widespread conversion by the state of rural land 
for non-agricultural use, particularly in suburbs of rapidly growing cities and the coastal areas. 
In what could be considered domestic land grabbing, or dispossession by the state, farmers are 
only compensated based on the value of their most recent agricultural output when the state 
59 
 
expropriates their land. She describes the scale of this expropriation and notes that between 
2002 and 2005 rural collective protests and insurgency became an everyday part of peasant 
politics and estimates that 60 million peasants have had their land seized between 1996 and 
2008 (Le Mons Walker, 2008). Recently updated figures, suggest that if the state appropriation 
processes continue, there could be 140 million peasants landless by 2030 (Sargeson, 2013). 
 
On the other hand, Zhang & Donaldson (2008) argue that these protests against land 
seizures demonstrate that to Chinese peasants, collective land ownership is an important 
bargaining chip for use in negotiating with expanding agri-business firms. They illustrate how 
peasant farmers in China have many choices with regard to how they structure the use of their 
land rights, ranging from what could be considered ‘semi-proletarian’ to ‘full proletarian’ 
status (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). Farmers can retain their land use rights and choose to farm 
their own land with family based labour or hired labour. Or a farmer can lease land use rights 
to a company or cooperative intending to farm the land in exchange for a waged position on the 
same or other land. Alternatively, the farmer could ‘sub-lease’ their land rights to someone else 
(such as one of the urban CSA farmers interviewed in this research) and then seek employment 
outside of agriculture. Or the household could give up their land rights and establish residency 
elsewhere and make their way in a waged economy. These options for peasants persist because 
land is not privatized. The existence of these choices for peasants in China leads scholars to 
suggest that the classic form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is not occurring (Trichur, 
2012).  
 
4.1.5 China’s ‘Floating’ Population and Urban-Rural Inequities 
Relaxing citizenship restrictions combined with the freedom to pursue income from 
off-farm sources has resulted in vast rural to urban migration in China. However, continuing to 
link social benefits to hukou status has meant that rural residents pursuing urban livelihoods 
have become a marginalized class. They have abandoned the possibility of earning a livelihood 
from land, to which they have rights, but have no social safety net in the urban area where they 
have chosen to live. The size of this ‘floating population’ is tough to pin down of course, since 
it is a state of constant flux, but most recent estimates suggest between 140 - 250 million 
people are living in a grey and vulnerable area ‘in between’ rural and urban status, occupying 
60 
 
30% or more of the population in an average large city at any point in time and leaving the 
countryside populated primarily by grandparents and children (Whyte, 2010). As might be 
anticipated, early in the reform era this group of migrants took the jobs that most urban 
residents eschewed, but as urban residents were laid off from formerly protected jobs in the 
1980s and 1990s, migrants were increasingly seen as a threat. As a result, most large cities 
further contributed to migrant marginalization by passing regulations which prohibited 
peasants coming to the city from various occupations (Whyte, 2010). This marginalization fits 
within a set of persistent social attitudes (discussed further in Chapter 6) in which urban 
residents are considered to be of higher quality, or suzhi, than rural residents (Anagnost, 2004). 
This suzhi narrative makes the urban look more attractive to rural residents and further 
perpetuates migration. In this privileging the urban, villages have been emptied of young 
people and men. It has been estimated that approximately 58 million children, 47 million 
wives, and 45 million elderly have been left behind in rural communities by migrating family 
members (Ye, Wang, Wu, He & Liu, 2013).   
 
However, the future of China’s ‘floating population’ is far from determined. Indeed 
rural areas also benefit from migration through remittances that are sent back to families and 
skill acquisition, such as construction trades, that is carried home when migrants return to their 
farms (Van der Ploeg et al., 2014). Since rural to urban migrants in China still possess land 
rights and often families in the countryside, this is not a simple “brain drain” (Whyte, 2010, p. 
363). Rather there is also an influx of skills and resources to rural economies. Unlike landless 
migrants that characterize slums in many developing countries, in China these migrants have 
land rights. Displacement is not dispossession and there is a difference between permanent 
migrants to urban areas and temporary migrants. The majority of China’s migrants retain land 
use rights in their home villages. So while statistics estimate the ‘floating population’, only 
time will tell where these families choose to take up permanent residence. Based on research in 
Heibei Province, van der Ploeg et al (2014) observe that migrant labourers seem to be returning 
to their home villages at younger ages, noting that 5% of men under 30 years old and 30% of 
men between 30 and 40 years have recently returned to farming as their livelihood. 
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4.1.6 Addressing Inequities: ‘New Socialist Countryside’ Policies 
While Deng Xiaoping’s call to “let some people and some regions get rich first” 
started the reform period three decades ago, we may now be seeing the latter part of that same 
slogan “to eventually achieve common prosperity” being put into action (Yeh, Xu & Liu, 
2011). Responding to growing rural-urban inequities and under the slogans of building a 
‘Harmonious Society’ and a ‘New Socialist Countryside’, China’s eleventh Five-Year Plan, 
announced in 2006, launched policies to place rural initiatives more prominently in the 
modernization agenda. Under this initiative, rural policies focused on building new 
infrastructure and social services and included phasing out agricultural land tax, supports for 
rural schooling, introduction cooperative medical insurance systems in rural areas, a minimum 
income subsidy program
18
 and some modest old-age payments to rural parents without children 
(Wang, 2007; Wang, 2010). The state also eased regulations to give migrants better access to 
some benefits, and opened up the possibilities, with some restrictions, to change hukou status 
(Wang, 2010). These progressive trends seem to be continuing, and analysts suggest China’s 
most recent Five-Year Plan, endorsed in 2011, signals the state may be centring social 
harmony over growth (KPMG, 2011). Introducing the concept of ‘inclusive growth’, Wen 
Jiabao noted in his February 2011 speech, “We should not only make the cake of social wealth 
as big as possible, but also distribute the cake in a fair way and let everyone enjoy the fruits of 
reform and opening up” (KPMG, 2011, p. 2). Features of addressing wealth disparity include 
targets to increase social housing, high school completion and minimum wage, in addition to a 
host of environmental programs. Yet leftist intellectuals in China are not hopeful, and note that 
these changes are premised on consumption and market-driven growth and further urbanization 
(Yeh et al., 2011) and argue that the state’s New Socialist Countryside recalls the propaganda 
of the Mao era (Perry, 2008). 
4.1.7 Commons Land and Capital Penetration as a Context for AFNs 
This description of agrarian change in China’s reform period has argued that China’s 
commons approach to land ownership presents fundamentally different context for the 
emergence of AFNs compared to the global north. Urban land is owned by the state and in 
                                                 
18
This program to a degree mirrored in rural areas the ‘diabao’ or minimum income program in the urban areas.  
For a thorough discussion see  Wang (2007).   
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rural areas land is owned by village collectives. Recalling the story of the Mandate of Heaven 
presented at the outset of this dissertation, scholars argue that such unfolding of land reform in 
China has not been a straightforward ‘accumulation by dispossession’ characteristic throughout 
most of the global south. The situation is more nuanced, with some arguing that the HRS 
system, as a response to popular demands from peasants, is an example of retaining legitimacy 
to govern through a strong commitment to ensuring livelihoods (Trichur, 2012). The Chinese 
context is further complicated by the separation of land entitlement (HRS) from citizenship 
status (hukou). Despite a commons approach to land, however, scholars have described how 
capital is penetrating the countryside and forms of agrarian capitalism and de-peasantization 
are underway. The result is a system of three social classes emerging in China’s reform period. 
Peasants or village residents enjoy land use rights but not the same social benefits as urban 
residents and have a range of possibilities for ‘feeding into’ a still modernizing food system. 
This change from collective to household production has opened the road to agrarian capitalist 
relations and a de-peasantization process is gradually unfolding. Meanwhile, urban residents 
who are entitled to social benefits but have no entitlement to land are facing increasing 
distancing from their food and rising food prices that accompany modernizing system. Finally, 
a vast group of migrants, who have temporarily or permanently relinquished land use rights 
and are seeking urban employment, are marginalized in cities without any of the benefits of 
urban citizenship. As I illustrate below, China’s AFNs weave together these different groups 
into diverse economic relations. Before moving to those findings, I introduce how the concept 
of diverse and hybrid economic relations, and re-peasantization have been drawn into AFN 
scholarship in the global north. 
 
4.2 AFNs in the Global North: Resistance or Futility?  
The above section looked at the relatively new penetration of capital into rural China 
and its effects on the self-provisioning subsistence farming of peasants. In the more neoliberal 
global north, the ability of AFNs to survive this penetration has been debated long and hard. 
Recently, rather than trying to argue that AFNs offer ‘alternatives’ to capitalist food relations, 
scholars have been theorizing about the existence of hybrid and diverse economic systems as 
better ways of explaining AFNs. This section briefly summarizes the position of AFNs as ‘in 
and against’ the market, where the negative impacts of capitalist markets on people and nature  
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are challenged through markets for high value products (Raynolds, 2000). These tactics have 
been a focus of debate, with scholars noting that even the smallest initiatives, like CSAs, are 
increasingly demonstrating capitalist relations with waged labour and commoditised food 
relations. Next I move beyond this critique to describe how another group of scholars 
understands AFNs as hybrid economic approaches that embrace both capitalist and non-
capitalist relations to demonstrate ‘another world is possible’. My purpose in this section is to 
introduce how the ‘diverse economies’ approach has been pursued by AFN scholars before 
using it to interrogate Chinese AFNs. 
 
4.2.1 Resistance is Futile 
Scholars have drawn on diverse examples to argue that as long as AFNs remain 
based in market rules they will not escape capitalist relations (Guthman, 2008). Even among 
what is considered the ‘most alternative of the alternatives’ with its risk-sharing approach and 
non-commodified food relations, scholars argue the CSA is increasingly becoming influenced 
by capitalist relations and losing its ‘alternativeness’. From this perspective, CSAs are 
diverting from their original model and members are increasingly referred to as ‘customers’ or 
‘shoppers’, who make choices from available options (Brown & Miller, 2008; DeLind, 2003; 
DeLind & Bingen, 2008) . The case of the Riverford CSA in England is frequently referenced 
in this regard, as a CSA that over time has followed a path of commodifying food relations to 
the point where it now takes the form of a consolidated firm that operates in competition with 
smaller growers (Clarke, Bloke, Barnett & Malpass, 2008). Instead of trying to maintain such 
alternatives as market-based activities, this critique advocates a focus on the redevelopment of 
a strong state that is willing to develop and enforce not only food-related policies, but also 
policies that address historical marginalization that plagues AFNs
19
. Julie Guthman is best 
known of this group of scholars for her perspective on ‘neoliberal subjectivities’ that lock us 
into capitalist relations. She explains that: “material neoliberalizations are inextricably bound 
with the production of neoliberal ‘mentalities of rule’ – specifically attempts to enforce market 
logics, to create conditions in which competition can flourish, to shift caring responsibilities 
from the public sphere (welfare) to personal spaces (self-help) and to depoliticize (or render 
futile) various social struggles over resources and rights” (Guthman 2008, p. 1243). 
                                                 
19
 This ‘social justice critique’ of AFNs is picked up in Chapter 6. 
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Increasingly however, these arguments are being met by the ‘other worlds are possible’ 
perspective.  
 
4.2.2 Other Worlds are Possible 
Rather than dismissing market-based alternatives as inevitably co-opted by 
mainstream pressures, some scholars are drawing on post-capitalist theories to help us think 
through different possibilities (Fuller, Jonas & Lee, 2010; Harcourt, 2013; Leyshon & Lee, 
2003; McKinnon, 2010). These views suggest that conventional, mainstream food systems 
(and indeed capitalism in general) are not totalizing, and our assumptions about ‘the market’ 
need to be questioned (Dixon, 2011; Tregear, 2011). In challenging the view of a hegemonic 
capitalist market that is destined to co-opt any alternative, these scholars see AFNs as 
“openings and possibilities” for “other-than-capitalist” ethics (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. xxvi). 
This growing discourse sees AFNs as diverse forms of economic relations that may include, 
but not be limited by, capitalist forms (Cameron, 2010; Cameron & Gordon, 2010). These 
scholars argue that bifurcated or ‘all or none’ thinking, where AFNs are seen as in opposition 
to, and thus often co-opted by, capitalist relations can overlook economic entanglements, 
diversity and hybridity (Holloway et al., 2007; Jarosz, 2008). AFNs may well demonstrate 
capitalist market relations, but these relations are not necessarily dominant or exclusive. There 
is growing recognition in AFN scholarship that small-scale ‘niche’ firms and farms seldom 
operate independently from the wider food system in which they are situated (Andree et al., 
2010; Fickey, 2011; Galt, 2013; Maye & Ilbery, 2006; Sonnino & Marsden, 2006). Rather, 
researchers have described the ways in which these AFNs frequently embrace both alternative 
and mainstream sales or input channels simultaneously (Ilbery & Maye, 2005; Ilbery, 
Courtney, Kirwan & Maye, 2010). 
 
4.2.3 Diverse Economies 
Following from the above examples, some AFN scholars have turned to Gibson-
Graham’s diverse economies framework as a way of understanding how AFNs create and use 
hybrid economic strategies (Dixon, 2011; Fuller et al., 2010; Harris, 2009; Jones et al., 2010; 
Little et al., 2010; Wilson, 2013). For Gibson-Graham (2008), alterity is seen as a matter of 
degree. This view understands AFNs to be in a state of incomplete transition or always in 
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development. Instead of reductive questions that try to evaluate alternatives against a dominant 
economic type (like capitalist), they would have us look for how alternative economic relations 
are being built and strengthened. A range of AFN types have been unpacked using the diverse 
economies approach. Little et al. (2010) draw on this perspective to analyze buying clubs and 
conclude they can be seen as a “microcosm of the ‘diverse economy’ …encompassing both 
corporate and not-for-profit, waged labour and payment-in-kind, and personal and 
communitarian gain” (p. 1802). Harris (2009) has used the diverse economies framework to 
offer an alternative reading of the ‘100 mile diet’ as a case study, and suggests that the 
“tendency to read neoliberal logics and subjectivities in AFN initiatives might inadvertently be 
closing down possibilities for constructive socio-environmental change in and through food 
networks” (p. 55). The possibilities Harris refers to have been explored by Galt’s (2013) 
extensive CSA research, in which he documents ‘other-than-capitalist’ relations such as 
farmers focusing on livelihood goals versus higher profits, or self investment versus distant 
shareholders. He clarifies that of course CSA shares have an exchange value which can be 
considered as a commoditized relation, but this alone should not lead us to characterise them as 
‘capitalist’. He explains that all commercial activities (selling food) are not necessarily 
capitalist activities, and research on mainstreaming of alternatives has at times confounded this 
difference. Indeed as Fickey (2011) so aptly notes, surely the “focus has to be on helping 
people make a living” (p. 237).  
 
4.2.4 Re-Peasantization 
Scholars have been suggesting these diverse economic forms might be considered as 
ruptures in trends to modernize farming and the re-emergence of the peasantry or ‘re-
peasantization’ in both developed and developing countries (van der Ploeg, 2008; van der 
Ploeg, Ye & Schneider, 2010). In this way, AFNs are seen as new peasant networks that are 
potential paths to finding local food systems that are economically, ecologically and socially 
sustainable. Van der Ploeg (2008, 2010) has been at the forefront of describing processes 
whereby land is considered as ecological capital, and commodity relations are part of a set of 
balances between human actors and living nature. He notes that, whereas in the past peasants 
were “obliged” (2010, p. 5) to use their land ecologically because there was no alternative, 
today’s new peasants have other alternatives available to them, with some of them choosing to 
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‘re-ground’ the farm on ecological principles. His analysis points to smaller scaled farms that 
resist scale enlargement, specialization, genetically modified technologies, state regulatory 
schemes and externally sourced inputs, and that are generating in many cases higher incomes 
than entrepreneurial and capitalist approaches of similar scale (Oostindie, van der Ploeg & 
Renting, 2002). Using the European IMPACT
20
 research program as an example, Van der 
Ploeg et al. (2010) note that “60% of professional farmers are actively engaged in cost-
reduction through greater self-provisioning, which contributed at least 5.7 billion Euros per 
year to the agrarian incomes realized in these countries” (p. 7). The process of re-
peasantization centres on the “sometimes contradictory re-adjustment of the balance between 
commodity and non-commodity relations, in which specific forms of de-commoditisation play 
a key role” (2010, p. 3). This balance takes the form of ‘self-provisioning’ where inputs and 
material resources are decommodified and either produced on the farm itself, or through 
community based co-operation and exchange processes with similar farms. Re-peasantization 
is about building multifuncationality into farms. In AFNs, we see this expressed in many ways 
as farmers add both non-agricultural activities (e.g. agro-tourism, handicrafts) and/or add value 
to farm products (e.g. on-farm processing, direct-selling) to their operations. These activities 
allow new peasants to continue to reproduce their existence in resilient ways, resist capitalism 
and interact with the market as an opportunity not an imperative.  
 
 
4.2.5 Reading for Difference not Dominance 
This discussion highlights how, following emerging thinking on post-capitalist 
diverse economies and ‘new peasantries’, scholars are challenging the idea that AFNs exist in a 
bifurcated alternative-dominant set of relations. Empirical research (Cameron, 2010; Dixon, 
2011; Harris, 2009; Jones et al., 2010; Little et al., 2010; Wilson, 2013) reveals that AFNs 
demonstrate hybrid relations, where capitalist and non-capitalist processes are entangled, and 
where markets present opportunities to reproduce the peasantry rather than eliminate it. In all 
these examples scholars argue that the economics of these AFNs or new peasantries cannot be 
‘simply’ reduced to capitalist relations that rely on commoditized production, waged labour 
                                                 
20
 The IMPACT project covered Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands, France, Spain and Italy.  For further details see 
Oostindie et al. (2002). 
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and extracting surplus. Instead, there is a diversity of relations that include self-provisioning, 
barter, and investing surplus in ecological production. Understanding AFN economies as 
diverse, this perspective complicates Marxist theories of capitalist development and challenges 
the view of capitalism as a totalising concept that subjugates all other economic forms 
(Gibson-Graham, 1996; Gibson-Graham, 2006). Further, these scholars argue that these 
diverse and other-than-capitalist relations are not insignificant. Indeed, they are widely 
prevalent. However, as Harris (2009) illustrates, we typically overlook them. Seeing the 
‘politics of the possible’ is a central problematic in AFN research. A growing scholarship on 
diverse economies offers a way of revealing these possibilities by “reading for difference rather 
than dominance” (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. 54). In this Chapter’s final section, the framework 
for doing this is explained and then used to look at economic relations in China’s AFNs. 
 
 
4.3 Diverse Economies of China’s AFNs 
As illustrated above, AFNs in the global north are demonstrating diverse economic 
relations, wherein people are able to earn a living without being purely subject to  capitalist 
relations. Following this reasoning, I turn to China’s emerging AFNs and ask, to what extent 
are these AFNs using logic other than capitalism to perform the economy otherwise? (Gibson-
Graham, 2001). Using the diverse economies framework, I consider the ways in which land 
tenure (e.g. private, state managed, open access or commons), enterprise type (e.g. capitalist, 
alternative capitalist or non-capitalist), market transactions (e.g. commodified, fair trade,  
barter, self provisioning), labour relations (e.g. waged, barter, self-employed, unpaid) and 
financing are demonstrated in these networks.   
 
The diverse economies framework is grounded in the view that capitalism is not all-
encompassing (Gibson-Graham, 2006). By unpacking the economic relations in detail, the 
diverse economies framework helps to dissolve the meta-narrative of capitalism that can mask 
heterogeneous economic relations. Gibson-Graham (2001) de-essentializes the idea of 
capitalism by likening the economy to an iceberg (see Figure 5). The part of the iceberg in 
view to us, above the water, is what we typically consider as ‘the economy’. However, there 
are diverse other economic activities which we do not often immediately consider when we 
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research economic relations. The activities and relations below the waterline are generally 
hidden from our view, but yet the capitalist economy, depicted as the tip of the iceberg, 
depends on these to function. For Gibson-Graham, the other-than-capitalist relations below the 
waterline are not an ‘alternative’ economy situated in opposition to the capitalist one. Rather, 
the iceberg reveals there are many types of economic relations and they can be packaged 
together to create diverse and hybrid forms. This perspective argues that criticisms of AFNs 
that see them becoming ‘mainstreamed’ and ‘co-opted’, draw on a limited view of the 
economy as the relations above the waterline. A broader view is necessary if we want to 
unpack economic relations in AFNs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Economy as an Iceberg 
Source: Gibson-Graham, 2001  
 
Another, perhaps more academic way of seeing these diverse economic relations is 
through the diverse economies framework presented in Figure 6 (Gibson-Graham, 2005). This 
framework offers an approach to thinking about economies broadly, as exchanges of goods and 
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services to meet needs and demands. It shows the dominant capitalist relations (or the tip of the 
iceberg) along the top row. This row includes goods and services transacted through the market 
by capitalist firms who use private property, investments and waged labour to produce and 
accumulate surplus. However, the figure also shows how the relations we typically consider as 
‘the economy’ are joined with all other-than-capitalist forms that sustain wellbeing, or the rest 
of the iceberg. The figure is organized by five characteristics or aspects of economic relations: 
remuneration of labour, transactions of goods and services, property relations, enterprise type 
(how surplus is appropriated and distributed) and finance. Using these dimensions, the 
framework can be a tool for revealing the contribution of economic relations that remain 
hidden when we only look with ‘capitalocentric’ eyes. In effect, capitalist activity is “knocked 
off its perch” (Gibson-Graham, 2005, p. 13) when we consider this diversity. 
 
 
Figure 6: Diverse Economies Framework  
Source: Gibson-Graham, 2001, 2005, 2006 
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4.3.1  Evidence of Entrepreneurial and Consumerist Ethics  
The AFNs I explored in China can be characterized as pragmatic and instrumental, 
driven by entrepreneurial ethics and a middle class pursuit of food quality, and supported by 
peasant labour. They have been established primarily by young urban residents who recognize 
the opportunities in an emerging market economy. These operators display a strong 
entrepreneurial spirit, encouraged in China’s new market economy, with its emphasis on 
urbanization and consumerism. In a comment typical of the CSAs I interviewed, one operator 
noted he chose the CSA approach because it is, “an easier way to market and with a better 
return than selling to a supermarket” (FCSAIB1). This frankness appears in contrast to the 
original conception of CSAs in the global north, where they were established as a way of 
resisting capitalist relations by de-commoditizing food and de-linking the cost of food from 
market-based commodity pricing (Janssen, 2010). As in the global north, China’s CSAs can be 
understood as responding to consumer demands for convenience and choice. They are evolving 
in instrumental fashion as a response to the emergence of a new middle class and an increased 
demand for high quality and safe food (Shi et al., 2011). To illustrate, on most of the CSAs I 
visited, there was limited ‘risk sharing’ between consumers and operators of CSAs. Indeed, 
only two CSAs asked members to share risk with the operators through up-front payment, and 
both of these had strong links with NGOs and academic communities, and would be considered 
‘not-for-profit’ operations. All the other CSAs, established more pragmatic payment schemes, 
typically selling goods on a week to week basis, with no requirement for pre-purchase. Other 
characteristics further suggest that Chinese CSAs demonstrate capitalist subjectivities of price 
and convenience. For example, convenient drop locations or home deliveries are the norm, so 
members are not required to make long trips to the farms. In summary, the initial picture that 
comes into focus is one of consumerism, choice and convenience, or what some global north 
scholars have described as neoliberal subjectivities and mainstreaming of alternatives (Allen & 
Guthman, 2006; Guthman, 2008).  
 
The labour relations on these farms offer further evidence for this ‘mainstreaming’ 
perspective that sees China’s CSAs operating under neoliberal subjectivities. CSAs are 
employing (in contrast with global north CSAs) large numbers of peasant workers. Indeed, as a 
CSA operator, it was incredulous to see the numbers of workers on Chinese CSAs the same 
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size as my own farm. On average, CSA farms I studied employed 2 workers per acre, in 
addition to non-waged family members (see Table 4, p. 56). However, few CSA operators 
involve members, labourers or other volunteers in the organization and planning of the farm. 
There is a clear separation of management and labour functions with no ethos of worker 
participation in farm decision-making and governance. China’s CSA operators shape the 
conditions of employment of peasant workers, believing the waged peasants are ignorant of 
organic farming techniques (discussed further in Chapter 5). This contrasts to CSAs in the 
global north where alternatively waged arrangements like self-provisioning, work shares and 
internships are common, and these individuals are, at least to some extent, involved in farm 
decisions (Cameron, 2010; Cameron & Gordon, 2010). In China, the way the term ‘work 
share’ has been adopted is revealing. In the global north, a work share refers to a member who 
contributes to the overall production on the farm as part of the farm’s labour pool, and receives 
an allocated share of food in exchange (Cameron, 2010). In China, the use of the term reflects a 
more individualist approach, where consumers rent land on the farm, and (to various degrees) 
participate in, and oversee, the production of vegetables for themselves (Chen, 2013a). (These 
work shares or ‘weekend farmers’ on China’s CSAs are discussed further in Chapter 6.)  
 
In conclusion, while the operators of many of the CSA farms I visited referred to 
themselves as ‘new peasants’, a first look at their capitalist style market transactions and labour 
relations, suggest they are better considered as examples of entrepreneurialism rather than 
peasant ethics. However, looking beneath the surface to the parts of the iceberg below the 
waterline using Gibson-Graham’s framework reveals a different picture. Concern with 
economic viability does not preclude or necessarily eclipse other motives and China’s AFNs 
are far from homogenous. The strength of using the diverse economies framework as a lens is 
that it prompts analyses that consider multiple dimensions of economic activity.  
 
 
4.3.2 Stories of Economic Diversity 
The following series of narratives and the summary in Figure 7, reveal the economic 
diversity in these AFNs, made possible by China’s unique hukou approach to citizenship and 
common pool land resources. The stories illustrate a persistence of the peasantry, a process of 
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de-peasantization that mirrors relations in the mainstream agrarian system, as well as processes 
of re-peasantization all occurring simultaneously in these economically diverse AFNs.  
 
 
Farm 
Narratives 
Enterprise 
Type  
 
Market 
Transactions 
 
Labour 
Relations 
 
Land 
Relations 
 
Financing  
Peasant Farm Non-
capitalist, any 
‘surplus’ is 
reinvested 
into the farm 
Self-
provisioning, 
and sell the 
extra 
Self and 
family 
labour 
Commons 
– holds 
right to the 
land 
Self-financed 
Not-for-Profit 
Farm 
Non-capitalist 
– structured 
as not for 
profit 
Shared risk Waged, 
barter, 
interns 
Leased 
land 
From shares, 
with 
NGO/academic 
support 
Entrepreneurial 
Farm 
Alternative 
capitalist – 
surplus is 
reinvested 
Commoditised, 
no shared risk 
Waged 
labour 
Leased 
land and 
labour as a 
“package 
deal” 
Self-financed 
Capitalist Farm Capitalist – 
surplus is 
extracted as 
profit for 
shareholders 
Commoditised, 
no shared risk 
Waged 
labour and 
contract 
farming 
Leased 
land  
Shareholders 
and investors 
Re-
Peasantization 
Farm 
Alternative 
Capitalist – 
surplus is 
shared by 
parties 
Shared Risk Mix of 
family and 
self-labour, 
interns and 
waged 
labour 
Peasant 
farmer 
holds right 
to the land 
From shares 
sold 
 
Figure 7: Diverse Economic Relations in China’s AFNs 
Source: this author 
 
Peasant CSA Farm (FCSAB7): This is a CSA farm on 2 acres of land located 
outside of Beijing. The operator is a young woman whose family has always farmed this land, 
for which she holds land use rights. She works in the field herself and occasionally other 
family members assist her. The farm is her only source of income. Her family consumes what 
she grows and she sells the excess to 50 CSA members as well as to the Beijing Organic 
Farmers market. She grows a variety of vegetables, some fruits, and raises a few laying hens 
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for eggs. I met her at the Beijing Farmers market, at a group meeting which several farmers’ 
market producers attended, as well as at the 4
th
 annual CSA Conference in Beijing in 2012 
where I interviewed her. She told me that she knows she could seek other work in Beijing as 
her farm is very close to the city, but that she believes there is honour in growing food. She 
became concerned about high chemical use on her farm in the 1980s and worried about her 
health, and made the decision to return to more traditional approaches and stop using synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides. She is frustrated by consumers who are motivated only by price. She 
said she is looking for “high quality” consumers and that it has been difficult for her to 
establish regular members. She only accepts annual shareholders so people can understand the 
limitations of the seasons. She is grateful to the farmers’ market because they sought her out 
and have helped her to bring some of her vegetables to the market for sale. At a meeting 
organized by the Beijing farmers’ market coordinator, she showed her frustration with 
consumers who are focused on price and engaged in debate with people who were lamenting 
the rising cost of vegetables.   
Not-for-profit Farm (FCSAB4): This farm is one of the larger CSAs I visited, and 
perhaps the best known CSA in China. Located in a Beijing suburb, the farm was started in 
2008 by a Chinese doctoral student in agricultural economics, who had been associated with 
the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) and spent six months an a CSA farm in 
the US. She brought the idea of starting a CSA back to China and with university support, 
began this CSA as a not-for-profit model farm. Supported by a university and municipality, the 
farm operates as a hybrid between public and private realms. The university arranged for land 
access and provides some funding for the management and operation of the farm. This 
academic support gives the CSA credibility and important connections or ‘guanxi’. The farm is 
strongly committed to member involvement and their CSA shares operate on a “shared risk” 
basis. They offer internships to university students as a form of barter in addition to having 
waged labourers. They have some migrant labourers from rural areas, as well as volunteers and 
try to involve workers in decision making. Their university support allows them to take on a 
strong educational role with other farms in the network and they host events and actively share 
resources via the internet and have a strong media presence. Their network relations extend to 
the local government, which originally provided some financial support as well as helping 
them to access over 50 acres of land. They are frequently highlighted in the local and national 
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media and their networks have helped them grow very fast. They started with 17 families in 
2008, and today offer 200 shares, and have over 800 families in their network. In 2011 they 
were awarded the ‘Constructing a New Socialist Countryside Innovation Award’ for their work 
in linking urban and rural communities.  
 
Just prior to my interviews with them in spring 2012, the person who initiated the 
farm left to start a new type of CSA (FCSAB6 described below). She felt that the first CSA had 
taken on a “corporate structure” and was differing form the original egalitarian working 
structure she envisioned. She explained to me that this first CSA had moved from a “producer-
centred to consumer-centred structure” and was neglecting the empowerment of farmers.  
 
New Peasants (FCSAB5): This farm was initiated by a young urban Buddhist couple 
motivated by both a concern for the environment as well as the “market opportunity”. 
Referring to themselves as “new peasants” they favour a small scale of production as well as a 
desire to re-learn traditional practices. They negotiated with the local village for both land and 
labour in a “package deal”. They are uncertain whether they should call themselves a “CSA”. 
While they have an established list of members who purchase food weekly, they do not expect 
these buyers to share production risk. Peasants working on the farm draw a wage. The 
operators draw wages, and surplus is reinvested in the farm. The operators coordinate the work 
of the farm, but the manual labour is performed primarily by peasant workers who live adjacent 
to the farm. The farm is “organic in transition”. They do not use chemical fertilizers or GMO 
seeds. Nor do they control pests by natural means, such as introducing beneficial insects. On 
their website, in reference to their agronomic practices, they describe themselves as a “truly 
harmonious farm”. They have a greenhouse for extending the season. They produce a wide 
range of vegetables as well as strawberries and also mushrooms. They have a small store for 
their own products as well as natural and personal care products from other small-scale 
producers. They make extensive use of the internet for promotion, sending weekly updates to 
their members with details of what is available. Members can select items from a list and pay 
‘a la carte’, or they can choose a “random selection” for weekly delivery. Either the farmers 
strongly encourage their buyers to come see the farm, or they set aside particular days for tours.  
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Capitalist Farm (FB1): This farm is best described as a dairy that contracts with 
“several farmers” and processes organic milk for sale through an on-line system. They sell at 
the Beijing farmers market, which is where I met the operator initially, and also offer weekly 
deliveries of fresh organic milk and yogurt. I spoke with the owner a second time at the 4
th
 
annual CSA Conference in Beijing in 2012. Beginning with funds from private investors, the 
company’s production has expanded beyond the household level. They milk 200 cows from 
their own organic farm and also have contract relations with several smaller farms for some of 
their milk. He considered their production capacity to be limited, but expanding. At present he 
noted they can only supply dairy products to 4,000 – 5,000 households. They are the only 
certified organic dairy in Beijing. They sell primarily through “high-end” retailers and through 
websites. They had just begun selling at the Beijing organic farmers’ market and were pleased 
with the response. There are a number of stories about them in the Chinese press. One China 
Daily report (July 3, 2013) pegs their business at US $226 million and a retail network 
spanning 260 cities.  
 
Re-Peasantization (FCSAB6): This is one of the newer farms in the AFNs I studied. 
It operates with the goal of re-building traditional peasant agriculture and re-establishing trust 
between urban consumers and peasant farmers in China’s peri-urban areas. The first season on 
this farm coincided with my first visit in spring 2012. The urban operators began the project by 
approaching a peasant farmer outside of Beijing with the idea of starting an ecological CSA as 
a way of establishing links between urban consumers and peasant farmers. Instead of renting 
land from the village as other urban-operated CSAs do, these operators live in the village with 
the peasant farmer and take on the role of “brokers”, selling shares and coordinating the CSA. 
Members share risk by paying up front. Instead of a waged labour arrangement, the urban 
operators share proceeds with the peasant farmer, and guarantee that as a minimum, they will 
match the amount of money he was making previously in conventional vegetable production. 
In the first 6 months, these urban operators sold 300 CSA shares by using their “networks” 
(guanxi), demonstrating a new viable model to the peasants and the village, and making it 
possible to expand operations to a second site. Their long term goal is for the village peasants 
to take the model over once trust has been re-established with members. The urban operators 
plan to then replicate the model in other villages and in this way they are trying to create spaces 
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of empowerment for peasant farmers with the goal that eventually the peasant farmers will 
assume operation of the CSA. The project makes extensive use of the internet, and has recently 
launched websites in both English and Chinese. They describe the project as a “public-
interested, service-oriented social enterprise started by a group of young people”. They sell 
CSA shares, as well as sales to local restaurants, schools, and the farmers’ market in Beijing. 
They use no pesticides, no fertilizers and no GMOs. Their statement of principles says that 
they are: choosing “sustainable farming in order to protect water, soil, air and biodiversity for 
the next generation”, adopting a “fair trade model to support local farmers and the local 
economy”, and building a “community based on the trust and sharing relationship between 
citizens and farmers”. 
 
The above descriptions illustrate the diversity of economic relations on China’s CSA 
farms. This is not a staged approach; there is no implied trajectory across these farm types. 
Despite their pragmatic and instrumental nature described at the beginning of this discussion, 
several characteristics evident in these stories distinguish Chinese AFNs from mainstream 
economic relations and I suggest we can best understand China’s AFNs as hybrids of capitalist, 
alternative capitalist and non-capitalist forms (Gibson-Graham 2006). This diversity is revealed 
in three ways: first through the ways in which land and labour are treated as common pool 
resources, second through the focus on livelihood, self-financing and decentring of surplus, and 
third through a prevalent discourse on the social economy.  
 
4.3.2.1 Labour-Land Nexus  
Since land remains a common pool resource in China and the HRS places decisions 
about rural land use squarely with rural villages, urban entrepreneurs seeking to start CSAs are 
faced with negotiating land tenure agreements with peasants resulting in a more complicated 
set of power relations than seen in waged labour relations in the global north. In China, 
landless entrepreneurs need to seek permission to use land from peasants. In the context of 
China’s rapid urbanization, where peasants with land rights in peri-urban areas are often 
waiting for lucrative compensation due to them when the state expropriates land for 
development, these leases are getting tougher and tougher to negotiate (FCSAB3). Thus land is 
a bargaining chip for peasants in China, in contrast to workers in capitalist class relations who 
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do not have direct control over the means of their own production and need to sell labour for 
wages. Several urban CSA operators explained how, on the outskirts of a large and growing 
city like Beijing, land leases are becoming more expensive and shorter in duration (FCSAB3, 
FCSAB1). However, while lamenting higher rental prices, accessing land did not seem to be a 
barrier for any of the urban entrepreneurs I spoke with. Indeed, several of them shared plans for 
expanding their land rental in upcoming years (FCSAB5, FCSAB3). It is also interesting that, 
unlike in the global north where land and labour are usually separated (in that both or either are 
available for purchase), land and labour in China can be a “package deal” for entrepreneurs 
starting CSAs (FCSAB3). Sometimes when villages are approached by an urban entrepreneur 
about leasing land, the terms demanded by the village include employment on the farm for a 
certain number of peasants (FCSAB3).   
 
This commons approach to rural land complicates the economic relations. Land is 
not simply a means of production or a cost for the entrepreneur as understood from a capitalist 
perspective. Rather, land is seen as a social safety net by the villagers who hold usage rights. 
Global north scholarship typically understands land access as an elite attribute and much AFN 
scholarship sees injustices in ways in which women, people of colour, or the poor are excluded 
in AFNs because of their lack of access to land (Bedore, 2010). In China’s AFNs a more 
complicated dynamic emerges. While peasants remain marginalized in many ways (discussed 
in Chapter 7), the demand for land to start CSAs by urban entrepreneurs begins to change these 
power relations. The peasant farmers and villagers in these AFNs are not dispossessed villagers 
at the service of urban food projects, as one might think of migrant labourers in the global 
north for example. Rather, the commons approach to land gives at least a small degree of 
control to marginalized villagers and peasants, while ‘privileged’ urban entrepreneurs, seeking 
to respond to market opportunity, need to negotiate for it. In this way, these land relations are a 
reversal from those studied in global north AFNs, where a “moral and economic primacy over 
farming and other occupations” characterizes “American agrarianism” and results in inequities 
of private land ownership (Allen, 2010, p. 300).   
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4.3.2.2 Focus on Livelihoods and Decentering Surplus 
As scholars have documented in the global north (DeLind, 2003; Feagan & 
Henderson, 2009; Galt, 2013), CSAs typically are not engaging in the same profit-maximizing 
logic that characterizes their mainstream counterparts. In China as well, AFN farms are 
focused on building sustainable livelihoods. Alternative economic scholars suggest that the 
degree to which alternative capitalist and non capitalist practices and institutions can sustain 
livelihoods is a key measure of their economic significance (Fickey, 2011). I found a strong 
focus on livelihoods among the CSA farmers I interviewed. As one CSA farmer said, “The first 
goal should be to solve the farmer’s employment problem and make sure they can earn a 
living; the second is business profits” (FCSAB4). All of the larger (over 50 shares) CSA 
operators responding to the survey I conducted indicated that their CSA operation was their 
primary source of income, contributing over 75% of the revenue in their households.  
 
This focus on livelihood or ‘making a living’ guards against the capitalist practice of 
surplus being accumulated and removed from the community. These AFNs effectively limit the 
flow of surplus out of the network by distributing wages to the villagers as described above, 
and by relying on self financing. I found all but one (the dairy I described above) of the CSAs, 
buying clubs and markets in these AFNs to be self-financed. While some of the farms received 
state support for infrastructure enhancements on their farms (greenhouse construction in 
particular) (FCSB4, FCSB5, FCSAJ2, FCSAB3), there were no private investors to influence 
or extract surplus from these networks. This leaves greater surplus for re-investment in the 
networks and indeed re-investments into the farms were extensive. Interviewees told me they 
were using surplus revenue to invest in new cropping approaches, (FCSAB3, FCSAB5), learn 
new ecological farming methods and practices (FCSAJ2, FCSAB3), buy books and resource 
material (BCB1), organize training events (FMB1), purchase food to distribute to families in 
need (FMC1, BCB1) and/or hire more villagers as workers (FCSAB3). This reinvestment of 
surplus into social and ecological improvements, or ‘growth by deepening’ (Van der Ploeg, Ye 
& Schneider, 2012), versus expansionary growth, has been noted in global north CSA research 
as well (Cameron, 2010). It represents a “reservoir of social wealth” (Gibson-Graham, 2001, p. 
26) that opens up possibilities in these networks. Further, it keeps these networks autonomous 
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and only ‘partially integrated’ with dominant capitalist economic forces (Zhang & Donaldson, 
2010). 
 
4.3.2.3 Discursive Construction of the ‘Social Economy’ 
While China’s AFNs have a strong pragmatic emphasis, they cannot be characterized 
only as such. In addition to the material practices in these networks described above, I found a 
pervasive discourse on the ‘social economy’ throughout my interviews, illustrating the ways in 
which China’s AFNs are trying to negotiate what they perceive as a contradiction between 
market-oriented projects and social goals. CSA operators, farmers’ market volunteers and 
buying club organizers in these networks all relayed a tension between market pragmatics and 
the ideals of a new movement they are trying to build. Interviewees struggled to find language 
that best describes their networks, often using the phrase the “social economy” (FCSAB4, 
BCB1, FMB1) in trying to describe a space between capitalist and state-socialist. Indeed 
academics associated with these networks (Hale, 2013; Pan & Du, 2011) as well as academics 
from the global north (Amin, 2009; Quarter, 2010) employ the social economy as a construct to 
describe this alternative space and initiatives that engage in market based activities as a means 
of addressing community needs. In China, however, there is no legal framework that 
legitimizes this space, so it exists only in people’s ideas. One interviewee shared her 
frustrations with this situation: 
After some time we found our business model as a social enterprise not a for-profit 
business. We want to function as a bridge between consumer and producer and we 
think we have the potential to contribute to society and help people. We want to use 
the term ‘social enterprise’ but no legal framework exists in China to permit this, 
and we have no choice but to register as a business. This devalues our 
work.(BCB1) 
 
Searching for a ‘social economy’ is also evidenced by the way in which some 
operators in these networks struggle with consumerist ethics in their CSAs. Registering as 
NGOs is “almost impossible” (FMB1), so they need to rely on market-based exchanges to earn 
operating funds. However, the same middle class consumerist ethics, that make these networks 
possible, are not easily accepted by many AFN participants who are frustrated by what one 
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person described as “consumer domination” (FCSAB6). As another CSA operator noted 
“shareholders make unrealistic demands, such as food that is not in season, and perfect 
looking and they are not always interested in helping to preserve traditional growing 
methods.” (FCSAB3). This is a conundrum the AFN organizers and producers struggle with as 
they try to evoke a different ethic. To illustrate, the guidelines for one CSA explicitly state, 
“We do not ‘regard consumers as god’. Each one of us is a part of this social movement. We and 
our members are not simply selling-purchasing agents, we are equal partners, and we trust each 
other” (FCSAB4). This struggle with dominant consumerist ethics is also evident in the way the 
CSA operators in these networks explicitly distance themselves from large more corporate farms 
using CSA as a branding term. As one operator noted, “They are not competitors with us, they are 
not like us, they don’t build connections to the farm …we are not one of those on-line firms, they 
have more capital and the capacity to get big but they are just trying to sell things. We are 
doing more than that” (FCSAB5). Such comments coupled with grasping for a social economy 
illustrates the ‘other-than-capitalist’ ethics in these networks. 
 
This analysis illustrates that AFNs in China are characterized by economic diversity, 
wherein capitalist relations involving waged labour, financial investment, and surplus 
extraction, co-exist in exchange relations with peasant economies characterized by self-labour, 
self-provisioning, a focus on livelihoods, and spaces of peasant empowerment. These AFNs are 
built on a foundation of a commons approach to land. In peri-urban China, where land is in 
high demand, landless, urban entrepreneurs seeking to capitalize on what they perceive to be a 
direct-to-consumer marketing trend, are placed in a position of negotiating with peasant 
villages to access land and labour. The results are mixed. While CSA operators lament the 
rising cost of land and the difficulties in negotiating for it, many of these entrepreneurs are 
actively expanding their farms, suggesting that access to land is not a barrier. At least in a 
small way, having to negotiate with peasants for land use serves to moderate urban-rural power 
relations. Further, while capitalist commodity relations are evident in these networks, and are 
perpetuated by consumer subjectivities and concerns over price, convenience and product 
quality, we do not see the same path toward de-peasantization that some argue is occurring 
more broadly in China’s agrarian economy.  
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In these ways, these networks embrace an other-than-capitalist ontology and are 
employing language of the social economy as they search for a way to mediate the conflicts 
they see between capitalist relations and social goals like building urban-rural. This is not to 
say that relations are always fair and just. Indeed (and as will be explored further in Chapter 7) 
migrant labour can be marginalized in these networks in the same way it is in the mainstream 
food economy. But the diversity revealed in these networks suggests that participants are 
negotiating interdependencies, and developing economic arrangements that reflect these 
interdependencies or their ‘economic-being-in-common’.   
  
4.4 Economic Hybrids of Capitalist and Other-than-Capitalist Forms 
In reviewing alternative economic theories, Fuller et al. (2010) describe the ‘rift’ 
between ‘make-believers’ and ‘skeptics’ of economic alterity. They suggest that if indeed such 
a rift exists, it could be mended by closer empirical work on alternative social institutions and 
structures. Responding to this suggestion this chapter has embraced such an empirical analysis 
of China’s AFNs.  
 
I began with an overview of China’s agrarian reform processes and outlined how the 
unique dual citizenship system and land rights reform processes have shaped the context of 
AFNs. Despite a commons approach to land which, to a degree protects against classic peasant 
dispossession, capital is none the less penetrating China’s countryside. Similarly, drawing on 
global north AFN scholarship I outlined how AFNs have been criticized as ‘market based’ 
alternatives that will inevitably also be overtaken by capital processes and neoliberal 
subjectivities, in a ‘there is no alternative’ argument. In response, I described how emergent 
thinking on post-capitalist diverse economies and new peasantries is challenging this view and 
revealing hybrid relations, such as those seen in AFNs, where capitalist and non-capitalist 
relations are entangled, and where markets present opportunities to reproduce the peasantry not 
eliminate it. Seeking ‘other-than-capitalist’ relations in China’s AFNs, I used Gibson-
Graham’s Diverse Economies Framework to unpack economic ‘alternativeness’. My analysis 
recognizes the diversity of economic life and revealed that these networks sit in a contradictory 
place where capitalist and other-than-capitalist market forms interact. There is indeed an 
instrumental and entrepreneurial spirit at the centre of these AFNs but they are not ‘simply’ 
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reproducing mainstream economic relations characterized by individual consumerist ethics. 
Rather, they demonstrate a space beyond the capitalist mode of exchange, through their 
emphasis on livelihood and subsistence ethics, their reliance on self-financing, the ways in 
which surplus is re-invested and the ways in which operators evoke the discourse of the social 
economy. Further, this analysis adds voice to suggestions of re-peasantization processes (Van 
der Ploeg et al., 2010). In China’s AFNs, peasant forms of agriculture co-exist with processes 
we can understand as ‘de-peasantization’ as well as‘re-peasantization’.   
Of course, economic relations are but one characteristic of AFNs. In the chapter that 
follows, I develop a second lens through which to view these networks, and consider the ways 
in which relations are being negotiated with the non-human world. 
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5.0 Ecological Hybrids of Traditional and Modern 
 
The previous chapter looked at how capital is beginning to penetrate China’s 
agrarian economy and how AFNs mediate the dualism of other-than-capitalist and capitalist 
relations. In this chapter, I shift the focus to another grand binary that shapes China’s AFNs. 
Global agro-food systems research, policy and practice can be seen as falling loosely into two 
camps. The dominant model operates within an ideology of productivism that sees agricultural 
land as a resource base or ‘production platform’. This model relies on energy intensive inputs 
and farm monocultures that characterize industrialized agriculture. This is an approach that 
disconnects people from food production and associated ecologies, and in turn, results in a 
number of environmental, social, and economic crises (Weis, 2010). The other perspective 
argues that it may be true that the world needs to produce more food. But this focus on 
productivity needs to be balanced with greater attention to how food is produced and the 
interdependence of people and nature (Halberg & Muller, 2013). Following this second view, 
AFNs are founded on various approaches, frequently described under the umbrella of 
‘ecological agriculture’. While this scholarship continues to espouse values of ‘organic’ 
(Andree et al.,2010; Jarosz, 2008; Ilbery et al., 2010), details of farming practices that 
characterize these networks are often not elaborated. This vagueness reflects the observation 
that around the world two general trajectories of organic agriculture have been theorised: a 
formal sector where practices are defined and codified (certified organic), and a more informal 
agro-ecological sector (Parrot et al., 2006). The latter approaches have been variously referred 
to as agro-ecological, ecological, non-certified organic (Halberg & Muller, 2013), passive 
organic or de-facto organic (Parrot & Marsden, 2002) to name a few. In this research, I 
embrace a broad view of ‘organic’, taking as my point of departure the International 
Foundation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) definition established in 2005:  
Organic agriculture is a production system that sustains the health of soils, 
ecosystems and people. It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles 
adapted to local conditions, rather than the use of inputs with adverse effects. 
Organic agriculture combines tradition, innovation and science to benefit the 
shared environment and promote fair relationships and good quality of life for all 
involved. (IFOAM, Definition of Organic Agriculture, para 1)  
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While this definition might include traditional agricultural practices, traditional farming per se 
is not necessarily organic. As Halberg & Muller usefully clarify “non-certified organic 
agriculture refers to organic agricultural practices by intent and not by default” (2013, p. 22, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Following this broad definition, this chapter looks at the ecological relations in 
China’s AFNs with particular attention to the ways in which they define and manifest organic 
production approaches in the context of a state-led, technologically-driven productivist 
approach to ecological agriculture development. The chapter’s analysis resists on two related 
issues. First, drawing on expert consensus on key indicators of functional integrity in 
agricultural systems, I look at the ways in which farming systems in these AFNs enhance 
biological diversity, demonstrate closed-loop systems and protect soil and water resources 
(Halberg, Tybirk et al., 2004; Luttikholt 2007). Second, I examine the ways in which lay 
participants in these networks conceptualize and negotiate what they understand as organic and 
ecological. Here, I detail the ways in which AFN participants are contesting the state-led 
organic regulatory process and using civic process to codify practices and define organic for 
themselves. To preview some results, I find that practices in these AFNs, while being strongly 
ecological based on the functional integrity indicators I selected, are none the less influenced 
by the dominant focus on productivism and are missing some fundamental ecological practices 
as a result. At the same time, there is an extensive adoption of traditional practices that the 
state-endorsed version of ecological agriculture has abandoned. Further, reacting to a 
widespread distrust of state-led organic and ecological agriculture intuitions, producers and 
consumers alike in these networks are forging bottom-up alternatives to ensure transparency, 
reconfigure state standards and construct their own meaning of ‘organic’.  
 
As background to this analysis, I begin by describing how, in both the global north 
and China, the underlying tension between productivism and ecological approaches has shaped 
how organic agriculture is understood and practiced. The organic sector in the global north has 
been challenged to maintain its original ideology in the face of growing market pressures. In 
particular, I focus on the question of ‘who decides’ in relation to the narrative of global north 
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organic standards. I describe how AFNs in the ‘beyond organic’ movement are working to 
recall the ideology of the organic movement from productivism through lay approaches to 
standard development and verification. Then I turn the discussion to China where the 
development of ‘Chinese Ecological Agriculture’ (CEA) has been situated in a modernization 
path that focuses on science, technology and productivism. In this context, I situate China’s 
emerging organic sector in the context of standardization and limited civil society involvement.  
 
 
5.1 The Organic Story: From Movement to Industry and Back Again 
This section offers a general assessment of the trajectory of the organic movement in 
the global north. I summarize how what began as an ideological movement changed under 
neoliberal market pressures that favoured producing more for less, into a system of codified 
practices, which in turn stimulated responses to re-claim the movement’s original values. I 
conclude the section by looking at the ways in which AFNs around the world are re-claiming 
organic standard setting and moving organic governance beyond the realm of experts, to 
include lay voices. The purpose of this brief review is to demonstrate how the organic 
movement has been pulled back and forth on a continuum between the two ‘camps’ of 
productivism and ecological agriculture. 
 
5.1.1 Origins of the Organic Movement 
 Several historical accounts of the organic sector (Hill & MacRae, 1992; Lockeretz, 
2007; Reed, 2010) have been written and it is not my intent to repeat this detail here. Indeed, 
authors describe the trajectory surprisingly consistently. What has come to be understood as 
the organic movement began in parallel with industrialised agriculture in the global north in the 
1920s, first throughout Europe and then migrating to North America and Australia. Early 
protagonists came together in various associations (e.g., Demeter International in Germany, the 
Soil Association in the UK, Rodale Press in the US, The Land Fellowship in Canada) to resist 
the accelerated use of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides, particularly after the second world 
war. The movement’s ideas consolidated in the 1960s-70s with the impetus of critiques like 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and linked with broader social movements about loss of 
farmland and environmental concerns to develop a holistic view on nature-society relations and 
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the economy. Historical scholars observe that the movement ‘de-radicalized’ during the 1980s 
and embraced the idea of ethical consumption as a central ethic and this paved the way for 
market expansion (Reed, 2010). 
 
5.1.2 ‘Standardization’ and ‘Organic Lite’ 
Since the 1990s scholars have suggested that organic systems have been losing their 
‘alternativeness’ and in the face of globalization and neoliberal pressures the ‘movement’ has 
turned into a ‘sector’ (Buck et al., 1997; Best, 2008; Guthman, 2004). Responding to economic 
opportunities, farms and firms have consolidated, differentiated and become significant global 
players (Adams & Salois, 2010). What was once a production approach linked to small farms, 
biodiversity, community engagement and animal welfare, has shifted to a global organic 
market (Howard, 2009) and become ‘conventionalized’, prompting scholars to call for 
“alternatives to the alternatives” (Guthman, 2008, p. 441).  
 
While social science scholars debate this ‘conventionalization thesis’, scholars based 
in biological and ecological sciences argue that, even if organic farms have grown in size and 
the sector has industrialized, soil, water and air resources are still better off because of it. A 
significant number of reviews (Gomiero, Pimentel & Maurizio, 2011; Lynch, MacRae & 
Martin, 2011; Lynch, Halberg & Bhatta, 2012) have compared organic and conventional 
farming approaches in terms of their resource use and environmental impacts. My purpose here 
is not to interrogate these reviews. Suffice to note that their general conclusion is that when a 
full range of factors are considered as a holistic system, organic systems are advantageous in 
terms of their energy use, greenhouse gas emissions, nutrient efficiency and cycling, soil and 
water quality, and species biodiversity.  
  
Consumers however, seek assurances. As the organic sector grew, consumers in local 
and distant markets began to seek more information and verification about unseen production 
methods. In response, initially groups of farmers developed ‘peer certification’ processes, 
resulting in a confusing array of organic labels. This chaotic landscape, along with trade over 
larger distances prompted the organic community to press for organic regulations (Reed, 2010). 
In less than a decade, these organic regulations and verification processes have become 
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intensely contested and the scholarship on agri-food standards has exploded (Burch & 
Lawrence, 2007; Busch, 2011; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, Clapp & Busch, 2011; Higgins et al., 2008; 
Higgins & Larner, 2010; Howard & Allen, 2006; Mutersbaugh, 2005). Situating their analyses 
in the context of trade liberalisation, scholars argue that private interests in standards have 
become increasingly powerful as states have retracted their involvement. In terms of organic 
standards in particular, these private interests have been able to influence standard setting 
processes to their advantage and diluted standards to the “lowest common denominator” 
resulting in minimalist national standards (Mutersbaugh, 2005, p. 2039). 
 
In the 1990s, when the organic sector had approached only 1% of the total food sales 
in the US for example, corporate participation dramatically accelerated, driven by profit goals 
rather than a commitment to movement ideals (Jaffee & Howard, 2010). As corporations saw 
potential in the budding organic market, they increasingly engaged in a “corporate 
countermovement” (Howard & Allen, 2006, p. 23), involving themselves in standard setting 
processes in order to make sure the resulting standards didn’t pose barriers in the industry. 
Relying on a strategy known as ‘regulatory capture’, corporations positioned themselves to 
influence states developing organic standards (Fridell, Hudson & Hudson, 2008; Jaffee & 
Howard, 2010). The result was referred to as ‘organic lite’ (Guthman, 2004), where the 
production practices codified in became progressively weakened (Buck et al., 1997; Guthman, 
2000).  
 
The scholarship and debate on ‘standardization’ is also driven by justice concerns, 
with scholars noting that organic (and other food quality) standards often show a distributional 
effect by adding a ‘policy rent’ or additional required cost which further marginalizes smaller 
scaled firms and farms in both the global south and north (Guthman, 2004). Thus standards 
result in a form of social exclusion, sometimes marginalizing the very farmers who were the 
pioneers of the organic movement. This social justice perspective goes beyond concerns about 
the cost of certification processes to include questions of inclusion in standard setting 
processes. In liberal democracies, legitimacy of standards is underpinned by participation, 
transparency and accountability, and as private actors have moved from “objects to subjects” of 
governance (Fuchs et al., 2011, p. 335) we need to consider these democratic values. 
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Regarding standards as “politics by other means” (Kimura, 2010, p. 5), consideration of who 
decides is at least as important as what is decided, or ‘Whose rules rule?’ (Friedmann & 
McNair, 2008). 
 
5.1.3 Beyond Organic  
These problems of standardization and conventionalization have given birth to a 
‘beyond organic’ or ‘post organic’ movement, where farms and firms turn toward local and 
direct-to-consumer types of retail channels, where third party verification might be less 
important to consumers, and the organic movement can return to its original holistic roots 
(Higgins & Larner, 2010). Protagonists of beyond organic frequently eschew organic 
certification, which they see as corporatized, and instead seek to mitigate the effects of 
conventionalization through forms of association, participation and governance that re-connect 
producers and consumers through AFNs. These AFNs seek to take back the definition of 
‘organic’, and embrace the aspects left out of the standards such as the need for living wages 
for producers and justice for farm and food workers. To this end, scholars argue that simply 
fine-tuning and tinkering with standards and standard setting processes will not lead us to 
necessary transformative change. Instead, we need to re-value lay knowledge (Goodman & 
DuPuis, 2002). However, given definitional challenges that lead researchers to focus on 
codified or certified organic production, questions about the degree to which this ‘beyond 
organic’ movement is embracing ecological production, as envisioned in IFOAM organic 
principles, agro-ecological principles, or other principles, remain largely unanswered.   
 
Whether public, private or a hybrid, standard setting processes typically draw 
legitimacy from their basis in ‘science’ and credibility from the role of ‘experts’ in their 
development and accredited certifiers in the auditing process. These processes typically 
presume that consumers’ wishes and demands are known a priori by experts, and thus lay 
people are involved marginally if at all (Kimura, 2010). The underlying assumption is that food 
governance, particularly the matter of food quality, is better based on science and such 
“science-doing” necessitates experts (Kimura, 2010, p. 135). As Nelson et al. (2010) observe, 
as the local has been reconstructed in these beyond organic AFNs, so too has the concept of 
lay/peer versus scientific/expert knowledge as the starting point for certification resurfaced. In 
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response to the need for some type of verification, in parallel to trust building processes, a 
variety of systems have evolved in AFNs to democratise standard setting processes based on 
lay knowledge. Building on processes like ‘citizen juries’, that challenge the privileged 
position of experts, verification systems led by lay-people have been rapidly evolving within 
the AFN movement, including in China as argued below. As a prelude to that discussion, I 
briefly describe two such systems - the ‘certification by many’ system in Japan (Kimura, 
2010), and the Participant Guarantee Systems (PGS) advocated by IFOAM (Kallander, 2008). I 
have selected these particular examples because the evolving standard development and 
governance in China’s AFNs shows characteristics of both. 
 
5.1.3.1 Participatory Guarantee Systems 
Most widely associated with IFOAM, Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGSs) are 
created by farmers, consumers and/or NGOs, in order to lower the costs of the dominant ‘third 
party’ system, yet respond to the need for some type of verification beyond each individual 
consumer visiting each producer or processor to verify processes. In some ways, PGS is how 
organic certification began, with small groups of peer farmers agreeing to standards and putting 
them into practice. IFOAM defines PGS as verification systems that are built through active 
participation of stakeholders working together in networks of trust (Kallander, 2008). Whereas 
a third party certification system verifies production processes against an agreed upon (usually 
state established) set of standards, PGS are based on lay/peer review and shared responsibility. 
These approaches are rapidly spreading throughout the global south and north because unlike 
third party systems, they can include social issues such as labour standards, in addition to 
production approaches. Sometimes PGS verify production against the state standards for that 
country. In other situations, PGS participants develop their own standards. IFOAM’s role in 
these systems is to facilitate and assist their development, not prescribe details or impose rules. 
The only requirement is that the standard used in PGS must reflect the IFOAM organic 
principles (Kallander, 2008). China does not yet have such systems place, but Vietnam had 
such a system approved by IFOAM last year (Vietnam Organic, 2013). Using their national 
standard as the reference, the Vietnamese PGS uses an elaborate checklist, a list of approved 
inputs and a system of annual inspections. Indeed the system seems as detailed as the national 
organic regulation, and addresses issues of genetic engineering, whole and part farm 
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conversion, development of organic plans, organic husbandry, processing and handling, and a 
number of other issues. 
 
5.1.3.2 Seikatsu Club Consumer Cooperative (SCCC) in Japan 
An interesting illustration of consumer engagement in lay certification is found in the 
Seikatsu Club
21
 in Japan. Kimura (2010) describes in detail the Independent Audit by Many 
(IAM) system that has formed the basis of the Seikatsu Club Consumer Cooperative (SCCC) 
movement. She argues that IAM offers a more democratic approach to food quality standards 
through its inclusion of both lay people and experts. Further the IAM offers an affordable 
alternative to ‘third party’ standards, as well as providing opportunities for vertical (between 
consumers and suppliers or farmers) and horizontal (among consumers) relationship building. 
Initiated within the context of continuing food safety scandals in Japan, today the SCCC 
movement engages over 30,000 members in 29 cooperatives with 1,200 staff, and sales over 
US $700 million annually (Kimura, 2010). It began in 1965 when a group of women organized 
300 other women to purchase 200 litres of milk each week in order to get a better price. From 
there the idea grew and the organization formalized. As the range of products purchased and 
the interests of the purchasers diversified, it became evident that there was a need to develop an 
agreed-upon set of principles to govern procurement. Ten principles became the foundation of 
their ‘standard’: food safety, domestic food self-sufficiency, reduction of harmful materials, 
use of natural resources, reuse and waste reduction, reduction of energy use, minimizing risks, 
full disclosure, independent audit and open participation. Their principles fully embrace the 
IFOAM organic principles (Kimura, 2010).  
 
This discussion illustrates how the growth of the organic sector attracted corporate 
interests which came to impact organic standard setting processes, shifting them toward 
conventional production. In response a beyond organic movement has begun to remove 
standard setting processes from an exclusive space, where only particular people are presumed 
as eligible to speak authoritatively, and place the development of standards and rules with the 
                                                 
21
 The Seikatsu Club in Japan is often confused with the Teikei movement and both are credited as helping to 
advance the development of the CSA model throughout the global north.  Seitkatsu is a larger movement of 
formally structured cooperatives that is often integrated with the less formal Teikei movement. In both, urban 
consumers band together to build direct procurement relations with producers. 
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consumers and producers who are the most affected by them. I turn now to the China context, 
where I detail the development of its ecological and organic sectors. 
 
5.2 Ecological and Organic Agriculture in China 
China’s agricultural modernization trajectory rests on a stark reality. It has 21% of 
the world’s population but only 9% its arable land (Carter, Zhong & Zhu, 2012). In this 
section, I contextualize the development of China’s ecological and organic sector. I illustrate 
how the sector’s development has been driven by the state’s dual focus on food security, as 
well as science and technology. Second, I describe how in the context of growing food safety 
concerns, global trade opportunities, and the growing agro-environmental crisis that threatens 
long term food security; the state has developed a complex system of progressively stringent 
ecological standards, including an organic standard. I contrast these standards and describe 
their associated markets. Finally, I conclude this section by looking briefly at the role played 
by civil society in China’s ecological governance. My goal in this discussion is to establish a 
background upon which to consider the ways in which China’s AFNs define and manifest 
organic production approaches in the context of state-led, technologically-driven, productivist 
approaches to agriculture.  
 
5.2.1 Chinese Traditional Agriculture 
China has been a society with rich agricultural practices for centuries (Christiansen, 
2009). F.H. King’s book, Farmers of Forty Centuries, or Permanent Agriculture in China, 
Korea and Japan, is considered the first English description of these practices (1911). King’s 
descriptions informed the work of organic pioneers Eve Balfour and Albert Howard in Britain, 
Ehrenfried Pfeiffer in Switzerland and Jerome Rodale in the USA, and is widely considered a 
foundational document of the present day organic movement. King’s call for a world 
movement for agricultural reform foreshadowed the 1978 formation of the International 
Foundation of Organic Movements (IFOAM) (Paull, 2011). 
 
King was a US soil scientist and his intention was, “to walk through [the] fields of 
…these oldest farmers in the world….[and to] learn how it is possible, after twenty and 
perhaps thirty or even forty centuries, for their soils to be made to produce sufficiently for the 
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maintenance of such dense populations” (2011, p.3). Based on an 8 month agricultural tour in 
1909, King differentiated Asian traditional agriculture from what was being promulgated by 
the US Department of Agriculture, with the descriptor ‘permanent agriculture’ (King, 1911). 
His book, which is more of an anthropological approach than a quantification, paints a picture 
of small scale, household-based farmers, depending on largely non-commoditized relations for 
the household’s reproduction, using experiential learning passed down through generations. 
King died before he could complete his work, so his book has no conclusion.  
 
As I review his descriptions and stories, several themes seem to tie together the 
diverse forms of traditional agriculture he documents. The stories depict farms where there is 
no such thing as ‘waste’. Rather, there is continuous recycling of diverse materials back into 
the soil. King describes how farmers used crop residues for cooking fuel and then returned 
ashes to the field. He details the labour intensive practice of enhancing anaerobic fermentation 
of canal sludge, plant straw, silk worm waste and animal manure, before field spreading. In the 
systems King describes, livestock are typically integrated into the farm and their manure, along 
with that from the household (‘night soil’) were composted for use on the fields for fertility. 
Other fertilizers included soybean oil cakes, green manures, sludge dredged from canals and 
silkworm wastes. These fertilizers were crop-specific, and farmers experience with regard to 
the plant’s growth pattern and leaf colour were used to determine application. Most stories 
seem to reflect an understanding of the time horizon as extending well beyond the current 
season. They refer to multiple year rotations for example. The stories reflect an ‘art’ or 
experiential aspect of farming, where decisions are not pre-determined, but instead are made 
‘in situ’ depending on factors like weather, available materials and household needs. Finally, 
and the feature that inspired the book’s title, King reveals complex and intensive intercropping 
systems that mimic nature with year round soil coverage and symbiotic relations between 
planted crops. For example, he documents the rice-fish-duck systems in Central and South 
China, the mulberry dike-pond sericulture in the Pearl River Delta and the agro forestry 
practices in the mountainous Yunnan province.  
 
There have been recent efforts to continue King’s work and document China’s 
diverse intercropping systems (Ellis & Wang, 1997; Li, 2001; Li, Liu & Min, 2011). For 
93 
 
example, Li Wehuna (2001, p. 13) offers a detailed description of more than 50 “integrated 
farming systems” classified as follows: 
 Systems that integrate components from the same production sector. Examples 
include poly-aqua-cultural systems that integrate culture of various aquatic species, or various 
dryland rotation systems such as maize-peanut, or onion-cotton. 
 Systems that integrate components from different production systems. Examples 
include frog production channels integrated between the rows of fruit trees, and aqua-terrestrial 
systems like mulberry-silk-fish, where where tree refuse and worm excrement fall into ponds to 
encourage plankton growth for fish. 
 Systems that are designed for particular scales of production. For example, closed-
loop integrated production around a homestead scale where crop stalks are used as livestock 
feed, followed by mushrooms grown in the manure, then earthworms are grown on the used 
mushroom media before it is re-applied to cropland. 
 Systems that are designed for particular ecosystem types. For example, terrace rice 
systems that stabilize hillsides in mountainous regions, and grape systems in temperate areas 
where specifically designed trellising conserves soil and water while protecting fruit from 
frosts and wind. 
It has only been in the last 50 years that the focus has shifted from self-reliant diverse 
farms to an input intensive culture (Zhang, Min, Liu & Cheng, 2012). The processes of nation-
wide collectivization of agriculture under the People’s Republic of China, as well as the de-
collectivization and ‘opening’ during the reform period that followed, were both framed within 
a productivism that de-emphasized China’s rich history of traditional practices and gave little 
attention to potential negative environmental impacts (Sanders, 2006). This productivism is 
framed by a political philosophy that centres food security as well as a historical and cultural 
embracing of science and technology. 
 
 
5.2.2 Political Philosophy of Food Security 
The traditional belief in the Dynastic Cycle (recall the story of the Mandate of 
Heaven that began this dissertation), illustrates the philosophy that securing the food supply, 
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protecting against famine, and maintaining harmony, are essential if the state wishes to 
maintain political legitimacy. Food security, in particular grain self-sufficiency, is embedded in 
Chinese political legitimacy. Providing sufficient food is the way in which political support is 
solidified. The state faced a legitimacy crisis linked to food insecurity at the start of the reform 
period when 250 million out of 800 million rural residents were impoverished and hunger was 
widespread (Zha & Zhang, 2013). Famine and hunger are deeply ingrained in people’s 
memories perhaps more so than any other civilization (Li, 2007). To illustrate, in the 1920s at 
least 500,000 people starved to death and almost 20 million were left destitute. In the 1940s 
somewhere between 2- 3 million people died in famines in Henan Province. Only a few years 
later between 1959 and 1961, starvation during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ killed an estimated 
30 million more people (Zha & Zhang, 2013). 
 
This political philosophy mingles with people’s memories of famines and results in a 
generally heightened importance of food in China (Simelton, 2011; Tong, 2011). As I heard 
several times in my field work, “Food is God”. Indeed the standard Chinese greeting, rather 
than “hello”, is Ni chile meiyou? or literally, Have you eaten yet? reflecting a history of food 
insecurity and the central place of food in society (Zhang et al., 2006). With a population 
increasingly demanding dietary diversity and more meat, coupled with pressures on land from 
increasing urbanization, food security is an ever-present concern in China and has continued as 
a state priority since ancient times (Carter, Zhong & Zhu, 2012; Li, 2012; Zha & Zhang, 2013). 
China’s commitment to food security is also driven by the state’s interest in protecting farmers 
in a sector that still employs more than one third of the labour force and to address rural-urban 
inequities (Zha & Zhang, 2013). Domestically produced grain can’t compete with heavily 
subsidized grain from industrialized countries, so the state seeks to buffer its farmers from 
price downturns to ensure political stability (Zha & Zhang, 2013). 
 
 China’s perception of its image in the world also motivates its food security policies. 
The state remembers the economic sanctions it experienced in 1959 when its people were 
suffering the worst famine in recorded history, and remains distrustful of reliance on an 
international food regime (Tong, 2011). Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, there has been 
even stronger attention to food security by the Chinese state. China recognizes, as the world’s 
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largest food consumer, that reliance on trade would destabilize global markets considerably, 
and this has reinforced its food security policies (Wong & Huang, 2012). Starting in the 1990s, 
to counter suggestions that it would destabilize global food prices if imports increased (Brown, 
1996), China responded with a range of policy instruments to stimulate agricultural production 
(Huang, Wang, Zhi, Huang & Rozelle, 2011). Policy actions to ensure it met food security 
targets included the ‘governor’s grain bag’ and the ‘vegetable basket’ which obliged cities to 
endorse food security targets and meet grain and vegetable quotas (Huang et al., 2011). While 
initially successful, these measures proved insufficient as yields began to drop in the late 
1990s. In response, the state spent US $21 billion on a new series of economic policies 
including reducing agricultural taxes and subsidizing chemical inputs. Since that time, China 
has met its 95% grain self-sufficiency
22
 targets across all food categories (Carter, Zhong & 
Zhu, 2012; Morton, 2012).  
 
5.2.3 ‘Technoscientific Reasoning’  
It is not only the pursuit of food security that drives China’s productivist approach. A 
“utilitarian” ideology (Shen & Williams, 2005, p. 205), in which an overwhelmingly positive 
and pragmatic view of technology is detached from social and political processes, further 
informs its agricultural approach. This ‘scientism’ can be traced to ancient China and continues 
today as a foundation of China’s modernization and rapid economic growth (Shen & Williams, 
2005; Chen, 2013). Scholars argue that the Asian approach to science and technology is 
distinct and has penetrated society more deeply than elsewhere (Shen & Williams, 2005). They 
describe a predominance of “technoscientific reasoning” (Sigley, 2009, p. 537), in which 
knowledge based on a claim to truth uncovered only through specific state-approved processes, 
has become the foundation of the socialist market economy (Sigley, 2009). The fundamental 
belief that scientific reasoning should be applied broadly across all fields of human endeavours 
has strong historical roots in China. From the early 1900s on, seeing the technological 
advancements in western cultures and fearing backwardness, China saw science as its future 
and traditional ideologies and beliefs as backward (R Chen, 2013). China’s worldview became 
                                                 
22
 There growing debate as to the degree of food self-sufficiency in China.  Other scholars suggest that recently 
this number has fallen to 85% food self sufficient.  Estimates vary depending on the definition of ‘food security’ 
used.  In particular there is debate about whether animal feed, such as soybeans,  should be considered a ‘grain’ 
and thus included in the definition of ‘food security’.   
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oriented toward science as a transformative ideology. The Mao era served to amplify this 
technoscientific reasoning by developing science and technology at the expense of social 
sciences, where the emphasis was limited to economic and quantitative analyses that could be 
used to monitor technological progress (Shen & Williams, 2005). This overwhelmingly 
positive and pragmatic view of science and technology was further amplified during the reform 
era, when the 1978 constitution declared, “the state devotes major efforts to developing 
science, expands scientific research, promotes technical innovation and technical revolution 
and adopts advanced techniques wherever possible in all departments” (Shen & Williams, 
2005, p. 209).  
 
5.2.4 Embracing Productivism  
Driven by this uncritical approach toward science and technology, and the 
preoccupation with food security, during the Mao era as well as during the reform period, 
China carried out a range of agriculture reforms that replaced traditional practices with 
chemically intensive cultivation. For the Chinese state, “production was granted as an absolute 
human priority” and agriculture was viewed as another means by which the state could 
“increase output by increasing input” (Christianson, 2009, p. 125). The result was that in the 
1980s and 1990s, China’s agricultural sector (farming, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fisheries) grew 300% (Carter et al., 2010). Fisheries grew the most rapidly (annual growth rate 
of 6.8%), followed by animal husbandry (5.9%), forestry (3.9%), and farming (2.9%) per year, 
over the 31 year reform period. Looking more closely at the farming sector, grain output grew 
at a rate of 1.8% over the same period, and surpassed the rate of population growth (Carter, 
2012). These increases were primarily because of increases in yields under extensive input use 
(described below), rather than increases in acreage under cultivation (Carter, Zhong & Zhu, 
2012). As notable examples, yields per hectare of rice (65%) wheat (157%) and corn (88%) all 
rose since economic reforms began in 1979 (Carter et al, 2012).  
 
In comparison, non-cereal cash crops grew even faster. Oilseed production, for 
example, increased by 6.0% per year, reflecting an increasing demand for edible oils. Cotton 
production grew at 4.4%. But more significant increases were in the fruit and vegetable sector. 
Outputs of fruit grew 11.7% per year, increasing from 6.6 million tons in 1978 to 204 million 
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tons in 2009. Official vegetable production statistics are not available, but area sown to 
vegetable crops increased 5.7% annually, over this same period, from 3.3 million hectares to 
18.4 million hectares (Carter et al., 2012). Additional dramatic increases can be found in 
livestock production. Based on official data, Carter et al. (2012) report that total meat 
production increased by 66.9% in the reform period, with an annual growth rate of 4.0%, and 
milk production increased even faster with a growth rate of 13.3%.  
 
These country-wide growth rates mask regional variation not reviewed here in detail. 
In general, and responding to urbanization pressures, agricultural production has shifted over 
the reform period away from the coastal regions to the north, northeast and northwest regions, 
which are less densely populated (Huang et al., 2012). As examples:  
 
 Wheat production declined in the northeast and northwest as farmers there shifted 
to vegetable and rice production in those areas (Huang et al., 2012). 
 Rice production has shifted from the southeast and coastal regions and become 
concentrated in the north and northeast (Huang et al., 2012). 
 Dairy production has grown primarily in north China. While poultry production has 
shifted to southeast China, primarily driven by sector consolidation and the locations of 
specialised processors and intermediaries (Carter et al., 2012). 
 Central and northwest regions are showing the fastest growth in fruit and vegetable 
production (Li, 2013) and cultivation of vegetables and fruits is intensifying in the suburban 
areas around large cities (Carter et al., 2012). 
  
5.2.5 Both a Miracle and a Disaster 
Scholars consider it a ‘miracle’ that China has managed to meet its food security 
goals with minimal reliance on global markets to date (Carter et al., 2012). Indeed in 2012 
China was recognized by the FAO with the Agricola Medal for reducing its population 
considered undernourished from 18% of its population in the early 1990s to 10% in 2008 
(Carter et al., 2012). However, the disastrous aspects to this miracle are being increasingly 
recognized and China is increasingly turning to global markets to help meet its food security 
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goals (Carter et al., 2012). Embracing productivism wholeheartedly has resulted in negative 
environmental impacts. While data sources are few and questionable, a robust scholarship is 
beginning to reveal the extensive impacts associated with both industry and industrialized 
agriculture (McBeath & McBeath, 2010; Holdaway, 2013; Gilley, 2012). China’s success in 
meeting its established food production targets has been primarily due to the extensive use of 
modern inputs which many consider unsustainable. I highlight below how China has 
accomplished its production miracle and the resulting environmental disaster that is still being 
revealed. My purpose here is not to undertake a complete review of the ecological impacts of 
China’s productivist approach.23  Rather, I seek to establish the context in which ecological 
agriculture is emerging in China. 
 
5.2.5.1 Labour Inputs and Mechanization  
China’s productivity miracle rests to a large extent on labour resources, and the percentage of 
the population employed by agriculture has been steadily declining with urbanization. At the 
beginning of reforms in 1979, 70% of the labour force was was employed in agriculture and 
that declined to 38% by 2009 (Carter et al., 2012). Given vast migration discussed in Chapter 
4, the dynamics of full and part-time, permanent and temporary, on farm and off farm 
employment are complex, and simply looking at numbers of workers does not give a complete 
picture of China’s agricultural labour. For example, young people are participating in off-farm 
employment more than older rural residents, and on-farm employment is dominated by ‘old’ 
labour (Huang et al., 2012). Further, there is a gender effect worth noting with women more 
likely to be working as full time farm labourers (Li, 2013). Whether these trends of aging and 
feminizing of the agricultural labour force will continue, and what effects they might have on 
production and its sustainability are unknown.  
 
While we often think of China’s farms as small and labour intensive, mechanization 
has been a core strategy in the state’s modernizing plans and in boosting productivity. Rising 
wages in the agricultural sector after the introduction of the Household Responsibility System 
(HRS), coupled with the availability of off-farm employment and migration (described in 
                                                 
23
 Nor do I interrogate the associated human health impacts of environmental degradation.  For a recent overview 
see Holdaway (2013).  
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Chapter 4), promoted the mechanization of agriculture as evidenced by the increasing number 
of tractors (Fan et al., 2012). The number of small tractors increased from 1.4 million units to 
17.5 million between 1978 and 2009, resulting in a 6.5-fold increase in terms of the power 
supplied by equipment from 117 million kw to 875 million kw (Carter et al, 2012).  
 
5.2.5.2 Over-use of Agricultural Chemicals 
Use of synthetic fertilizer has expanded five fold since reforms began, and China 
now leads the world in both the production and use of synthetic fertilizers (Fan et al., 2012). 
Chemical fertilizer use increased from 8.8 to 54.0 million metric tons between 1978 and 2009, 
and applications per hectare increased from 59 kg to 341 kg over the same period. A low 
fertilizer nutrient use efficiency has been noted, and there are high nutrient losses due to 
inappropriate application (Zhang & Shen, 2013). Further, fertilization is considered 
unbalanced. There are large regional variations in amounts used, and while nitrogen and 
phosphorus have generally been over-used, potassium use has been insufficient in relation, and 
shows declining balances in multiple soils across China (Zhang & Shen, 2013). As outlined 
below, this overuse of nitrogen-based fertilizer in particular has resulted in eutrophication of 
surface water, excessive greenhouse gas emissions (Zhang & Shen, 2013), and soil 
acidification in multiple regions (Holdaway & Hussain, 2014). 
 
Parallel increases in other agricultural chemicals (herbicides, fungicides, pesticides) 
as well as agricultural plastics have been noted since the 1970s (Carter et al., 2012). The usage 
of pesticides increased 2.4 times between 1990 and 2010 to over 17 million tons (Holdaway, 
2013; Fan et al., 2012), making China the world’s second largest producer and consumer of 
pesticides, responsible for nearly 35% of all global consumption (Zhang & Shen, 2013). 
Excessive pesticides have been noted to persist in soil and estimates suggest that some 16 
million hectares of cropland in China are polluted by agricultural pesticides (Toth, 2013). 
 
5.2.5.3 Soil Degradation  
With over 35% of China’s land surface subject to wind and/or water erosion 
(Holdaway, 2013), desertification is extensive, reaching 33 million hectares of land at last 
count (Zhang & Shen, 2013). Arid and semi-arid grassland ecosystems are particularly 
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vulnerable to erosion from wind, which is worsened by over grazing and deforestation 
(Holdaway, 2013). 
 
Soil organic matter dynamics can vary widely across China’s diverse land systems. 
Country-wide, 38% of the soil suffers from nutrient and organic matter losses associated with 
erosion (Fan et al., 2012). For example, the average soil organic matter in topsoil in China is 10 
g/kg compared to 25-40 g/kg in Europe and the US (Holdaway & Husain, 2014).   
 
Finally, heavy metal contamination of soil, as a result of rural industrial processes, 
pesticides and manure, is suspected to be a problem that is more severe than in many other 
countries, although data are scarce and suspect (Holdaway & Husain, 2014). A soil pollution 
survey undertaken by the state in 2006 has not been made public, and results were recently 
declared a state secret (Holdaway & Husain, 2014). However, in 2012, a Ministry of 
Environmental Protection official publically revealed that 10 million hectares of arable land 
were polluted to at least some degree. Later, a Ministry of Land Resources official clarified 
that 3 million hectares of farmland had medium or serious levels of pollution, mostly in areas 
near heavy industry. In 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture began a province-by-province soil 
survey specifically focused on heavy metals and other pollution, and researchers are awaiting 
its completion and hoping for its release (Holdaway & Husain, 2014). 
 
5.2.5.4 Declining Safe Water Resources 
Agriculture uses 60% of all water resources in China (Wang et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, while northeast regions have adequate rainfall, the northern and northwest 
areas, to which much production has shifted, are becoming increasingly reliant on irrigation. 
The use of groundwater in these regions has increased from 30% in the 1970s to 70% of all 
irrigation water (Wang & Huang, 2004), and groundwater tables are significantly declining, by 
as much as two metres per year, in these areas (Fan et al., 2012). Further, agriculture water use 
efficiency, defined as grain produced per unit of water consumed, is low in China because of a 
reliance on inefficient irrigation systems (Liu & Yang, 2012). Pollution of freshwater resources 
is further reducing the availability of safe water for agricultural production. More than 40% of 
China’s rivers and more than 80% of its lakes show eutrophication exceeding the country’s 
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safe drinking water standards. There has been a four-fold increase in nitrogen leaching to 
estuaries since 1980, contributing not only to eutrophication, but decreased fish production and 
algae blooms (red tides). Occurrence of red tides increased from 10 per year in the 1960s to 
300 per year in 2004 (Norse and Zhu, 2004). Further, wastewater from industry, which is 
sometimes used in agricultural irrigation, has been shown to have high concentrations of heavy 
metals (Khan, Cao, Zheng, Huang & Zhu, 2008). In sum, food crops in China are shifting to 
areas with fewer water resources, and existing water resources have been significantly 
impacted by agricultural and industrial pollutants. 
 
5.2.5.5 Reliance an Plant Breeding and Uncertain Plans 
China’s increasing productivity over the reform period was partly due to breeding 
programs established in the 1960s that selected for higher yields and dwarf sizes (James, 
2010). The collectivization of agriculture prior to 1976 disseminated and entrenched use of 
these hybrids (James, 2010). More recently, China has pursued genetically modified (GM) 
crops to increase productivity. In 2010, 3.5 million hectares was sown to GM crops, ranking 
China 6
th
 in the world (Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). However, GM acreage to date has been 
limited primarily to non-food crops. At least according to official records, 90% of GM acreage 
is sown to cotton (3.3 million hectares). China has proposed further use of GM crops, and 
indeed leads the world in terms of planned GMO acreage. However, there has been some 
hesitation in implementation of these plans due to a strong anti-GMO sentiment in China, 
primarily organized by Greenpeace (Carter, et al., 2012).  
 
5.2.5.6 Impacts of Recent Dietary Changes 
Most recently, trends of increasing meat consumption have added what could be the 
last straw to this list of disasters. Livestock production and consumption of animal products is 
positioned at the nexus of economic, environmental, health, trade and ethical concerns in China 
(Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). It is exacerbating the impacts of almost all of the above 
environmental problems. Increasing livestock production is driving increased use of water, 
changes in production patterns and deforestation, water and soil pollution from four billion 
tons of manure annually, emission of greenhouse gasses across the food chain, and land 
degradation from over grazing (Schneider, 2011; Garnett & Wilkes, 2014). Indeed, it raises 
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fundamental questions about food security and the meaning of ‘enough’ food for China 
(Garnett & Wilkes, 2014) and ensuing decisions about importing animal feed for example are 
already having impacts on global land use, trade and livelihoods (Zhang et al., 2012; Garnett & 
Wilkes, 2014).  
 
5.2.6 Development of China Ecological Agriculture (CEA) 
China’s productivist legacy is being revealed, and the very changes that helped 
production soar to meet food security goals, may now be posing the barriers to meeting those 
goals in the future. Further, the dream of agricultural modernization and the state’s focus on 
food security through science and technology has driven traditional agriculture to the margins 
where it exists today only in the most remote areas (Li et al., 2011; Shi, 2004). In response, 
starting in the 1980s a group of scholars introduced ‘Chinese Ecological Agriculture’ (CEA) as 
a discourse framed within ecological economics. Understood as a new type of integrated 
farming system that could harmoniously blend environmental protection, agricultural 
production, rural economic development and efficient use of natural resources (Wang, Qin, 
Huang & Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2011), it became an area for research and development 
supported by the state. CEA can be understood as a hybrid of traditional and modern 
agriculture. It takes as its foundation traditional intercropping systems or ‘circular farming’ 
(closed loop) systems, where off farm inputs are minimized, and adds to this breeding systems 
(including GMOs) that stress yields, prudent use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers (Wang 
et al., 2007; Shi, 2004).  
 
Recently, reflecting on the progress of CEA, Li et al. (2011) acknowledge the 
establishment of some excellent models and pilot areas. They describe how the core strategy of 
CEA has been to look to traditional agricultural practices, reinterpret them in light of China’s 
food security needs and integrate them into China’s modern, industrialized agriculture system. 
They note that these traditional practices framed within subsistence peasant economies, do not 
easily blend with China’s technology-driven approach to agricultural modernization. Whereas 
the state’s modern approach sees agriculture as serving human ends, traditional agriculture in 
China followed a Taoist eco-philosophy that emphasized self-sufficient and subsistence 
oriented systems in harmony with nature (Li et al., 2011). Reviews by two different groups of 
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scholars (Wang et al., 2007; Li et al., 2011) concur that ecological agriculture will not meet the 
yields required by the state’s food security policies if it is only based on traditional practices. 
These scholars argue that China needs to find an ecological agriculture path different from that 
of the global north, where sustainable and ecological agriculture often means the avoidance of 
synthetic inputs and GMOs. Chinese CEA scholars argue that ecological agriculture ‘with 
Chinese Characteristics’ needs to embrace “biotechnology and ecological engineering” as well 
as chemical inputs to some degree (Wang et al., 2007, p. 195).  
 
However, global north scholars note the limitations of the Chinese research approach 
to CEA. Horlings and Marsden (2011) for example, have examined some cases of ecological 
modernisation of agriculture in China, Africa and Brazil, and note that for ecological 
agriculture to contribute to a “real green revolution” a radical approach that weaves together 
farmers and consumers participating in embedded “eco-economies” (p. 441) is necessary. In 
the case of China, the state’s uncritical embrace of science and technology has resulted in CEA 
research that has focused almost exclusively on “ecological entrepreneurism” through large-
scale, state-sponsored ecological themed villages and construction projects versus more ‘grass-
roots’ producer engagement (Horlings & Marsden, 2011, p. 448). This entanglement of 
economic growth and ecological improvement is typical of China’s ecological modernization 
narrative about ‘going green’ that sees market dynamics, entrepreneurship and technology 
solving environmental problems (Zhang et al., 2012). Research on ‘real’ farms versus state 
controlled production bases is necessary if traditional farming practices are to be documented 
and saved from “becoming victims of modernization and other technological and economic 
changes” (Zhang et al., 2012 p. 744).  
 
CEA is only beginning to emerge as an academic field in China, and scholars are 
calling for more state funding (Egelyng et al., 2013). The state seems to have lessened its 
support for CEA for two reasons. First, de-collectivization of agriculture has made it more 
difficult to add more large demonstration sites (Egelyng, et al., 2013). Second, the lack of a 
clear definition of CEA led to coherence problems in supply and under developed markets 
(Paull, 2008), leading the state to pursue stronger standardization, as evidenced below, in order 
to develop domestic and export markets. 
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5.2.7 Ecological Sector Governance 
Ecological governance in China rests on a unique system of progressively more 
stringent production standards for hazardous-free foods, green foods and organic foods (Scott, 
Si, Schumilas & Chen, 2014). As shown in Figure 8, when taken together, food produced with 
this ‘set’ of ‘ecological’ standards totals 34 million acres or 28% of China’s agricultural land 
(Scott et al., 2014; Mei, Jewison & Greene, 2006). These different standards, compared in 
Table 5, were introduced by the state starting in the 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of Eco-Labelled Food as a Proportion of Cultivated Land in China 
Source: Paull, 2008 
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Table 5: Comparison of ‘Ecological’ Standards 
  
Source: Compiled from Lernoud, Willer & Schlatter (2014), Paull(2008), Scott et al., (2014) 
and soil testing and residue testing information provided by Dr. Yuhui Qiao, April 13, 2014 
 
 Certified Organic Green Food Hazard-Free Food 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Year Established
 1994 1990 2001 
Production (ha)
 2.89 million ha
 
9.91 million ha
 
21.19 million ha
 
Target Markets
 Export initially, but 
domestic market has 
overtaken exports 
Domestic primarily, but 
some recognition 
Domestic 
Requires soil and 
water testing? 
Yes – samples must 
meet at least the second 
level of restriction in 
China’s soil quality 
standard 
Yes – samples must 
exceed the first level 
(most restrictive) of 
China’s soil quality 
standard 
Yes – samples must 
meet at least the second 
level of restriction in 
China’s soil quality 
standard 
Requires product 
testing for residues? 
Yes - 0 detection limit Yes - standard is stricter 
than for hazard-free 
food 
Yes - needs to meet the 
national standard for 
food hygiene 
Requires crop 
rotation? 
Yes 
 
No No 
Permits synthetic 
chemicals?
 
No use of synthetic 
fertilizer, pesticide, 
growth regulators or 
feed additives 
Yes, but limited use of 
synthetic fertilizer, 
pesticide, growth 
regulators and feed 
additives 
Yes, permits use of 
government approved 
fertilizer, pesticide, 
growth regulators and 
feed additives 
Permits GMO?
 No Yes Yes 
Traceability?
 Yes No No 
Regulatory Body
 China Organic Food 
Certification Centre, 
Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Green Food 
Development Centre, 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Centre for Agri-Food 
Quality and Safety, 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Verification Process 3
rd
 party verification at 
each crop planting 
2
nd
 party verification 
with annual 
surveillance 
None 
Period of Validity
 1 year 3 years 3 years 
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5.2.7.1 Green Food 
In 1990, the Ministry of Agriculture launched a ‘green food’ designation in China 
and established the China Green Food Development Centre (CGFDC) to provide oversight 
(Paull, 2008; Scott et al., 2014). Green food needs to be produced in areas that meet state-
established air quality standards, low levels of heavy metals in irrigation water and soil tests, 
and chemical applications of some pesticides and herbicides are banned (Giovannucci, 2005). 
There is no requirement for or regulation of specific agronomic practices (such as cover 
cropping or other soil building practices, or animal stocking rates), and GMOs and/or synthetic 
fertilizers are permitted (Lin, Zhou & Ma, 2010). Originally, a distinction was made between 
green food Grade A and Grade AA, with the higher grade AA prohibiting more synthetic 
chemical inputs and thus approaching the organic standard (Scott et al., 2014; Thiers, 2005)
24
. 
In this way, some scholars suggest that the green food standard has acted like a stepping stone 
to help producers gradually shift to organic production resulting in rapid sector development 
(Paull, 2007). Green food is produced for both domestic consumption and exports, and 
recently, China is importing production certified to this standard. For example, in 2008, China 
accredited 600,000 tonnes of malting barley from the Canadian Wheat board for import 
annually (Paull, 2008). 
 
5.2.7.2 Hazard-Free Food 
In 2001 the Ministry of Agriculture launched the ‘hazard-free’ food program as the 
foundation level for agricultural production (hazard-free is also translated as ‘pollution-free’ or 
‘no public harm’ food). Hazard-free food production follows a less stringent production 
standard than green food (Sanders, 2006). In researching these standards with colleagues, we 
have noted that this standard was developed after the green food standard, even though it is less 
stringent, and indeed is more or less what we could consider ‘conventional’ agricultural 
production that uses government regulated pesticides, fertilizers, GMO and other inputs (Scott 
et al., 2014). Scott et al. (2014) have suggested that the hazard-free standard was announced in 
response to the difficulties farmers and processors were facing in adopting the lower pesticide 
requirements of the green food standard. In other words, the state recognized that it needed to 
                                                 
24
 Some interviewees indicated to us that  grade AA does not exist any longer and has been folded into the organic 
certification. 
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move toward ecological agriculture, but initially set the first bar too high in launching the green 
food standard and did not see the adoption levels they were hoping for. Further, most scholars 
and farmers in the global north would not classify hazard-free food as an ecological standard. It 
permits use of synthetic pesticides and fertilizers, as well as GMO seeds and feed. While it is 
still a voluntary standard at present, it may evolve to become the basic minimum requirement 
for all conventional agricultural production in China (Scott et al., 2014).  
 
5.2.7.3 Organic Food 
In 1994 China introduced its organic label, motivated by promising export markets, 
particularly for products such as tea where there was a demand in the global north (Lyons, 
2008). However, the domestic market, with sales estimated at US $750 million in 2006, has 
overtaken exports estimated at US $350 million (Scoones, 2008). Also in contrast to green 
food and hazard-free standards, the organic food standard was introduced and developed under 
the auspices of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) (now the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection) as opposed to the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1994 SEPA 
established the China Organic Food Certification Centre as the first research, certification, 
training and marketing body for organic agriculture. Today, they remain the largest of China’s 
23 certification bodies accredited to verify organic production. Initially, China’s organic 
products were certified only to foreign standards, in particular the EU, Japan or the USDA. 
However, in 2005 China launched its own standard, compliant with IFOAM’s principles and 
Codex Alimentarius, and including aspects from the US, Japanese, and EU programs (Sheng, 
Shen, Qiao, Yu & Fan, 2009). There are four sub-standards that detail the requirements for 
food and fibre production, processing, labelling and marketing, and the management of the 
national organic system. The standards cover fibre crops (notably cotton), agricultural crops, 
mushrooms, wild harvesting (notably medicinal plants), livestock and aquaculture products 
(Xie, Tingyou & Yi, 2010). Today, the certification industry is managed by the China National 
Accreditation Services for Conformity Assessment (CNAS) under the direction of the 
Certification and Accreditation Administration of China (CNCA), which ensures transparency 
of certified products and maintains a publically viewable database (Scoones, 2008).   
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5.2.7.4 The Organic Food Market 
 Considering that China’s organic standard was first developed only in 2005, growth 
to a position of one of the ‘top four’ countries with the most organic acreage is impressive. In 
2012, China had 1.9 million hectares of cultivated land plus 982,400 hectares of wild collection 
land in organic production for a total of 2,882,400 hectares or 0.4% of all arable land and 
placing fourth after Australia, Argentina and the US in terms of acreage in organic production 
(Lernoud et al., 2014). In March 2012, in response to rising public concerns over food safety, 
reports of fraudulent organic products in markets, as well as the state’s desire for 
harmonization with the EU, China strengthened its organic standard (Lernoud et al., 2014; 
BioFach China, 2013; Scott et al., 2014). This strengthening of the standard, coupled with 
extensive reports I heard from interviewees about fraud and corruption, casts skepticism across 
the apparent growth in the organic sector and raises questions as to whether the original 
organic standard did indeed comply with IFOAM principles. For example, the new standard 
requires crop rotations and cover cropping as well as access to outdoors for livestock, but these 
practices would have been assumed in any standard claiming IFOAM equivalence. Now 
however, China’s most recent standard goes beyond requirements of most organic standards in 
requiring an inspection each time a new crop is planted, as opposed to annually. So to 
illustrate, for a vegetable farmer who likely has successive planting dates throughout the 
season, an inspection needs to be scheduled each time a new crop is planted. Interviewees 
widely criticized the new standard as being overly stringent and several certified organic 
producers said they would forego organic certification in the future and maintain green food 
certification instead, or only certify part of their production. Despite this more stringent 
standard, official reports assert that the numbers of organic operators have not diminished. 
There were an estimated 10,000 certificates issued in 2013; two-thirds for farms and one-third 
for processors (Wai, 2014). 
 
There have been challenges associated with China’s organic development. An EU 
China Trade project mission in 2008, noted the immature state of the organic regulatory 
framework, poor understanding of the regulation and processes, and corruption (Scoones, 
2008). Other scholars have noted complex bureaucracy as a barrier to sector expansion (Wai, 
2010). Yet, others have noted that in many ways the organic standards are a façade that hides a 
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policy ghetto, noting no incentives for transition to organic production, no price supports for 
organic products, no mechanisms for providing farmers legal redress against GMO 
contamination, and indeed the state does not even appear to be keeping statistics on organic 
production (Egelyng et al., 2013). These scholars argue that China’s focus has been on 
placating consumers concerned with food safety and has neglected attention to policies that 
address more fundamental problems through polluter pay principles. For example, the state 
continues to subsidize synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and generously fund and patent 
GMO crop developments (Carter, 2012). 
 
5.2.7.5 The Role Played by Civil Society  
Where a populist and democratic concern about agriculture and associated 
technology exists in the global north, a similar movement has been absent in China, where a 
state-controlled, elitist decision-making approach excludes people from the development of 
technology and science-driven standards (Xie et al., 2010). This state initiation has been called 
“authoritarian environmentalism” (Gilley, 2012, p. 287) in reference to a non-participatory and 
largely non-consultative approach to policy-making which excludes civil society and business 
actors, and emphasizes state-managed processes where only particular scientists and 
technocrats of the state’s choosing are involved (Gilley, 2012). The approach eschews 
participation of either independent academia or civil society, and authoritatively proclaims 
scientific knowledge based on the participation by technocratic elites, deciding which ‘science’ 
to listen to and ignoring scholars with non-dominant views (Gilley, 2012). Writing about the 
development of climate change policy in particular, Gilley describes the lack of participation in 
environmental governance and standard-setting in China, noting that “As a general statement, 
all public policy processes in China are non-participatory” (2012, p. 293, emphasis in original). 
Further, where there is civil society involvement in policy and standard setting processes, it is 
tightly managed and participation is curtailed (Johnson, 2010).   
 
The the lack of substantive input from farmers, coupled with a low level of 
ecological awareness and poor technical skills are holding back further development of the 
ecological and organic sector (Horlings & Marsden, 2014) and there is urgent need for ‘bottom 
up’ participation in strategy development as well as more effective agricultural instruction. 
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Small-scale farmers converting to organic agriculture require better production-related supports 
(Oelofse et al., 2011). Yet, part of the challenge is that even though food security is prioritized, 
many farmers have become despondent and lost enthusiasm for agriculture given its falling 
revenues, rising input costs, and the expanding opportunities they have for off farm work. 
Further, while farmers see environmental pollution as affecting their livelihoods, they generally 
believe the responsibility for solutions lies with the state and they can accomplish little acting 
autonomously (Ma, Chen, Zhao, Zheng & Lu, 2009). 
 
5.2.7.6 Environmental Awareness and Food Eco-Labels 
Recently however, awareness of environmental issues generally, and agro-food 
environmental issues specifically, is growing, particularly due to more transparency in the 
Chinese media and access to western media (Xie, 2009). For example, drawing on China 
Environmental Statistical Reports from 1995-2003, Xie shows how, in a sample of 10,000 
households from 31 provinces and municipalities, 57% of respondents believed environmental 
problems in China are serious, with most acute concern centred on noise pollution, and air and 
water quality. Yet, scholars stop short of considering this an environmental movement similar 
to the experience of the global north and note that people’s perceptions of environmental 
pollution are ambiguous (Tilt, 2013). Green activism in China is structured by a political 
environment in which authorities restrict efforts that involve mass organizing, control 
information flow, and limit channels of participation (Xie, 2009). Environmentalism is further 
restrained by the reality that, in rural areas, people understand that their livelihoods depend on 
being a polluter (Lora-Wainwright, 2009) and by a sense of fatalism that pollution is inevitable 
(Lora-Wainwright, Zhang, Wu & Van Rooij, 2012). 
 
In terms of environmental awareness and food in particular, things seem bleak. 
Recently, Liu, Pieniak and Verbeke (2013), undertook a meta-review of 34 studies, published 
primarily in Chinese, relating to consumer attitudes toward green, hazard free and/or organic 
food in China. Most Chinese consumers are aware of these various eco-labels and associate 
them with safe food. The green food label had the highest consumer awareness, whereas people 
were least aware of the organic foods labels. Regardless of being aware of the labels, in most 
studies consumers were confused by these eco-food standards and were unable to explain the 
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differences between them. Further, Chinese consumer studies describe a pervasive distrust and 
suspicion about food quality and these labels, and consumers are skeptical about state 
enforcement systems. Consumers who purchase eco-labelled foods were doing so for personal 
benefits, or concerns about their own exposure and health, rather than environmental protection 
(Liu et al., 2013). 
 
This section has outlined how ecological agriculture in China has been framed in an 
approach that celebrates the use of state-approved science and technology and is developing in 
a paradoxical place. On one hand, China has a strong history of traditional and often ecological 
practices, but, on the other hand, because farmers are not included in discussion and research, 
these skills are being lost. Meanwhile, China’s prevailing productivism and food security 
policies has influenced what is considered ecological production. China’s progressively 
stringent ecological standards and complicated governance illustrate this. While some scholars 
have considered hazard-free foods as ‘ecological’ (Lin et al., 2010; Paull, 2007), a closer look 
reveals that the allowable inputs in this standard are what, throughout the world, would be 
considered ‘conventional’ production. Finally, in this section I described people’s low 
environmental awareness and the absence of any type of ‘bottom up’ involvement in the 
development of China’s ecological agriculture sector. With this background, I now look at the 
ecological relations in China’s AFNs with particular attention to the ways in which they define 
and manifest organic production approaches in this context. 
 
 
5.3  Exploring the Meanings and Practices of ‘Organic’ in China’s AFNs 
Following the post-structural framing of this research, the ecological is understood as 
something that is not ontologically given. In other words, it is not something out there to be 
discovered. Rather I understand ecological as a relational concept that is negotiated within 
these AFNs in processes that are influenced by the Chinese political-economic and cultural 
contexts. Hence, the state, agricultural scientists as well as the consumers and producers 
comprising these AFNs all define what is ecological and organic, and develop institutions in 
response. This presents an assessment challenge.  
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Considering compliance with the Chinese organic standard as a definition of 
‘organic’ for this research is problematic. While the Chinese organic standard as described 
above is comprised of a clearly codified measurable set of practices and ‘rules’ that could be 
assessed, AFN experience around the world suggests that smaller scaled producers often don’t 
pursue certification because of cost, or because it is not seen as necessary for direct marketing. 
More importantly, the Chinese standard development was a state-led process that excluded the 
voices and experience of peasant farmers. Instead of taking the state definition of organic as 
my criteria, I have constructed a simplified assessment that considers the degree to which the 
production practices in these networks reflect a mutual interdependence of human and 
ecological systems. Using this tool, I look at the ways in which farming systems in these AFNs 
enhance biological diversity, demonstrate closed-loop systems and protect soil and water 
resources (Koohafkan, Altieri & Holt Gimenez, 2012; Luttikholt, 2007). Second, I complement 
this ‘objective’ assessment of farming practices by considering the ways in which producers 
and consumers in these networks are co-constructing the meaning of organic for themselves 
and how this lay definition responds to the state governance of organic. The key questions 
guiding this reading of the data are: to what degree do the production practices inherent in 
these networks reflect agricultural science consensus on functional integrity (as outlined 
below) and a mutual interdependence of human and ecological systems? And how do lay 
participants in these networks conceptualize and negotiate the meaning and practice of 
organic?  
 
Numerous frameworks for documenting and assessing agro-ecological approaches 
exist. These frameworks consider the production methods on ecological farms as ‘alternative’ 
because they reject the dominant, productivist emphasis on yields and resource sufficiency. 
They focus instead on the functional integrity or stability of the agricultural system and its 
impacts on natural capital such as soil, water, crops and livestock, as well as on the ecosystem 
services from non-cultivated landscapes such as insectaries for pollinators (Luttikholt, 2007). 
As Halberg (2012) notes, a functional integrity approach has strong kinship with ecological 
production perspectives that underlie social science explorations of food systems. Specifically, 
the functional integrity approach aligns with principles of organic agriculture, principles of 
agro-ecology, as well as with discourse on traditional farming systems and ethics of care for 
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land (Luttikholt, 2007). It also aligns with the IFOAM organic principles and thus with the 
Chinese organic standard (Halberg & Muller, 2013). 
 
The dimensions of functional integrity and associated indicators are listed in Table 6. 
These indicators were selected based on three criteria:  
 They hold importance in the literature and are frequently cited. 
 They are culturally-relevant and meaningful in Chinese traditional farming discourse. 
 They are non-technical in nature and amenable to farmer self-reporting and site 
observations characteristic of social science research.  
Table 6: Indicators of Functional Integrity Selected for Investigation 
Dimensions of Functional Integrity  Selected Indicators 
Protecting soil structure, fertility and 
biology 
 Cover/Plow down crops/soil cover 
 Compost and/or manure 
 Use of ferments 
 Mixed Cropping – Integrates Livestock 
Using Close Loop Systems & Re-
cycling nutrients at the farm or regional 
level (‘Circular Farming’ in Chinese 
traditional farming) 
 On-farm composting 
 On-farm manure  
 Use of ferments 
 Feed grown on the farm 
 Mixed cropping – integrates livestock 
Landscape, species & genetic diversity  Use of untreated seeds, seed saving 
 Biological pest management  
 Use of ferments 
 Include land for ecosystem management set 
aside  
Protect and Conserve Water  Cover/plow down crops 
 Adapted varieties 
 Rain collection 
 Source: Compiled by author based on Halberg (2012),  Koohafkan et al., (2012) 
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5.3.1 Ecological with Productivist Pressures  
Table 7 summarizes the results from surveys from the CSA farms in this study. As 
illustrated, most practices on these farms appear largely consistent with the IFOAM organic 
principles and the Chinese organic standard including the practices of sourcing non-GMO seed, 
using on-farm composting and manure, mixed cropping and avoidance of synthetic pesticides 
and fertilizers. However, the use of cover crops and intercropping, two practices considered 
strongly ecological and essential to organic systems, seem to be lacking in these networks. The 
absence of practices to protect soil resources stands out as problematic and illustrates a logic of 
intensification that contrasts with other traditional practices observed. Intercropping is a 
traditional practice in China where two or more crops are grown on the same field in order to 
more efficiently use land, water and nutrients nutrients, as well as lower weed and pest 
pressure. While Chinese traditional agriculture has a strong reputation for intercropping and 
using cover crops (King, 1911), more recently agronomists have been finding the practice to be 
declining, especially in peri-urban areas where other farm income possibilities are expanding 
(Oelofse et al., 2011) . The CSA operators I interviewed felt the practices of cover cropping 
and intercropping are very labour demanding, and they would need to spend more time in the 
field in order to manage the increased complexity of these cropping systems (FCSAB4, 
FCSAB5, FCSAB3). Further, several CSA operators said they lack equipment such as tractors 
necessary for these practices and the traditional knowledge of using work animals with plows 
has been lost (CSAB4, CSAB3).  
 
This pragmatism echoes other research on ecological agriculture in China. A cross 
country case study involving China and Brazil also found Chinese cropping systems to be 
strongly influenced by market pressures, and thus falling short of organic principles established 
by IFOAM (Oelofse et al., 2011). Global north scholars have considered such examples as a 
weakening of organic practices and an unravelling of the organic movement philosophy by 
pragmatists responding to market pressures. In China’s AFNs, this pressure to produce is not 
only economic. While the dominant practices in these networks are strongly ecological, the 
absence of some key practices suggests that the productivist ideology of the state permeates the 
largely traditional practices in these networks. As one farmer noted when I asked about the 
absence of cover crops, “On a small farm, it is just inefficient to grow a crop that you don’t 
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sell. Plus I think most of these farmers know that we have a lot of people to feed in China. It is 
our responsibility to produce as much as we can. We don’t have room for crops we don’t eat” 
(FCSAB3). 
 
Table 7: Functional Integrity Practices on China’s AFN Farms 
Source: this author 
 
5.3.2 Searching for Traditional Knowledge  
It is instructive to return to King (1911) and examine the adoption of traditional 
practices in these networks. Site visits and interviews I conducted, demonstrate the use of 
closed loop farming systems, which operators referred to as “circular farming” (FCSAB5, 
FCSAB4, FCSAJ2). Embracing closed loop systems is an illustration of ties to traditional 
Chinese practices (Li et al., 2011) and stand in contrast to industrialized farming systems 
which tend to specialize and increase the use of off-farm inputs Prior to China’s 
industrialization of agriculture, these were the dominant practices of the peasant farming 
system as described by King (1911). A number of these circular farming techniques were 
evident on the CSA farms in this study. For example, almost all the farms I visited were 
Outcomes Indicators Percentage of farms 
(N=14) 
Protect Soil structure 
and biology 
Cover/Plow down crops/soil cover 
Compost and/or manure 
Use of fermentation  
Mixed Cropping – Integrates Livestock 
 
38% 
100% 
77% 
70% 
“Circular Farming” 
Closed Loop Systems 
On-farm composting 
On-farm manure  
Use of ferments 
Feed grown on the farm 
Mixed cropping – integrates livestock 
 
92%  
85% 
77% 
56%  
70%  
Promote landscape, 
species and genetic 
diversity 
Use of untreated seeds, seed saving 
Biological pest management  
Use of fermentation 
100%  
92% 
77% 
Protect and Conserve 
water 
Cover/plow down crops 
Varieties adapted to drought 
Rain collection 
 
38% 
Not observed 
Not observed 
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aerobically fermenting vegetable waste, and using composted human manure for fertility. In 
addition, typically farms were integrating livestock into their farming systems and relying on 
plant-based medicines made on the farm to treat the animals.  
 
Yet the low input, traditional practices on these farms co-exist with advanced 
technologies. All the farms had extensive modern infrastructure, including modern greenhouse 
operations, paved roadways, concrete irrigation ditches, on-farm restaurants, farm stores and 
sometimes accommodations for visitors. In some cases, it is easy to understand the reasons for 
this mixture of traditional and modern. This infrastructure supports multifuncationality on 
these farms and a strong orientation toward tourism (discussed in the next chapter). Modern 
toilets that separate liquid and solid waste, make the traditional practice of separating ‘night 
soil’ from urine (somewhat) easier. Similarly, modern distilling equipment adds sophistication 
and precision to the processing of traditional medicines. These examples reflect a general 
philosophy that traditional practices can be re-articulated with modern practices and thereby 
improved.  
 
However, other traditional farming practices, documented by King (1911) are 
notably absent on these farms. For example, CSA operators talked about challenges in sourcing 
non-GMO seed, but none of the CSA operators I interviewed talked about saving seed, and 
only one farmer was raising heritage breed animals. Clearly, seed saving and variety breeding 
are central to the re-establishment of traditional practices, so the absence of these practices is 
curious and problematic. Further, there were few traditional pest management approaches 
being used on these farms, even though several of the farmers told me that managing pests was 
their biggest challenge. But I saw none of the traditional practices that would help address their 
challenges. For example, there were no insectaries planted to draw in beneficial insects. Nor 
were there any symbiotic cropping patterns, like the use of frogs to control insects, as described 
by King (1911).  Indeed, the cropping patterns I observed were rather unimaginative and 
pragmatic. Vegetables were conveniently planted in rows to facilitate harvest, and as noted 
above, intercropping was limited. 
 
117 
 
There are some possible explanations as to why some traditional practices are 
adopted and others are not. First, these are nascent farms and inexperienced urban farm 
operators. Some traditional practices, like the complex cropping systems and plant breeding, 
described by King (1911), might be, for the present, beyond the skill levels of these new 
farmers.  Second, the state strongly influences the adoption of particular practices through its 
subsidies for certain technologies. In particular, in recent years, the state has recognized the 
potential of farm-based tourism for economic development and has supported its expansion 
(Su, 2011).   This policy direction and associated funding could explain the extensive on-farm 
infrastructure seen on these CSAs and the adoption of related practices. However, with neither 
funding nor extension support, traditions such as seed saving or preserving heritage livestock 
breeds, are not being preserved in these networks. 
 
5.3.3  Support from Within the Networks 
This selective adoption of traditional practices illustrates that while China’s ‘new 
peasants’ are environmentally motivated and seek to re-cover traditional practices, enacting 
these plans is challenging. Most of the CSAs in these networks were started by “self taught” 
(FMB1) urban residents without farming backgrounds in a context where traditional ecological 
practices have been lost. Interviewees lamented that “chemical farming is now seen as 
‘traditional’ to peasants in China” (NGOB1). At one farm visit, the CSA operator noted in 
reference to a 65 year old peasant farmer who had come to join our conversation, “These 
traditional practices and heritage breeds were foreign to my head foreman when he came here 
and we had to learn together” and that he “wanted to leave the farm in the beginning because 
he was worried that he wouldn’t get paid. He did not believe we would have a good yield 
without using chemicals” (FCSAB3). Chinese scholars have also noted the loss of traditional 
ecological practices is exasperated by the state’s focus on technological solutions and the 
absence of state or other civil society supports (Li, Miao & Lang, 2011), a situation that these 
networks are trying to address by “learning from each other” (FCSAB4).   
 
In the absence of civil society supports, these AFNs are filling this knowledge and 
skill void themselves. Notably, during my last visit one of the farmers’ market organizers was 
using proceeds from market sales to subsidize CSA operators to attend an organic farming 
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workshop she had arranged with a Canadian organic consultant. As she explained, “There is 
nowhere else these farmers can get this help. The state does not help us and the universities do 
not have the resources. There is really only one NGO that would even consider this practical 
kind of training and they are in Hong Kong” (FMB1). 
 
CSA operators in these networks are not facing these educational challenges alone. 
Organizers of the farmers’ markets and buying clubs, as well as some CSA members, are 
strong supporters of organic practices, and on-line posts frequently defend and celebrate these 
practices. As a typical example, in response to a consumer question about how the products 
offered at the farmers’ market are different from others, a consumer responded:  
Fertilizer and pesticide residues in the 1.8 billion acres of farmland in China 
would make us regret that our later generation won’t have clean water and healthy 
soil for safe food. Comparing to the pollution of industrial production and 
urbanization, agriculture is a bigger polluter in China. These farmers are doing 
something different and we should support them. (FCSAB4).   
 
This post resulted in a rally of responses about the problem of synthetic fertilizer use in 
China, complaints that the “organic fertilizer industry in China should be more 
regulated” (FMB1), discussions about the difficulties in sourcing “clean” manure for 
fertilizer resulting in many farmers “keep[ing] animals just for their manure, even 
though the animals need a lot of land for grazing” (FS1). 
 
Other examples further illustrate this co-construction or ‘organic’ between producers 
and consumers around ecological issues. A series of posts responded to a blogger who saw 
inconsistencies in the ecological practices on one of the farms and asked, “The original drive of 
developing organic farming is to protect environment, but now we see all these vegetables are 
packed in unrecyclable plastics bags, what you all think?” (FCSAB4). Responses from both 
producers and consumers offered alternatives to the use of plastic, such as packing vegetables 
in a kind of dried grass, and inviting others for further exchange and sharing of ideas to come 
up with better solutions. The series of ideas were then gathered together and re-posted as a list 
to all the farmers in the network to consider as possibilities for packaging CSA vegetables.  
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These AFNs have also developed a focus on food skill development for both 
producers and consumers. In response to widespread loss of traditional farming skills, some 
volunteers have undertaken the task of visiting peasant farms to explore their practices 
(FCSAB6) and to offer workshops on these practices to CSA operators and CSA members. 
Further, some of the better resourced CSAs in the networks host internships for students 
interested in learning organic farming techniques so they can return to their home villages and 
begin new organic farms and thereby reproduce the ecological resource base in the countryside 
(cf. Van der Ploeg, 2010). Indeed an entire stream in the 4
th
 Annual CSA Conference I attended 
in Beijing was devoted to the theme of ‘Young People Return Home to the Countryside’, which 
I was told was an emerging phenomenon that academics and NGOs are following with interest 
and hope (NGOHK).  
.   
5.3.4 Embracing Traditional Practices but Marginalizing Peasants 
While these AFNs are organizing strong networks and drawing support from 
consumers, NGOs and academics, it seems contradictory that they are not seeking advice in the 
most obvious place - the peasant farmers who are working on their farms. The CSA operators I 
interviewed believe that traditional agriculture in China has been lost, and that peasants no 
longer have traditional knowledge and skills. Yet, many of the farms I visited were employing 
peasants who looked to be over 50 years old, and would have been raised on collective farms 
of the Mao era and it seems unbelievable  that the parents of these peasant farmers, who would 
have farmed with traditional methods, had such little influence. It seems unbelievable that 
farming traditions that persevered for forty centuries could be lost in one generation. This 
contradiction requires another explanation for why CSA operators are not identifying the 
opportunity to learn from the peasant farmers on their farms. I suggest these networks 
articulate a discourse of suzhi. Discussed further in the next chapter, suzhi is a discourse of 
quality that substitutes for the concept of social class. Suzhi discourse portrays peasants as low 
quality, linked to the uncivilized, uncultured and superstitious (Anagnost, 2008). It is revealed 
in a widespread distrust of the peasantry in China, and in the way CSA farmers describe the 
peasant labourers on the farms. Comments such as, “peasants no longer know how to farm 
traditionally” (FCSAB5), “We needed to show them [the peasant workers] how to farm” 
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(FCSAB4) and “It is difficult to find a peasant who knows anything about organic farming” 
(FCSAB3) suggest that two solitudes of urban and rural prevail in these ‘alternatives’. Hence, 
while the appeal of traditional agriculture drives the desire for strong ecological practices in 
these networks, this gaze toward the peasant, judgements about their motives and 
backwardness, and their exclusion from decision-making on the farm, ignore what could be the 
best source of knowledge and skills on traditional farming available to China’s ‘new peasants’. 
 
5.3.5 Resistance to the State’s Organic Standard 
It wasn’t possible for me to completely assess farm compliance with the state’s 
organic standard, and under a quarter (24%)
25
 of the farms I visited had chosen to have their 
processes verified by a third party. I suspect that most of the CSAs I visited were compliant 
with China’s organic standard in terms of farming practices, but likely they were not keeping 
the required audit trails for inputs, harvest and storage. Nor were most of them testing soil, 
water and/or produce for heavy metals or other residues as is required by the state standard. 
Further, there was a reliance on enclosed systems for pigs, as noted below, that would not meet 
the requirements for outdoor access in the organic standard, and it is doubtful that the use of 
human manure would meet the standards.  
 
Instead of supporting the national standard, most of the CSA operators I spoke with 
were cynical about the state’s role in organic standard setting and speculated that its 
development was not motivated by ecological concern. They thought the whole group of 
ecological standards (described above) were a façade to give the “appearance of addressing 
food safety concerns” in order to maintain “social harmony” (FCSAJ2). There was also 
widespread distrust of the certification and enforcement process with AFN participants feeling 
that the state “doesn’t monitor the sector effectively and hasn’t done an effective job at 
promoting the organic concept” (BCB1), and that there is little hope of civil society shaping 
these standards or audit arrangements in the future.  Further, CSA operators explained that the 
standard was not achievable for small producers, especially with the most recent changes 
                                                 
25
 This compares with the situation in Ontario, where 28% of CSA farms  are certified  (Schumilas, 2011).    
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(outlined earlier). One farmer explained that it would cost the equivalent of US $145
26
 for an 
inspector to visit and oversee their work, each time they put new seeds in the ground. For CSA 
farmers who sow seeds continuously throughout the season, this cost becomes prohibitive. 
However, the rejection of the state’s organic standard goes beyond economic concerns to 
reflect an ecological ideology inherent in these AFNs. As one CSA operator noted, “It is not 
just because it is expensive. The organic standard is for farmers who are using organic 
pesticides and inputs as substitutes. We are farmers that are trying to shift from that 
philosophy to traditional methods and these are not addressed by the standard. Our traditional 
pig system for example does not meet the standard because the pigs do not have open access to 
outside” (FCSAB4).   
 
Reacting to these concerns and exclusion from standard setting processes, producers 
and consumers in these networks are contesting and reconfiguring state standards by 
constructing their own meaning of organic (BCBI, FMBI). Rejecting the state’s expert-led 
third party verification system, their approach relies on the development of lay knowledge. 
Both farmers’ markets and buying clubs in these networks have developed practices they 
consider fundamental to organic production along with regimes for verifying these practices. 
As one of the farmers’ market volunteers described: 
We met with farmers and went to the farms with scholars from the university to 
discuss their practices, because I didn’t understand about organic practices. In the 
end we now use a set of criteria for who we accept to sell at the markets. For 
example: no pesticides and chemical fertilizers, avoid GMO (but we know 
sometimes farmers can’t tell), animals cannot be kept in cages, no antibiotics 
unless the animal is very sick. Farmers must be willing to work with others, and 
they have to be small or medium size, and for processed foods there are no 
chemical additives, and they are made in a traditional way” (FMB1). 
 
The market then uses these criteria to assess farms. In 2012, there were over 300 applicant 
farms to the market in Beijing. One third of these were refused vendor status based on the 
                                                 
26
I received widely ranging estimates on certification costs.  Some estimates were as high as US $2,200 per crop.  
The divergence in estimates suggests to me that some CSA farmers dismissed the idea of certification before 
investigating the details.  
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practices the farmer described. The remaining 200 farms were visited by market volunteers and 
only one third of those were considered “qualified” (FMB1).   
 
These criteria are not well defined and codified as in a national organic standard. 
Instead they convey the general interest of market organizers in supporting a shift toward a less 
industrialized and safer food system. Plus, unlike the situation in national organic standards, 
there is flexibility. While, on one hand market volunteers stressed their commitment to 
screening prospective vendors, at the same time they emphasized that this is the responsibility 
of consumers in noting, “We are only a platform for producers to connect with consumers. It is 
up to them to communicate about the products. For example, we have accepted products from 
farms that use limited pesticides as long as it is declared and transparent when the product is 
in the market” (FMB1).  
 
In parallel fashion buying club volunteers ensure the quality of their sourced food by 
visiting and interrogating suppliers directly. They highlight the time and organization it takes 
to regularly visit multiple farms. They are committed to rigor and they work with agricultural 
researchers from the university to design forms that translate the technical aspects of organic 
production into lay language with various indicators, which they use to inspect farms (BCB1). 
They are committed to transparency. They post the criteria and the results of their farm visits 
on their website. They describe their process as an “ethical inspection” in which the farmers 
make pledges as to their practices (BCB1). One of the buying club organizers I spoke with was 
particularly critical of the state’s approach to standard-setting and enforcement, and adopted a 
stance I would define as activist. She was passionate about needing to feed her children healthy 
food and disgusted by the state’s unwillingness and inability to ensure food quality. She 
described the state’s ecological standards and governance as a “flawed concept” which 
deceived the public, media, officials and experts. She said that they have visited farms that had 
been verified as organic and found pesticides and synthetic fertilizers in plain sight, and 
“farmers did not even try to hide them” (BCB1).  
 
This process of community based standard development reflects a civic approach 
wherein expertise is not limited to experts with credentials, but rather is a shared responsibility 
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inclusive of lay perspectives. In this way, the Chinese case is similar to processes used in Japan 
by Seikatsu Club Consumer Cooperatives and their Independent Audit by Many described 
earlier (Kimura, 2010). There is also discussion among China’s AFN participants about PGS, 
although, this term was used quite indiscriminately. For example, in contrast to the rather 
structured approach taken by IFOAM, where criteria to use in assessing farms are carefully 
constructed, on my first visit CSA operators used the term PGS to refer to the situation where 
individual consumers come to the farm to visit and to observe practices for themselves 
(FCSAB4). However, I have learned not to underestimate how quickly things can change in 
these networks. By my second visit (7 months later) the “National Ecological Agriculture 
Network” had been launched by a group of CSAs with the support of Asia’s IFOAM 
representative (OB1). In May 2013, I noticed in an IFOAM newsletter and on one of the CSAs 
websites (FCSAB6), that the IFOAM PGS Coordinator had visited with a group of CSAs I had 
interviewed, and that the farms had identified what was needed to pursue a formal PGS system 
and were actively working towards that goal. 
 
Some global north scholars have suggested that this type of participatory standard 
setting process is characteristic of advanced neoliberalism where states are aligning with 
industry and devolving their responsibilities to communities (Guthman, 2008). The evidence 
from the Chinese AFNs considered here complicates this reasoning. The participatory 
producer-consumer co-constructions of standards in China’s AFNs do not result from a ‘weak 
state’ acting in concert with agri-business to ‘water down’ standards. Rather, the evidence 
suggests the opposite. In China, the state has acted to address widespread corruption and fraud 
in organic governance by enacting strong standards, in effect setting the bar ridiculously high 
with requirements for an inspection every time a seed is planted, knowing that farmers can’t 
possibly comply. Citing examples of corruption, participants in the AFNs I interviewed distrust 
the state’s standard setting mechanism and the bureaucracy charged with its enforcement. In 
what can be understood as a form of everyday resistance to the state’s approach, this distrust is 
motivating the formation of nascent civil society action to develop standards in which they can 
place their trust. As with the IAM, producers and consumers are involved in this civic standard 
setting together, and are jointly responsible for selecting the aspects of quality they seek. As a 
result, the focus of the criteria is on organic farming practices rather than market quality 
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criteria like size, appearance or consistency. Plus, these AFN processes are situated and 
reflexive versus universal and inflexible, allowing for exceptions in particular situations. So 
while it could be argued that such civic processes in effect ‘let the state off the hook’ by 
accepting its responsibilities (Guthman, 2008), it can also be argued that in this process, people 
are developing skills that could be prefiguring future democratic processes. 
 
5.4 Ecological Hybrids of Traditional and Modern Production  
This chapter has explored the ecological relations in China’s AFNs with particular 
attention to the ways in which they define and manifest organic production approaches in the 
context of state-led, technologically-driven productivist approaches to ecological agriculture 
governance. I argue that the farms in these networks articulate a mixture of traditional and 
modern production methods in a type of ecological hybridity. I began by considering the 
divided ways in which organic is understood in both scholarship and practice, as a set of 
codified practices and as diverse ecological processes. From there, I discussed how in the 
global north the organic movement came to rely on the former approaches, resulting in 
standards becoming co-opted and watered down in response to corporate pursuit of profits. In 
response, a ‘beyond organic’ movement is rekindling the original ideology of the organic 
movement and there is growing interest in civic-led standards construction that centres lay 
voices in open, democratic process.  
 
However, the situation in China sits in contrast to this civil society mobilization that 
characterizes AFNs in the global north. In the absence of any type of ecological social 
movement, and driven by historic scientism and celebration of technology, the state has 
sponsored the development of a ‘made in China’ ecological agriculture sector. But this Chinese 
ecological agriculture is in trouble. Its research base is limited, the traditional practices it seeks 
to adopt are evaporating, and scholars have no room to manoeuvre from within an ideology of 
productivism that finds traditional subsistence oriented farming lacks the yields to meet the 
state’s food security targets. In efforts to built stronger import and export markets for high 
quality foods, the state has built a complex set of standards, which are largely devoid of other 
policy supports.  
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Turning to China’s emerging AFNs, I used two different lenses to explore how they 
understand and construct organic food in this context of authoritative standard governance and 
productivism. First, using the concept of functional integrity, I described how the farms in 
these networks are strong examples of organic practices with a focus on biodiversity, closed 
loop systems and de-emphasis of externally sourced inputs. However, the state’s reach and 
drive for productivism extends to these ‘alternatives’ and CSA operators and farmers eschew 
key ecological practices because they would negatively impact yields. In the absence of 
organized civil society or government support, these producers, many of whom are new to 
farming, are challenged in a context where traditional practices are being lost. In response, 
farmers and consumers are supporting each other in these networks to build food skills and 
celebrate both traditional and modern ecological practices. However, my observations raise 
questions about why some traditional practices are pursued and others are not, and why, in 
their search to re-kindle traditional agriculture, these urban CSA farmers are not looking to the 
peasants who are labouring on their farms. 
 
Finally, I described how, in the face of widespread distrust of and exclusion from the 
state regulatory system for organic, these face-to-face interactions have spawned new 
approaches to defining organic and verifying production practices. In resistance to state 
authorized standards, consumers and producers in these AFNs are co-constructing what organic 
means and building skills and establishing trust in the process. In this way, paradoxically, the 
state’s focus on food sufficiency and productivism, and food quality through the setting of 
artificially high standards, results in the formation of nascent civil society that is resisting the 
dominant paradigm by constructing its own understanding and practice of organic from below. 
 
The next chapter looks more closely at how the process of connecting and trust 
building between producers and consumers in these networks is occurring and explores the 
nature of these interpersonal relations using an ‘ethics of care’ theoretical approach.  
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6.0 China’s AFNs as Windows to Trust and Reconnections 
 
The economic and ecological aspects of China’s reforms, and how those are 
implicating the formation of AFNs, were considered in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. This 
chapter complicates the analysis by taking a closer look at the interpersonal dimension of 
reforms and the emerging AFNs framed within cultural changes. The de-collectivization 
processes described in Chapter 4, and the agricultural modernization described in Chapter 5, 
combined with urban reforms such as privatization of housing, and marketization of education 
and medical care are all encouraging individuals to assume greater responsibility and engage 
with the competitive forces of the market, and thus assume more risks (Yan, 2011). These 
sweeping social and economic changes are not all negative. They have resulted in food 
abundance and diverse food choices that have replaced historical experiences with hunger and 
famine (Veek et al., 2010) detailed in the last chapter. Yet, anthropologists in China describe a 
changing and contradictory cultural landscape where growing individualism and profit motives 
mingle with strong expectations that the state is responsible for ensuring food safety and 
security, recalling once again, the story of the Mandate of Heaven. 
 
I frame this look at the interpersonal relations in China’s AFNs within China’s food 
safety ‘crisis’, which I argue is a central part of the backdrop to the emergence of AFNs. I 
outline how the food crisis has become “socially lethal” (Yan, 2012, p. 717), how food fears 
are conflated with broader quality fears about the industrializing food supply, and are 
promoting attempts to re-build trust in food. Of course, this story resonates with the global 
north experience, and I review the ways in which AFNs can be examples of re-embedding and 
re-establishing relations of trust. Here I focus on the ethics of care literature as applied to food 
networks and use this to develop an interpersonal lens through which I consider China’s AFNs. 
 
To forecast some conclusions, I argue that given the high level of social anxiety 
about food in the current context, people are coming to China’s emerging AFNs to avoid 
unsafe food and mistrust of the food supply, versus being drawn toward trust. In engaging in 
these networks, most consumers are motivated by ‘caring for themselves’ and their immediate 
families. Yet regardless of what brings people to these networks initially, for some, there is a 
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deepening of interpersonal relations and development of trust that mirrors research from the 
global north. I argue that AFNs function as a ‘window’ through which distrusting and self-
interested consumers can enter and encounter a different ethic, that for some, deepens their 
interpersonal connections and conflates identities of ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’. But these 
networks are caught in a space where cultural conditions shape them in contradictory ways. On 
one hand, suzhi, a discourse on quality that stands in for social class works in opposition to the 
egalitarianism of traditional Chinese ethics and exemplifies the individualization and 
weakening of social bonds in the reform period. On the other, the ancient practice of guanxi 
helps to build informal trust networks that work to grow China’s AFNs as well as motivate the 
formation of nascent civil society.  
 
6.1 The Appearance, Disappearance and Re-Appearance of Confucius 
In 2012, a large statue of Confucius rather abruptly appeared in Tiananmen Square, 
and after a brief time, it was moved to the national museum. The statue’s abrupt appearance, 
disappearance and reappearance has provoked significant discussion among cultural scholars in 
China (cf. Wan, 2013), with some suggesting this as a metaphor for China’s struggle to 
integrate its traditional cultural views with those of western-influenced modernity. I do not 
engage at length with the cosmology guiding China’s traditional cultural norms and beliefs, nor 
do I seek to essentialize culture as an influence on China’s AFNs. Yet to write about the 
appearance of AFNs in China without, at least briefly, engaging with selected aspects of 
Chinese traditional culture, would leave the phenomenon under-explored. Chinese cultural 
heritage is founded on diverse schools of thought including Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, 
all of which shape cultural practices in contemporary society, and need to be considered as 
context for examining AFNs, in the same way that political economic and environmental 
conditions have been considered thus far in my analysis.  
 
In reflecting on the appearance, disappearance and re-appearance of Confucius 
described above, Wan Junren (2013), a Chinese ethicist and philosopher, argues that “the moral 
problem of contemporary Chinese society reflects the moral anomie and lack of norms in 
modern Chinese society’s process of transformation” (p. 185). He joins with others (Kleinman 
et al., 2011; Yan, 2010) in detailing how traditional moral culture in China has almost lost its 
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effect, but society has not yet established a new moral order. Beginning with the ‘New Culture 
Movement’ in 1910, and its slogan, “’Down with Confucianism’” (Wan, 2013, p. 186), old 
ethics were cast aside in a disillusionment with traditional culture as ancient values came to be 
seen as a historical burden that was impeding China’s entry into the modern era. China’s 
experience with modernization is putting enlightenment values of liberty, individualism and 
equality at odds with traditional Confucian ethical concepts of benevolence (ren), righteousness 
(yi), propriety (lie), wisdom (zhi), and fidelity (xin) (Wan, 2013)  
 
Moral traditions, however, are not easily broken. The Chinese version of modernity 
may still be in development and traditions can be a “spiritual driver for social change and 
transformation” in these troubled times (Wan, 2013, p. 197). As with the reappearance of the 
Confucius statue in a different place, Chinese society needs to find a way forward that 
integrates its moral traditions with those of Western liberal society. However, the journey Wan 
notes, will be marked by discontinuities and apparent contradictions between traditional and 
liberal worlds. An example of these contradictions can be found in the simultaneous rise of 
individualism and the perpetuation of guanxi network relations, and their contradictory 
influences on China’s AFNs. 
 
6.1.1 Rise of Individualism and Weakening of Social Bonds 
Individualism is a social theory and ideology to do with the self-realisation and 
voluntary choices manifest to various degrees in different societies (Wan, 2013). It is typically 
associated with liberalism and competitive capitalist relations where people are influenced to 
see themselves born as equals, and as autonomous almost asocial beings, characterized by 
relatively weak traditions and weak social bonds between people. Scholars argue that, to 
various degrees, increasing individualization has been manifest in China’s reform period (Yan, 
2011). Under Maoist socialism, the traditionally central institution of the family was replaced 
by the party-state through enforced participation in public political, economic and social 
campaigns. Chinese society shifted to “highly developed collectivist society where the 
individual almost entirely had lost her/his freedom and autonomy” as individual identity 
became tied to the state with the great goal of building a “strong and modern China” (Yan, 
2010, p. 493). But this has shifted during reforms and the the Chinese term songbang, or ‘to 
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untie’ has been used to describe recent changes (Yan, 2010). Reforms such as 
decollectivization of farms, farmers and urban work units, can be understood as the untying or 
freeing individuals from the constraints of collectives. Other major reform projects such as 
privatization of housing and marketization of education and medical care have all forced the 
individual to take on greater responsibility, engage with competitive forces of the market, and 
assume more risks (Yan, 2011). In this way, the complex pressures of privatization, 
urbanization, and the rise of consumerism are all encouraging a shift to a more individualist 
society. 
 
However, unlike throughout much of the global north, in China the persistence of 
state control means that this untying is only partial and the individual’s rights and identity 
remain dependent on the state (Yan, 2010). For example, a growing consumer protection 
movement, illustrates that, what on the surface appears as a growing assertion of rights
27
, has 
indeed been developed within government structure where the state retains absolute authority 
and control, suggesting that processes of ‘untying’ and ‘retying’ are occurring simultaneously 
(Kleinman et al., 2011; Yan, 2010).  
 
An interesting example of the way in which state control of the individual is 
perpetuated, notwithstanding the individualizing forces of the market, is given by the way in 
which high schools hold ‘pep rallies’ to indoctrinate young people (Hansen & Svarverud, 
2013). Hansen and Syarverud provide an interesting glimpse into how schools simultaneously 
promote an ideology of the self-made individual, capable of creating economic value through 
individualism, but at the same time, promote a type of individualism that sees people as 
subordinate to the state. This is a fundamental contradiction in China. The single party state 
requires complete loyalty, but simultaneously promotes liberal economics that depend on 
individual self-reliance and entrepreneurship (Hansen & Syarverud, 2010).  
 
6.1.2 Discourse of Suzhi 
A further illustration of the tension between traditional and liberal values in 
contemporary China is the discourse about population quality or suzhi (Anagnost, 2004; 
                                                 
27
 The Chinese view of rights and civil society-state relations are discussed at length in the next chapter. 
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Sigley, 2009) introduced in the previous chapter. With over thirty different definitions in 
English, suzhi defies simple translation as its meanings can be very contextual (Kipnis, 2006). 
Whereas during the Mao-era, the peasantry was cast as revolutionary, in reform-era China, 
educated urban elites have enacted this discourse in portraying peasants as backward and 
obstacles to modernization (Anagnost, 2004). In the 1980s, suzhi became the dominant word 
for ‘quality’, with a meaning that reflects the shifting power dynamics evolving with growing 
individualism and capitalism (Jacka, 2013). Suzhi is used to explain differential value of 
labour, and by extension, the differential value of people. As such, it is a signifier that stands in 
for the concept of ‘class’ in Chinese discourse (Anagnost, 2004). In essence suzhi discourse 
divides behaviour into civilized (mostly associated with the urban)  and uncivilised (mostly 
associated with the rural). Anagnost (2008) describes, “the discourse of suzhi, appears most 
elaborated in relation to two figures: the body of the rural migrant, which exemplifies suzhi in 
its apparent absence, and the body of the urban, middle-class only child, which is fetishized as 
a site for the accumulation of the very dimensions of suzhi wanting in its ‘other” (p. 195). As 
such, it stands in opposition to the egalitarianism that characterizes traditional Chinese ethics 
(Jacka, 2009). In this way, the discourse has become an important tool in responsibilizing 
citizens toward a productive market society in the reform period, and in diverting gaze away 
from the state’s failure in addressing growing economic inequities (Kipnis, 2006; Jacka, 2013). 
In summary, the discourse of suzhi exemplifies the individualization and weakening of social 
bonds in contemporary China. Yet multi-directional shifts are underway. This un-tying co-
exists with re-tying and strengthening of informal networks illustrated by the practice of 
guanxi.  
 
6.1.3 The Practice of Guanxi 
While suzhi discourse strongly illustrates the growing individualism in contemporary 
China, guanxi relations illustrate the persistence of traditional ethics. Drawn from Confucian 
ethics valuing informal rules, versus liberal traditions favouring laws and legal institutions, 
guanxi, has been seen as the Chinese version of social capital (Kipnis, 2006). In essence, 
guanxi is understood as an informal system of social connections that are cultivated through 
the ongoing exchange of gifts and favours, and deeply rooted in Chinese culture (Gold, Guthrie 
& Wank, 2002). The practice of guanxi is seen as having multiple dimensions. First guanxi 
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relations are dyadic. Social bonds are made between two parties, and sets of these dyadic 
relations form networks, in which a person can use someone else’s guanxi ties to their 
advantage (Keith, Lash, Arnoldi & Rooker, 2014). These bonds are characterized by mutual 
commitment, loyalty and obligation (Keith et al., 2014). If the quality of guanxi is high, the 
relationship is also characterized by a deep trust and feelings between the parties. This is 
cultivated by repeated interaction, reciprocity, and long-term equity (Chen & Chen, 2004). On 
the other hand, guanxi can also be unequal and there can be a strong element of patronage or 
clientelism to its informal networks (Keith et al., 2014), giving it simultaneously positive and 
negative connotations.  
 
Guanxi is linked to sentiment and feelings (Gold et al., 2002). For this reason guanxi 
is not easily acquired, and people speak of ‘cultivating guanxi’ as a long term practice. Indeed 
this feelings or sentiment component differentiates quanxi from social capital, which is 
typically understood in the global north as more instrumental (Keith et al., 2014). This is not to 
say that guanxi relations do not serve instrumental needs, indeed they do. But guanxi relations 
are about both “things and feelings” (Chen & Chen, 2004, p. 309). Guanxi is best understood 
as a resource for social networks, that can help facilitate trust and reduce uncertainty, 
especially in situations where formalized institutions are lacking (Keith et al., 2014).  
As with the shifting locations of the statue of Confucius, on one hand we see the pull 
of individualist forces as demonstrated through suzhi discourse, and on the other hand, 
strengthening social bonds through informal guanxi networks. This tension is evidenced in 
China’s food safety ‘crisis’, which as the analysis below shows, provides an important 
backdrop to the exploration of China’s AFNs. 
 
6.2 Unpacking China’s Food Safety Crisis 
The social and cultural untying processes evident in contemporary China, and the 
reliance on informal networks over formal institutions, has dramatically affected food relations. 
Growing anxiety, fear and worry about the safety of food can be viewed against the backdrop 
of this evolving moral landscape of growing individualism and profit motives, yet strong 
expectations as to the state’s responsibility for food safety and security (Keith et al., 2014; Jia 
& Jukes, 2013). China’s food safety scandals started to receive exponential attention, by 
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scholars and the global press, in 2008 when 40,000 infants had to be hospitalized because of 
deliberate contamination of milk powder with melamine (Yan, 2012). Since that time, scholars 
have begun to unpack the ways China’s continuing food safety scandals reveal deep social and 
political processes deserving of the term ‘food safety crisis’ (Cheng, 2012; Yan, 2012). Yan 
(2012) has proposed a typology to help understand the various incidents that comprise the 
‘crisis’. He notes that incidents can be divided into three semi-distinct types. First, food 
hygiene problems, common in pre-modern China, have continued despite a more industrialized 
food system. Second, Yan (2012) describes a category of “unsafe foods” which are generally 
incidents associated with the extensive use of fertilizers and pesticides in China’s industrialized 
food sector (p. 707). Significant numbers of incidents fall into this category. Reports suggest 
that nearly 50% of fruits and vegetables in China have pesticide residues exceeding official 
standards and that each year more than 100,000 people become sick due to pesticide exposure 
(Holdaway, 2013; Yang, 2007). Third, Yan (2012) characterizes some food safety problems as 
“poisonous foods” and the types of scandals most provocative of the food safety crisis (p. 710). 
 
Poisonous foods are a newer phenomenon in China, and can be differentiated from 
other types of food problems because they are associated with deliberate contamination and 
thus serious ethical concerns (Yan, 2012). There are multiple pathways through which food has 
been deliberately contaminated by processors and producers motivated by profit. Specific 
harmful inputs have masked cheap processes, as in the case of colouring vegetables and berries 
with dye to improve their appearance. Cooking oil has been re-claimed and adulterated. Dye 
has been fed to poultry so eggs will be more brightly coloured. And, in one of the highest 
profile cases, melamine has been added to milk to boost its protein content cheaply (Yan, 
2012). Yan (2012) also describes a category of “fake foods” which present a “a challenge to 
the imagination” (p. 712). Examples are staggering and nauseating, and include starch 
masquerading as milk powder, soy sauce made from human hair, as well as chicken eggs made 
of water and various chemicals.  These cases of deliberate food adulteration in the pursuit of 
profit are most disturbing because evidence suggests they, all too frequently, occur with the 
knowledge of government officials (Yan, 2012, Holdaway, 2014). Hence, while research 
suggests the incidence of ill health from the deliberate adulteration of food may indeed be 
lower than from food hygiene problems, these “fake food” examples are “socially lethal” (Yan, 
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2012, p. 717) because of the intention to do harm with the apparent knowledge of the state, and 
because of the widespread fear, panic and distrust they engender.  
 
There is widespread agreement among scholars that a generalized distrust around 
food exists in Chinese society and state efforts thus far have failed to re-build trust in food. 
Indeed my interviews confirm this. Every individual I spoke with initiated a conversation about 
China’s food safety crisis, even though I never prompted this with a question. Despite harsh 
penalties for the guilty, and new food safety legislation and enforcement systems, the problem 
continues because of bureaucratic fragmentation, competition among regulatory agencies and 
corruption of officials (Jia & Jukes, 2013). Canadian sociologist Hongming Cheng (2012), who 
has investigated white collar crime in China, has recently turned his attention to “food crime” 
(p. 254). He argues that food scandals are perpetuated by the existence of a “helix of industry-
government-university relations” that favours “cheap capitalism” (Cheng, 2012, p. 257). The 
government’s own surveys consistently show food safety as a top concern revealing that by the 
end of 2010, 18 months after the state passed strengthened food safety legislation, 70% of 
surveyed consumers still ranked food safety as a top concern (Yan, 2012). In an unprecedented 
move, the party-state acknowledged its inability to provide safe food to its people. Yan (2012) 
cites a 2008 Ministry of Commerce report that admits “the increase in public concern about 
food safety may be an indicator of the decline of consumer confidence in the government’s 
ability to regulate food safety” (p. 724). Indeed, the state officials also don’t trust the food 
supply. The previous Mao era practice of a “special supply” of food designated for government 
officials and intellectual elite that existed when food shortages were part of life, has re-
appeared in response to the food safety crisis (Yan, 2012, p. 723). It seems that no resolution to 
the problems is in sight.  
 
Given the tendency toward suzhi discourse described above, blame for China’s food 
safety crisis is frequently cast toward peasants and away from the state’s regulatory failure 
(Ross, 2012). In analyzing milk adulteration scandals in 2010 and 2011, Ross (2012) raises the 
question of why farmers are blamed for contamination instead of  state regulators and 
industries whose contaminated water is used on fields. Indeed, the majority view is that 
China’s food safety problem is a crisis associated with a food system that is chaotic and 
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fragmented, and dominated by multiple small handlers (Holdaway & Husain, 2014). Critical 
analysis however reveals that consolidated food chains are not exempt from problems. The 
large 2008 melamine incident was not caused by the actions of small farmers, but 
comparatively large and powerful firms (Holdaway & Husain, 2014).  
 
6.2.1 Reconnections to Restore Trust in Food  
Jacob Klein (2013) is one of the few scholars in China studying how people are 
responding on a day-to-day basis in this pervasive climate of food distrust. His work suggests 
that these concerns about food safety are conflated with broader quality concerns and fears 
associated with the modern food system and industrialized production methods described as 
“unnatural” or “polluted” (p. 384). He argues that while, on one hand the disconnections, 
emphasis on individual responsibility, and market competitiveness of the reform period result 
in growing food uncertainties, at the same time these changes encourage people to pursue new 
connections in attempts to re-build trust in food (Klein, 2009, 2013). He describes, for 
example, his work with the Sino-Agriculture group in Kumming. Sino-Agriculture is part of a 
large alternative food company with a far-reaching ethical agenda. By 2009 they had 
established an organic vegetarian centre in Kumming that included a restaurant, food store, 
cafe and educational programs. Drawing on Buddhist notions of compassion and virtue, their 
activities focus on connecting producers with consumers and promoting ecological food 
systems (Klein, 2009). 
 
Klein’s anthropological research suggests that people’s values can be influenced by 
these ‘alternative’ food programs and that consumers are seeking ties with specific vendors at 
markets and other programs, to reconnect with producers and develop trust-based relationships 
around food (Klein, 2009). He notes that trust in food is entangled with people’s understanding 
of place and seasonal cycles, regional cuisine as well as perceptions of the food vendor or 
provider. Further, in the process of rebuilding trust, state endorsement of processes through the 
existence of certification schemes was found to be irrelevant, a finding echoed by nascent CSA 
research in China (Klein, 2013), as well as by this research.   
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In the face of ineffective food governance, China’s food safety crisis has perpetuated 
a crisis of distrust of the market, of individuals and of the state. This ‘food safety crisis’ sits in 
a context where people have been untied from collectivist institutions during the reform period, 
but still look to the state, although perhaps more tentatively, for ensuring food security and 
safety. Yet preliminary research suggests that the same processes that are contributing to the 
‘food crisis’ might be stimulating diverse solutions by encouraging new connections to rebuild 
trust, not in the state’s ability to provide safe food, but rather in place-based face to face 
relationships. Indeed agro-food scholars argue such a situated ‘reconnection’ has been 
occurring in the global north. 
 
6.3 Reconnecting to Food in the Global North 
As discussed above, scholarship that interrogates the ideas and practices of untying 
(disconnecting) and retying (reconnecting) to food is only just beginning in China. In contrast, 
in the global north these concepts have been foundational to AFN scholarship for over two 
decades. The tangible and intangible qualities of connections between and among producers, 
consumers and food production through local, direct exchange (as in for example CSAs, 
buying clubs, farm shops, farmers’ markets) have been extensively explored and contested 
(Cox et al., 2008; Feagan & Morris, 2009; Feagan & Henderson, 2009; Hendrickson & 
Heffernan, 2002; Hinrichs, 2000; Kneafsey et al., 2008). AFN scholars most frequently draw 
on theories of embeddedness in discussing these connections and reconnections (Granovetter, 
1985; Polanyi, 1944). More recently, however, and in response to some of the critiques of 
embeddedness as an analytic, the feminist theory of ‘ethics of care’ (Tronto, 1993) has offered 
another tool (and indeed the lens used in this analysis) to unpack relations in food systems. In 
this section, I briefly highlight the ways in which AFN scholars have drawn on embeddedness 
theory and the resulting critiques. Then I introduce how ethics of care theory has emerged with 
AFN scholarship and describe its application to AFNs before using it as my analytic approach 
to interrogate the interpersonal relations in China’s AFNs. 
 
6.3.1 Embeddedness as a Lens on Reconnections 
Scholarship on connection and reconnection in AFN most frequently draws on 
theorizing of Polyani (1944) and later Granovetter (1985), who both argued that economies do 
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not exist in the abstract, but rather are embedded in social relations. AFN scholars draw 
particularly on Granovetter’s28 proposition that through social networks, people in market 
relations can work together to resolve difficulties. In this way, economic transactions are 
mediated by wider concerns as opposed to being solely guided by personal interests (Sage, 
2003). Embeddedness has been interpreted in different ways in AFN scholarship (Feagan & 
Morris, 2009). Feagan and Morris (2009) for example, develop social, spatial and natural 
domains or interpretations of embeddedness. Most frequently, however, the focus in AFN 
studies has been on social and relational interpretations of embeddedness (Hinrichs, 2000; 
Kirwan, 2004; Sage, 2003; Sonnino, 2007). In this view, embeddedness reflects notions of 
connection, reciprocity and trust (Hinrichs, 2000), cooperation (Sonnino, 2007), and relations 
of regard (Sage, 2003). A wide range of practices, such as distributing information, hosting 
workshops, organizing on farm events, are suggested as central to creating favourable 
conditions for establishing trust, friendship and reciprocity that strengthen connections between 
and among producers, consumers and the environment. Indeed, these relations have come to be 
understood as a defining characteristic of the alternativeness of AFNs (Marsden, Banks & 
Bristow, 2000; Whatmore et al., 2003).  
 
Despite its emergence as a prominent analytical tool and an “almost magical” 
(Hinrichs, 2000, p. 297) attribute of AFNs, increasingly scholars are re-visiting the utility of 
embeddedness in food systems research and a number of critiques have been posed. First, 
citing the broad range of interpretations noted above, scholars suggest the concept is fuzzy, and 
often its meaning is assumed in relation to the research findings versus being determined a 
priori (Sonnino, 2007). Second, scholars note that the concept of embeddedness is normative 
and poses ‘alternative-good-local-embedded’ against ‘conventional-bad-global-disembedded’ 
food systems, where embedded systems are treated as always desirable by default (Morris & 
Kirwan, 2010), and doesn’t account for other factors such as price, availability, taste and so on, 
that affect food purchases. Third, there is little concrete elaboration of precisely how relations 
                                                 
28
 Much AFN scholarship extends Granovetter’s theory of embeddedness to the concept of trust.  However, 
Granovetter did not assume this linkage.  Rather, he acknowledged that social relations can indeed leave a person 
vulnerable to deceit,  as opposed to being automatically trust-based. 
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become embedded (Sonnino, 2007). Rather the scholarship assumes that anything and all 
interactions and behaviours, from sending newsletters out to posting signs in a market stall, 
contribute to embeddedness. Finally, scholars note that there is the assumption that embedded 
relations are of an ‘all or none’ nature and ignores the incremental nature of deepening social 
relations (Sonnino, 2007). These critiques have led scholars to conclude that embeddedness is 
not particularly useable for AFN studies. Winter (2003) notes “in truth, all market relations are 
socially embedded, and in a range of contrasting ways… We cannot equate ‘alternativeness’ 
with embeddedness in a deterministic manner” (p. 25). Instead scholars have argued that 
greater attention needs to be given to processes of embedding versus trying to measure the 
construct itself (Sonnino & Marsden, 2006). 
 
6.3.2 Ethics of Care 
Following from the theoretical predisposition toward post-structural and relational 
approaches to AFNs that frames my research, I have chosen to use the theory of ‘ethics of care’ 
(Fisher & Tronto, 1991; Gilligan, 1982; Lawson, 2007; Tronto, 1993) as an analytic to 
examine relations manifest in Chinese AFNs. This section overviews that approach and 
illustrates how it has been used in alternative food studies to date. 
 
Ethics of care theory is about moral reasoning and a sense of empathy and 
responsibility for others. Fisher and Tronto describe caring to include “everything that we do to 
maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That 
world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave 
in a complex, life sustaining web” (Fisher & Tronto, 1990, p. 40). Ethics of care originated as 
an ethical theory with feminist scholars, most notably Carol Gilligan (1982) who observed that 
people in her studies on identity sometimes made an empathetic, responsive and relationship-
building responses rather than the expected rational and universal ones. Gillian identified this 
as an alternative ethical orientation. Considering the thought experiment she used helps to 
illustrate. She described a hypothetical dilemma for a man named Heinz. Heinz has a wife who 
is very ill and they cannot afford the medication that would save her. Should he steal the drug? 
Some people in discussing the dilemma juxtapose the question of protecting property and the 
question of protecting life, and following a universal concern for life advocate that Heinz 
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should indeed steal the drug and save his wife. However, Gillian observed that many of her 
subjects had a different response. Rather than this juxtaposition, they expressed concern for 
Heinz’s wife and wondered how she would cope if he stole the drug and ended up in jail. Or 
they wondered how Heinz’s choice would affect the drugstore owner that Heinz stole from. 
Gillian noted the joining of empathy, reason and relationships in these responses and coined 
this alternative orientation as care ethics. 
 
How does the ‘Heinz dilemma’ apply to connectedness in AFNs? Like the concept of 
embeddedness discussed above, care ethics are drawn from the understanding that economic 
life and social life are not distinct. These relations are focused on a sense of responsibility for 
others and thus challenge ideas of individualism and of a society organized around efficiency 
and competition (Lawson, 2007). However, care ethics are not simply thoughts or propositions. 
Rather care needs to be understood as a set of practices (Lawson, 2007; Tronto, 2006). Care is 
both a consideration of, and a willingness to, take action about the needs of others. To 
illuminate this practice approach to care, Tronto (2006) has described four phases of care: to 
care about, to care for, to give care and to receive care. In elaborating these phases, she is clear 
that care is something everyone needs and everyone can be involved in. The following section 
briefly illustrates these phases of care with reference to AFN scholarship before using care 
ethics as a lens in the current research. 
 
6.3.3 Application to AFNs 
Kneafsey et al. (2008) have taken this theory and tried to understand how care can be 
understood as a practice in AFNs. Over three years, from 2004 – 2007, they worked with a 
collection of food enterprises that focused on producer-consumer direct connections. They 
employed Tronto’s phases of care as an analytic to explore three sets of relationships in these 
networks: reconnections of producers with markets, reconnections of consumers with products, 
processes and/or place, and reconnecting people with nature. They found that “care-ful” 
relationships are a foundation to re-connecting among and between producers, consumers and 
food in these enterprises (Cox, 2010, p. 113). In particular, they identified care for local 
economies, environments and future generations, care for health and wholeness and care about 
transparency as “overlapping cares” evident in AFNs that involved both producers and 
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consumers. Further they found that these different care relations were important in the process 
of building trust in AFNs (Kneafsey et al., 2008, p. 212-214). A range of identities, practices 
and motives adopted by producers and consumers in AFNs translated into different ethics of 
care being demonstrated. Consumers for example, demonstrated strong caring for their own 
health, their families’ health and for local economies. In comparison, producers demonstrated 
strong caring for the soil, the environment and future generations. However, face to face 
proximal relations does not guarantee caring, and care ethics can also be exclusionary and 
overlook needs of some (Tronto, 2006). In addition, Kneafsey et al. (2008) found that distant 
relations can also be characterised by care ethics. In particular reconnections can happen 
through electronically mediated mechanisms such as on-line purchasing and internet mediated 
schemes, suggesting caring in food relations can occur at a distance.  
 
Finally, one of the most interesting findings of Kneafsey et al.’s (2008) research is 
the uncovering of a graduation effect in which, through the process of being part of an 
alternative, some network participants refined their skills and transferred their knowledge to 
other life situations. This led to building trust and deepening the relations in the AFNs, 
suggesting the potential for transformative change beyond the specific AFN initiatives. They 
argue that, “a broad ethic of care for others…acts as an important moral foundation upon which 
many decisions regarding food are taken. ... This ethic of care can endow the discourses and 
practices of reconnection with radical and transformatory potential” (Kneafsey et al., 2008, p. 
26). 
 
6.4 Care Relations, Trust and Distrust in China’s AFNs 
As discussed above, some global north scholars argue that reconnections based in 
ethics of care and trust is a defining characteristics of alternative food procurement networks. 
Further, Chinese social scientists argue that exceedingly rapid social, economic and political 
changes, and accompanying food system industrialization, are producing disconnections in 
Chinese society. These disconnections are amplified by distrust in food resulting from a 
general perception of a food safety crisis and associated uncertainties. Care ethics makes a 
useful lens through which to examine interpersonal relations in Chinese AFNs because it 
moves well across different political philosophies (Robinson, 2010). In particular, care ethics 
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theory challenges the dichotomy between liberalism and socialism and between the individual 
and the collective, because it focuses on people’s ability to fulfill responsibilities to others 
(Robinson, 2010). In this respect, comparative philosophy scholars also note that much of 
traditional Chinese thinking overlaps with concept of ethics of care (Shirong, 2012). Having 
overviewed the ethics of care theory, I turn now to China’s AFNs to explore the ways in which 
people in these networks care about food relations and are demonstrating care for and with 
others (or not) in the human and non-human world.  
 
6.4.1 Caring ‘About’ Food and Pragmatic Reconnections 
Tronto (1993) describes the first phase of developing care ethics as “caring about” or 
the recognition that care is needed (p. 106). Producers and consumers in Chinese AFNs 
generally recognize that they have personal and family needs to meet and this is a precursor for 
their involvement in the network. As illustration, producers in these networks describe multiple 
motivations for their engagement with CSAs, farmers’ markets and buying clubs, with many 
producers noting that they enter into relations with consumers for instrumental reasons, most 
notably to offer consumers the high quality food they seek. At the same time they express 
concern for the environment. Further, AFN organizers and CSA operators widely acknowledge 
that consumers enter these networks seeking safe food in a context of pervasive uncertainty 
about food quality. As described in the typology presented in Chapter 3, seeking safe food is 
the common motivation in these networks. 
 
Beyond this conjoining of producers and consumers in the recognition of respective 
needs, consumers and producers in these networks are acting to deepen their connections. To 
illustrate, the farmers’ market coordinator is continually trying to maintain and establish new 
connections with consumers and helping to shift consumers to a place of caring about food and 
food relations. Indeed a significant amount of effort goes into these general communications 
about the network. One market manager described, “It is like a window, where the market 
opens up a world of different foods, producers and relationships…. People can come and 
simply buy a few items, or they can get to know the people who grow their food better” 
(FMB1). Similarly, CSA operators are constantly trying to forge connections with members, 
and consumers who are not currently members to create an ethic of care about food. All the 
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CSAs I visited offer a calendar of diverse events as well as newsletters and blog posts that go 
beyond simple promotions of their goods.  
 
I do not suggest that all CSA members engage in these ‘caring about’ relations. 
Indeed, echoing global north research (DeLind, 2003), despite ongoing attempts to draw 
members into closer participation in CSAs, often operators expressed disappointment at lower 
than hoped participation. As one CSA operator lamented, “consumers have little understanding 
of the importance of small farmers or environmental protection; they only focus on food safety, 
and it seems impossible to interest them in anything else” (FCSAIB4). Indeed CSA operators, 
market managers and buying club organizers alike explained their challenge with establishing 
connections with consumers given their strong suspicions of, and distrust in food relations 
generally, making the process of deepening the care and trust relations difficult. In the global 
north as well, many AFNs offer events and activities in the hope of drawing members into 
‘care-ful’ reconnections but such initiatives are often met with lacklustre participation (DeLind, 
2003; Feagan & Henderson, 2009). Often such instrumental consumer connections to AFNs 
are provided as evidence of neoliberal subjectivities and mainstreaming of the alternatives.  
 
6.4.2 Taking Care of Self and Family in a Context of Distrust 
Tronto (1993) describes the second phase of care ethics as ‘taking care of”. In food 
procurement networks, ‘taking care of’ is evident when a person moves beyond simply 
recognizing the need of the other and takes on some responsibility for that need. In this way 
taking care of can be seen as a step toward more active engagement. For consumers in these 
networks, care ethics are most typically manifest by consumers seeking to take care of 
themselves and their families by reconnecting to healthy food. Consumers in these networks 
are motivated to do the best for themselves and their bodies in an environment of distrust in 
food they perceive to be frequently adulterated. As a consumer who began one of the buying 
clubs noted,  “The whole reason we started this was because we all wanted to feed our children 
healthy and less adulterated food and we thought we could not do that by buying vegetables in 
the supermarket because we did not trust them” (BCIB1).  
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As described at the outset of this chapter, these AFNs exist in a culture of 
uncertainty,  where the food and the food providers are seen with suspicion. The heightened 
distrust in food, which I encountered in every interview and site visit, is explained succinctly 
by officials at the China Green Food Development Centre who explained, “In China, ‘food is 
God’, so food safety is essential for the health and stability of society” (0410). People 
considering participation in China’s AFNs are caught in the context of pervasive uncertainty, 
to which these networks have not totally succeeded in responding. It is the avoidance of 
distrust, not the positive motivation of trust, that draws consumers to these networks. One 
consumer I spoke with at one of the farmers’ markets shared that she thinks buying food at the 
market directly from a farmer is the “least bad” option. When we asked her about trust she 
responded that she could not say she trusted the farmers at the market, but rather that she 
distrusted them less than others. The CSA operators as well as the market volunteers I spoke 
with concurred that they had not “won the trust” (FMB1) of consumers yet. 
 
These findings echo both global north research and recent research in China. Direct 
connections between producers and consumers in AFNs seems to be just as much about an 
avoidance of distrust as a construction of trust (Chen, 2013a, Lamine, 2005; Little et al., 2010), 
leading to the conclusion that consumers join these efforts seeking to minimize risks in the 
context of food safety generally, and scandals more specifically. Producers are well aware of 
this primary motivation and do as much as they can to demonstrate transparency by engaging 
consumers to come to the farm. Nonetheless, care of self, family and one’s immediate network 
is an early stage of care ethics and should not be dismissed as ‘self-serving’. Seeking better 
food for one’s family is a demonstration of care, even if the driver is fear and anxiety. 
 
6.4.3 Taking Care of Self Through Reconnecting to Land 
While re-connections and ethics of care between consumers and producers seem 
weak in China’s social context of distrust, different kinds of ethics and re-connections seem to 
be more strongly enacted in these networks. Interviews, site visits and surveys illustrate that for 
many consumers, participation in these networks is a way of re-connecting, not to farmers, but 
rather to land. On the majority of the CSAs I visited, the operator sets aside a portion of the 
land, sometimes as much as one third of the farm, for members or sometimes non-members to 
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rent a plot and grow their own food with the assistance of the CSA farmers. Described as 
China’s “weekend farmers” (FMIB1) this plot renting is part of a larger country-wide 
obsession with nong jia le, a popular form of agritourism in which middle class urban 
consumers visit farms for relaxation and solitude. Nong jia le is translated with phrases such as 
“happy farm family” (Sia et al., 2013) or “delights in farm guesthouses” (Park, 2008), and is a 
state-supported, cultural rural tourism trend in China and also South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. 
The weekend farmers at these CSA farms, like the nong jia le tourism, draw on contrasts 
between rural and urban life.  
 
While most of the farms I visited had these weekend farmer plots, I was unable to 
interview any of these weekend farmers directly. So, in this section I draw on some recent 
research (Chen, 2013a) conducted on  many of the same CSAs I visited, that provides a 
glimpse into these ethics of care for land. A few examples illustrate how this ethics of care for 
land is motivated by complicated values and beliefs.  
  
6.4.3.1 Connecting to Land for Rest, Relaxation and Leisure 
For some, this reconnection to land appears as another enactment of caring for 
oneself  and thus might be considered as a form of respite or perhaps escapism from intensely 
urbanized environments. Indeed on these farms, the landscape itself seems to be more of a 
commodity than the vegetables, wherein consumers come to the farm to enjoy open space and 
fresh air while removing themselves from the dirtiness of food production: 
The environment here is good, with fresh air and some green instead of cement. I 
love this place; it is so idyllic. I want to own apiece of land in the suburb after 
retirement. I love the relaxed natural living environment (Informant 19, cited in  
Chen 2013a).  
 
6.4.3.2 Connecting to Land for Health and Well-being 
However, for others it could be that this connection to land also links to personal 
wellbeing, supporting the idea that it is a demonstration of ethics of care for oneself. Indeed 
Tronto (1993) understands ethics of care for one’s body and one’s health, not as selfishness, 
but rather as a foundation upon which ethics of care for others and the non human world can be 
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built. Indeed, on many of the farms I visited, groups of members were assembled in collective 
exercise such as Tai Chi. Again Chen’s (2013a) interviews with weekend farmers in these 
AFNs are helpful and fill a void in my own data. In his research, respondents regularly 
reflected on the health dimension and motivations behind their plot rental. For examples: 
 
From the start, I thought this land area was very small, but the amount of labor 
required is actually very significant. Plowing, planting and watering made me very 
tired; however, I enjoy a better feeling about my body. I used to feel very tired half 
way home in my walk from my unit, now I easily walk all the way home without 
feeling tired (Informant 41, cited in Chen 2013a).  
 
This is a way to relieve stress. Coming to the great farm is a kind of relaxation. I 
get relief from all sorts of pressures from work and my daily life. You will feel 
relaxed at such a green and natural place (Informant 15, cited in Chen 2013a). 
 
For example, you may feel very depressed at work this week. However, once you 
come here, depressed feelings are quickly relieved. All of unhappiness will 
disappear through working (Informant 25, cited in Chen 2013a).  
 
It seems that this focus on healthful and care-ful practices within a natural setting distinguishes 
Chinese CSA farms from those in the global north. While CSA research in the global north 
often cites health as a consumer motivation for joining AFNs, I have found no reference to the 
routinized practice of exercise, health and/or meditation on CSA farms, or in AFNs generally 
that I see in China’s AFNs.  
 
6.4.3.3 Connecting to Land as Producers 
China’s weekend farmers also blur the boundary between consumer and producer in 
these networks. AFNs are making land available to people who are trying to be more self-
reliant in the face of food uncertainty. In this view, the consumer becomes a producer to 
contribute to their family’s food security in the context of having no one else to trust. Chen’s 
(2013a) research on weekend farmers supports this idea as well. He notes that for many, having 
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a plot of land to grow food on a CSA farm offers a chance to learn about and develop skills 
related to ecological farming. So there is a pragmatic side to the more emotional values of 
respite and relaxation.  
 
Considering these examples, it is interesting that while ethics of care for producers 
seems largely absent in these networks, ethics of care for land seem strong and variously 
motivated. Through these AFNs, people are re-connecting to and caring for land for material 
reasons (safe food in a context of uncertainty), for symbolic reasons (source of peace and 
respite) and for personal health reasons. These findings also suggest an entanglement of 
producer-consumer identities in these networks, echoing global north research (Renting et al., 
2012).  
 
It is difficult to unpack exactly what this care for land entails, and even more 
mysterious to identify why it is so strong in China at this point in time. There seem to be 
several layers to this practice and as an unanticipated finding in this AFN research, it warrants 
further investigation. On the surface, weekend farming seems to be a simple nostalgia or a rural 
idyll that draws in self-interested urbanites in a movement that ‘consumes’ the countryside. 
Yet, these urbanites are not merely nostalgic about farms. The rural idyll motivates them to 
engage with these AFNs and grow food. Can this pastoral imagery be turned to advantage? Is 
this a first step toward deepening relations about land and building an environmental awareness 
with China’s urban consumers? 
 
6.4.4 Taking Care of Others – Laying the Groundwork for Trust 
As illustrated above, consumers seem to be connecting to these networks because 
they distrust the CSA farms less than they distrust food and food relations in the dominant 
system. It is important to note that this is not saying that consumers in these AFNs don’t care 
or don’t have ethics. Rather, I am suggesting that in terms of procuring food through these 
‘alternative’ networks in China, many consumers are motivated by the instrumental needs to 
‘take care of” themselves rather than being drawn into connections with the farmers in these 
networks. However, what is most interesting in this context is that CSA operators, farmers’ 
markets volunteers and buying club operators in these AFNs seem undaunted by this lack of 
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trust and are persevering with continuous activities and ongoing internet posts through which 
they seek to build reconnections and care and trust in these networks. Interviewees detailed an 
impressive list of festivals, workshops, events, conferences and other activities all aimed at 
building what seems like hard fought for reconnections. As illustration, farmers’ market 
volunteers post blogs before and after every market. The style is always positive and practical, 
with sharing of pictures from the market and recipes. One of the market volunteers explained, 
“Sometimes we are tired of this, but we need to keep energy about this. This is what will 
interest people in connecting further. They need to see we are having fun and then they are 
interested in coming to check things out.” (FMB1). CSAs in the networks hold harvest festivals 
(FCSAB3, FCSAB1), workshops on traditional handicrafts (FCSAB4), exercise and relaxation 
courses on the farm (FCSAB4) and programs for school children (FCSAB4), all in an effort to 
deepen the consumer’s experience and to strengthen relations of trust and care. Indeed, global 
north research suggests that ethics of care are constituted and deepened through such 
knowledge and practices (Kneafsey et al., 2008), and face to face relations between producers 
and consumers help to create caring relationships that are the basis of trust (Hendrickson & 
Heffernan, 2002). CSA operators and volunteers in China’s AFNs seem to know this 
intuitively. As one CSA operator said, “You can’t force people to care. But we can provide fun 
opportunities for them to feel more connected and that might help them move beyond their 
distrust” (FCSAB4). 
 
6.4.5 Deepening Care and Co-constructing the Network  
Tronto’s (1993) ethics of care framework describes two final phases of care as ‘care-
giving’ and ‘care-receiving’, where the receiver recognizes the care received and care relations 
are mutual (p. 107). While it seems that reconnections of care and trust are not guaranteed in 
China’s AFNs, for some consumers, relations of care seem to deepen to these final stages of 
care relations over time. In particular, participants who are now taking organizing roles in these 
AFNs reflected on their own experience of care ethics and connections. They describe how 
they were initially drawn into alternative food procurement because, like many others, they 
were trying to find safe food, but they gradually became more involved in the network and in 
environmental issues more broadly, just as Kneafsey et al. (2008) uncovered in their research. 
As one of the market coordinators described, “I started like everyone else, I wanted safe food. I 
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was afraid of what I was eating. I heard about the CSA and went to the farm one day. I liked 
the energy. I was just like other consumers, I didn’t know if I could trust them or not. I’m not 
sure why, but I just saw that there was something I could do…. I could help ….. help the 
producers and also help other consumers find good food” (FMB1).   
 
The narrative is the same for a woman who helped to start one of the buying clubs: 
I was worried about the food I was feeding my child. We were all worried. So a few 
of us decided we had to do something more. We educated ourselves and learned so 
many things. We started with a book club and we read……We knew we needed a 
different way to get food. We learned about [one particular] farm. But some of us 
had jobs and with small children and it was difficult to go to the farm. So we 
thought about working in partnership with those farmers to understand how hard it 
is for them, that they have difficulties too… how they produced food and to let them 
know about the quality of food we wanted and then to start a program with them 
(BCIB1).  
 
In both these cases, distrust and care about one’s own health motivated actions to connect, 
which then deepened to an ethics of care with others, where the identities of ‘producer’ and 
‘consumer’ become blurred and entangled. As these women entered these AFNs as consumers, 
their role gradually changed and they became producers responsible for reconnecting others to 
food. Global north research also underscores this entanglement of producer-consumer identities 
(Renting et al., 2012, Veen et al., 2012). 
 
6.4.6 Guanxi and Trust 
The cultural construction and practice of guanxi is in many ways similar to what 
Tronto (1993) describes as care-giving and care-receiving, and it helps us understand how for 
some there is a deepening of trust in these networks, whereas for others, trust does not develop. 
Because guanxi engenders trust, it serves as a form of insurance against risk in networked 
relations (Gold et al., 2002). Once guanxi relations are established, trust deepens. But as one 
CSA farmer explained to me, you cannot “break into an existing network” because you first 
have to “pull guanxi” or take the time to exchange favours and build informal personal 
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relationships (FCSAB3). After a period of reciprocated exchange of favours, once an 
individual has ‘pulled guanxi’ or established trusted network relations, they can draw on those 
relations for favours, such as by joining a CSA. But, if someone is new to a non-kinship 
network, and has not yet established guanxi relations there, there is no basis yet for trust (Gold 
et al., 2002).  
 
With this emphasis on guanxi or personal and informal ties, versus structures or 
institutions, the AFN movement in China is rapidly growing by always extending its relations. 
When a new person enters a guanxi network, their network is brought along too, and favours 
can be asked of these people (Gold et al., 2002). So in this way, networks expand rapidly. To 
illustrate, when I asked one CSA farmer how another farmer managed to grow her CSA so 
quickly (by 150 people in 2 months), she explained that it is because she “walked guanxi”, 
meaning that the CSA operator had extensive guanxi relations, and these people would be 
obliged to join her CSA when she asked. So she was able to use her established connections for 
the purpose of starting the new CSA (FCSAB3). 
 
6.5 AFNs as Windows to Trust and Reconnections  
This chapter began by describing a changing and contradictory cultural political-
economy landscape in China where a growing individualism and profit motives mingle with 
strong expectations that the state is responsible for ensuring food safety and security. However, 
against this backdrop, a food safety crisis has shaken people’s trust in the state’s ability to 
deliver on its part of the social contract, and in response people are seeking ways to forge new 
connections and procure safe food for their families. This story rings familiar in the global 
north, where scholars have suggested processes of reconnecting and re-embedding food 
relations is foundational to AFNs. 
 
Using Tronto’s (1993) framework of care ethics, I illustrated how relations in 
Chinese AFNs demonstrate pragmatic reconnections where people care about healthy and safe 
food and are drawn to CSAs and markets and buying clubs. In the context of pervasive 
uncertainty about food quality, these are connections motivated by distrust in the dominant 
food system versus trust of AFN operators. Indeed, in these networks, shaped by a powerful 
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suzhi discourse that portrays peasants as backward, not to be trusted and responsible for the 
food safety crisis, trust is hard to build. Consumers are more likely to connect to land as 
weekend farmers pursuing a rural idyll than to the traditional farmers who grow their food. 
Undaunted by the absence of trust however, AFN volunteers and CSA operators offer a 
continuous menu of activities and projects to draw people deeper into relations. For some 
connections in these networks progressively deepen, identities of producer and consumer 
become entangled, and some people establish relations of care and trust with others. In this 
way, these findings echo the work of Klein (2012) and Chen (2013a, 2013b) in suggesting that 
in response to disconnections through China’s reform processes and the ensuing food safety 
crisis, people are actively seeking to rebuild ties and connections. The perception of a food 
safety crisis is thus stimulating the formation of AFNs as nascent forms of civil society 
organizations focused on food.   
 
Further, among the core group of initiators and organizers in these networks, we see 
an emphasis on informal, personal guanxi relations which help build trust and expand the 
networks rapidly. This analysis offers support for the idea that Chinese society is experiencing 
multi-directional and contradictory changes (Kleinman et al., 2011), and we see strong guanxi-
inspired networks and reconnections based on trust at the same time as as relations of distrust 
in these networks.  
 
However, this needs to be seen as a preliminary exploration of the interpersonal 
relations in these networks. The cultural context and the interpersonal relations are complex, 
and the sample is small. This look at interpersonal relations in China’s AFNs also leaves 
unsettled questions about how care ethics and reconnections move these networks beyond food 
procurement and distribution toward addressing questions of food system transformation. And, 
if these are indeed early networks of resistance, to what is this resistance directed and what 
forms does it take? These questions are tackled in the chapter that follows. 
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7.0 China’s AFNs as Everyday Resistance 
The previous section addressed intra-network relations and explored how AFNs in 
China can be understood as windows into diverse connections and reconnections based on an 
ethics of care, and how for some this process deepens into trust relations in this individualized 
and high distrust context. The final lens in my analysis asks: So what? Indeed, ‘simply’ 
reconnecting and caring, even in the reciprocated ways described, does not address  
ecologically degrading, and unjust conditions in which these networks are situated. In what 
ways do Chinese AFNs move beyond instrumental market relations to bring about structural 
change? In response, I note that, similar to their global north sisters, Chinese AFNs can be 
blind to privilege and perpetuate some of the very injustices they seek to transform. Yet, I 
argue that using inclusive and reflexive processes, participants are building diverse networks 
that hold transformative potential. In contrast to global north AFNs, however, in the context of 
pervasive uncertainty of an authoritarian state, Chinese AFNs have adopted a subtle everyday 
resistance style. I suggest that these AFNs are actively, though not always with full awareness 
perhaps, positioning themselves as a path or a ‘portal’ to building connections to broader 
emancipator spaces of global social justice movements.  
 
Theories of resistance within geography examine the ways in which people react to 
and try to change that which exists (Rose, 2002) and a central theme is the ways in which 
people challenge dominant relations of power (Martin & Pierce, 2012). The resistance 
literature dovetails with a large scholarship on social movements and contentious politics 
(Leitner, Sheppard & Sziarto, 2008). Recently, scholars have begun to use these perspectives to 
consider the potential for AFNs, to take on transformative goals outside of the market (Lamine 
et al., 2012; Renting et al., 2012).  
 
In this chapter, I consider the ways in which, in addition to being experiments in 
alternative economics, AFNs in both the global north and China embrace models of citizenship 
with action directed at the state. As background to this analysis, I first unpack the ‘social 
justice critique’ of AFNs in the global north to expose fundamental challenges that have been 
articulated. This social justice appraisal reveals AFNs as frequently exclusive and privileged, 
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often perpetuating the very types of relations they oppose. Responding to this critique, I 
summarize a shifting scholarship and join a growing number of scholars arguing that global 
north AFNs can be seen as operating ‘beyond the market’ with potential to become agents of 
transformative changes that address structural injustices. Here, I look at several recent AFN 
examples and summarize how they engage in resistance and challenge hegemony. I then situate 
this discussion in China where I describe the embedded and everyday resistance that 
predominates in an authoritarian state. I draw on an emerging literature on environmental 
NGOs (ENGOs) in China to offer some examples of typical resistance practices of civil society 
and its networks. Finally, I turn to Chinese AFNs and consider the ways in which these 
networks are challenging hegemony in this context.  
 
7.1 Can we change the world by shopping? Or do we need a food fight? 
Questions of whether the ethical consumption that characterizes market-based 
initiatives can create opposition and resistance to dominant unsustainable food relations have 
been debated in AFN scholarship now for two decades. Scholars continue to detail the ways in 
which AFNs can be places of exclusivity and privilege. Without explicitly working to 
transform these systemic inequities and power imbalances, AFNs can help to perpetuate some 
of the unjust relations they seek to alter (Allen, 2010; Allen et al., 2003; Allen & Sachs, 2007; 
Bedore, 2010; DuPuis, Harrison & Goodman, 2011; Guthman, 2008), leaving scholars calling 
for alternatives to the alternatives (Guthman, 2008). This social justice critique is summarized 
below. 
 
7.1.1 Blind to Exclusivity and Privilege 
AFNs have been criticized for their lack of inclusivity and diversity with scholars 
arguing that such initiatives and networks tend to be designed and enacted by those in 
dominant and privileged groups. This critique of AFNs argues that political activism through 
food is limited and restricted to those with capacity and resources and excludes people 
representing diverse genders, races, ethnicities and classes. Positions of privilege can be 
unwittingly upheld in AFNs by participants, often blind to power and privilege dynamics with 
regard to farmers and farm workers and issues of race, class and gender (Allen & Sachs, 2007; 
Slocum, 2007). Even in those alternative initiatives most widely considered to be fair and just 
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such as CSAs and farmers’ markets, there can exist a tendency for farmers and organizers to 
see people primarily as shoppers and vendors, and  perpetuate exclusive gender, class and race 
relations (DeLind & Bingen, 2008). This exclusivity in AFNs leads to a ‘politics of 
conversion’ (Childs, 2003) where an unrepresentative group (typically urban, white, middle-
class males) outlines the path forward and in order to participate all other groups need to 
become ‘converted’ and follow the design or else remain invisible or become the targets of 
education, charity, or both (DuPuis & Goodman, 2005; Guthman, 2011).  
 
7.1.2 Normative and Essentializing View of Scale 
Social justice critics argue that AFNs frequently fall into the ‘local trap’ (DeLind & 
Bingen, 2008) when they present global and local scales as a dichotomy in which local is 
‘good’ and global is ‘bad’. In response, a significant scholarship has outlined how scale is 
socially constructed and not ontologically given and therefore there is nothing inherently more 
just or fair about localized AFNs (DuPuis & Goodman, 2005; Hinrichs, 2003). Further, while 
local food strategies can be powerful, adopting this normative view can result in exclusion of 
the non-local and thus perpetuate unjust structural conditions and in this way take a reactionary 
and defensive position to those perceived as external threats (Winter, 2003; DuPuis & 
Goodman, 2005). AFNs that have essentialized ‘the local’ often make both implicit and 
explicit normative claims in suggesting that the local scale is automatically characterized by 
democratic relations and/or ecological sustainability (Goodman et al., 2012). As Born and 
Purcell (2006) describe, adopting a normative and essentialist view of the local scale “leads 
wherever those it empowers want it to lead” (p.195) and, depending on the agendas of the 
leaders it empowers, this view can manifest as a “defensive localism that frequently is not 
allied with social-justice goals” (Born & Purcell, 2006, p. 202) leading scholars to call for a de-
reification of the local (Allen & Guthman, 2006).  
 
7.1.3 Perpetuate the Conditions they seek to Oppose 
A final aspect of the social justice critique of AFNs details how these market-based 
responses tend to produce individualist subjectivities that are a product of dominant neoliberal 
perspectives and thus another way that responsibility is devolved from the state to individual 
citizens (Goodman et al., 2012; Guthman, 2008; Allen & Guthman, 2006). In AFNs, these 
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subjectivities translate into individualist ‘niche markets’ comprised of producers and 
consumers, rather than collectivized, socially-conscious citizens, and do little to address 
structural inequalities and in effect leave the state ‘off the hook’ (Allen & Guthman, 2006). In 
this way, AFNs have been criticized for perpetuating the very ideals of neoliberalism they seek 
to oppose. This has led scholars to suggest the only meaningful politics in AFNs are those 
focused on collective action and resistance (Barnett, 2010) and to question whether action in 
the market can ever be a route to transforming structural injustices.  
 
7.1.4 Voting with your Chopsticks 
Other scholars see more transformative possibilities in AFNs (Dubuisson-Quellier, 
Lamine & Velly, 2011; Johnston, 2008; Levkoe, 2011; Pratt, 2009; Sonnino, 2010). Some have 
called the preceding views an “all-or-nothing style of neo-Marxist critique” (Barnett, 2010, p. 
1881) that favours state-centric solutions and universalist politics. Scholars respond to the 
social justice critique by noting that neoliberal contexts cannot be assumed to automatically 
immobilize or co-opt alternatives (Micheletti, 2003). Indeed the hegemony of neoliberalism is 
not total and we have some degree of ‘agency’ to respond under these structural constraints. 
Drawing on the concept of ‘political consumption’(Hassanein, 2003) these scholars suggest 
people can use the market to engage in ‘boycotts’ (avoiding negatively viewed products) and 
‘buycotts’ (seeking out positively viewed products) to accomplish justice goals and through 
these actions it is indeed possible to overcome injustices by ‘voting with your fork’, or in 
China with your chopsticks. What emerges is the concept of the citizen consumer who 
entangles the public role of citizen with the private role of shopper.  
 
7.1.5 Moving Beyond the Market 
In order to move beyond a limited view of market-based responses, some scholars 
are beginning to conceptualize AFNs as complex hybrids of market and non market relations to 
consider the extent to which AFNs are “collectivizing consumption” and “reclaiming the 
commons” (Johnston 2008, p. 243) as ways to establish “collective subjectivities” (Levkoe, 
2011, p. 691). These hybrid ‘market-civil society networks’ identify and work toward common 
interests and reframe analysis toward collective and away from individualist responses to food 
system challenges (Levkoe, 2011). In practice, building these collective subjectivities blends 
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market-based activities with ‘civic’ relations, where food is used as the entry point. In this view 
AFNs are seen as experiments which go beyond the market to include evolving forms of 
collective agency and non-market institutions (Pratt, 2009).  
 
A variety of constructs have been suggested to convey the ways these networks 
function within the market as well as taking on characteristics of social movements in their 
pursuit of transformative change. For example, ‘food democracy’ (Hassanein, 2003; Shiva, 
2006) and ‘civic agriculture’ (Lyson, 2005) have been advanced as better descriptors than 
‘alternative’ for these networks. These notions centre the position of producers and consumers 
as acting toward common causes, building on “shared understandings and responsibilities” 
versus “agreement or sameness” (DeLind & Bingen, 2008, p. 130). Drawn from a republican 
tradition of citizenship, civic agriculture sees the individual not as a sovereign actor seeking 
universal rights, but rather as someone who deliberates with others to define responsibilities 
(DuPuis et al., 2011).  
 
This collectivist notion of citizenship posits AFNs to be places where consumers 
have shifted from passive receivers of goods in the marketplace to proactive agents who work 
alongside producers and others through networks and coalitions. Their role is extended beyond 
ethical consumption and sending ‘signals’ in the market about their values to include collective 
efforts with others, such as policy advocacy, that shapes elements of the food system itself 
(Johnston, 2008; Koc, MacRae, Desjardins & Roberts, 2008; Lamine et al., 2012). At the same 
time, producers in AFNs have extended their roles beyond selling food in ‘the market’ to 
include activities that add value and educate buyers as well as the community at large about 
their food ethics (Little et al., 2010). This perspective on AFNs sees them as functioning 
beyond market relations to include a “myriad [of] social enterprises, non-governmental 
organizations, and other organizations working to reduce inequities in health and access to 
fresh, nutritious food, alleviate ‘food poverty’ and build sustainable local procurement 
systems” (Goodman et al., 2012, p. 82). As Johnston (2008)  describes, “possibilities for a 
more balanced citizenship-focused hybrid may be found in different modes of food 
provisioning, particularly when they are framed by non-profit organizations more able to de-
center the idea of consumer choice in the service of ideals like social justice, solidarity, and 
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sustainability (e.g., community supported agriculture, slow-food movements, community food 
security projects)” (p. 339). In these assemblages, producers also move beyond ‘market’ 
considerations to function as citizens who speak of their “moral rights and responsibilities” 
(Lamine et al., 2012, p. 391). 
 
7.1.6 Unpacking the Concept of Food Citizenship 
In the early days of alternative food scholarship, Welsh and MacRae (1998) 
described “food citizenship” (p. 237) as a construct demonstrated through the work of the 
Toronto Food Policy Council,  emerging from “people’s active participation in shaping the 
food system, rather than by accepting the system as passive consumers” (p. 239). Recently a 
group of scholars have again brought forward and elaborated the concept of food citizenship by 
looking at a range of different AFNs in Hungary (Balazs, 2012), France (Lamine et al., 2012), 
Italy (Brunori, Rossi & Malandrin, 2012), and Brazil (Lamine et al., 2012). These scholars 
describe the ways in which AFNs build alternatives in food provisioning as well as how they 
shape public options and actions through advocacy. This work is paralleled by recent work 
from Ontario on ‘food hubs29’ (Blay-Palmer, Landman, Knezevic & Hayhuyrst, 2013). In the 
sections that follow, I move this conceptual discussion to a more pragmatic level and detail 
some of the characteristics and practices of these networks ‘on the ground’. I look at these 
networks in terms of their actions, rather than how they are labelled, in order to ask, what are 
the ways in which these assemblages transcend the market and engage in forms of resistance 
that challenge hegemony and move toward system change? This analysis provides a foundation 
for my examination of these types of action repertoires in China’s AFNs. 
 
7.1.6.1 Reflexive Practice 
Scholars underscore the importance of reflexive process as a way of working in 
AFNs. By working with a strong awareness of injustices and inequalities, networks can create 
an open process that guards against the risk of the privileged taking hold of and co-opting the 
process (DuPuis et al., 2011). Reflexive processes emphasize ‘becoming’ versus assuming 
                                                 
29
 Blay Palmer et al., (2013) use the language of ‘food hubs’ in Ontario to refer to “networks and intersections of 
grassroots, community-based organisations and individuals that work together to build increasingly socially just, 
economically robust and ecologically sound food systems that connect farmers with consumers as directly as 
possible” (p. 524) 
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desired ends and are conscious of deficiencies and pathology possible in our actions (Amin, 
2002). Reflexivity involves facing and deliberating about underlying assumptions, practices, 
structures and the various possible ways of framing problems and actions. AFNs demonstrating 
reflexivity build collaborations as “open ended stories” (Goodman et al., 2012, p. 24) rather 
than beginning with ‘like-minded’ people who hold a shared view of the world. This process 
has been described as “politics in place” versus “politics of place” (Amin, 2002, p. 397, 
original emphasis).  Politics of place refers to pre-existing power relations in a particular 
territory, but politics in place is a “nonterritorial way of viewing place politics” and everyday 
ways of relating (Amin, 2002, p. 398).  
 
This reflexive practice is evidenced in AFNs by the ways in which they make 
decisions and structure their coordination. To illustrate, in describing AFN action in France, 
Dubuisson-Quellier et al. (2011) and Lamine et al. (2012) provide examples of maintaining an 
open and inclusive process characterised by shared decision making and collaborative relations 
in the ways that the AFNs take on projects in the public interest, consciously thinking about 
and inventing ways of holding meetings and organizing advocacy that are more inclusive. As 
Goodman et al. (2012) suggest, AFNs need to struggle with difference and be inclusive of 
people with different worldviews rather than limiting their involvements to people with whom 
values are shared, noting that networks starting with shared values can be “intrinsically 
inegalitarian, because they are based on a single world view” (p. 156).  
 
7.1.6.2 Strengthening Capacity and Building Skills 
These market-civil society hybrid networks are continually working to build and 
strengthen capacities of stakeholders by offering and facilitating skill building opportunities 
(Mount & Andree, 2013). Such networks work as “platform[s] for interaction” around a range 
of issues (Balazs, 2012, p. 411). Scholars describing AFNs in Hungary (Balazs, 2012) and Italy 
(Brunari et al., 2011), for example, describe the ways in which the networks focus on the 
development of a broad range of food skills by creating social spaces for experience based 
learning such as farmer to farmer training, study circles, workshops, mentoring and 
apprenticeships. Typically skill development moves beyond simple knowledge and skill 
acquisition and adopts an empowerment objective by drawing together local-lay and expert-
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scientific knowledge (as discussed in Chapter 5). Further, these networks work beyond food 
skills and also focus on developing capacities needed for transformative change by focusing for 
example, on how to plan and understand policy and how to negotiate regulatory environments 
and skills (Balazs, 2012). Finally, these ‘civic food networks’ also focus on building the 
capacity to engage the community around them through vibrant activities such as festivals and 
artistic events as well as community-based research and consultation (Lamine et al., 2012). 
AFN organizers understand that this broad range of skills and capacities must exist in their 
diverse networks if they are to challenge hegemony effectively. 
 
7.1.6.3 Building Diverse Connections and Coalitions 
Indeed diversity in these AFNs is the operative term. Blay-Palmer et al. (2013) detail 
diverse ‘types’ of AFNs, which they refer to as food hubs, in Ontario to include urban/rural 
composites, producer based or consumer initiated, and for-profit or not-for-profit leadership. 
These networks are equally diverse in their motives and the focus of action.  Such diversity 
requires extending relations in complex assemblages, or ‘networks of networks’. The research 
on food hubs in Ontario illustrates the complexity of these networks and the various 
connections they cultivate (Mount et al., 2013). Through the continuous building of alliances 
AFNs diffuse ideas for advocacy and action and also cultivate partnerships to expand 
resistance strategies (Ballamingie & Walker, 2013), drawing connections from beyond the 
local scale (Fridman & Lenters, 2013). Indeed, research into these networks concludes they can 
be left vulnerable if these broad connections are lacking (Nelson, Knezevic & Landman, 2013). 
Typically these AFNs build connections ‘beyond the familiar’ often resulting in ‘strange 
bedfellows’ where, for example, organic activists work alongside conventional agriculture 
groups to advocate for local food procurement, but then work in opposition to the same groups 
in anti-GMO advocacy. In this way, rather than being ideologically bound, AFNs construct 
relations with groups as needed based on how issues are framed (Lamine et al., 2012). 
 
7.1.6.4 Diverse Types of Advocacy 
Sometimes AFNs call for mobilizations and overt forms of resistance by way of 
protest campaigns (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011). More typically, however, their resistance 
repertoire focuses on diverse types of advocacy, frequently involving business and/or state 
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representatives in the process, and typically using the media creatively. Advocacy issues are as 
diverse as the methods. In Brazil for example, rural development policy and nutrition policy 
came into focus (Lamine et al., 2012). In France, land use issues, water quality and energy use 
became central frames (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011). In Hungary, AFNs worked in 
coalitions around tourism policies (Balazs, 2012). While in Ontario, protecting agricultural 
land and local food purchasing drew AFNs into complex advocacy networks (Ballamingie & 
Walker, 2013).  
 
7.1.6.5 Food citizenship 
In response to pervasive social justice questions, AFNs in the global north are taking 
the shape of complex hybrids of civil society and market-based activities and organizations that 
are variously active in processes of social, economic, ecological change. The degrees to which 
they are transformative is debated as scholars and practitioners alike acknowledge the need to 
move beyond individual approaches to change through collectivized action understood as ‘food 
citizenship’. This action and discourse in the global north is based in a long history and culture 
of a civil society as something that is distinct from the state and the market.  The situation in 
China is remarkably different in that there is no historic separation between the individual and 
the state, and the degree to which a new independent civil society is emerging is contested. 
This discussion of food citizenship leaves us with a key question. If the ability of these civic 
networks to influence broader systems and tackle structural injustices relates to governance and 
to the ability to form alliances within and across civil society organizations, what possibilities 
for such transformative change exist in contexts, like China, where such institutions are 
lacking? 
 
7.2 Contention and Resistance in China 
China is said to be in the “age of contention” (Yang, 2009, p. 42). The repression of 
the student democratic movement in 1989, which has been referred to as China’s 
“enlightenment” (Yang, 2009, p. 86) marked the end of an era. The ‘democracy wall’ 
movement preceding this was a wave of protests that voiced a loss of confidence in the party 
state’s leadership and called for democratic reforms (Yang, 2009, p. 86). This was a time of 
“effervescence” and “cultural and social activism” in which an incipient civil society emerged 
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and a “‘culture fever’ of book publishing and public debate” ensued (Yang, 2009, p. 87). While 
these hopes ended with the Tiananmen massacre, the spirit of resistance in China is alive and 
well, despite risks of repression. My focus in this section is to understand and describe in a 
general sense the approaches to resistance in China and in particular the styles of ‘everyday 
resistance’. This selective focus is not meant to deny the practice of overt resistance in China, 
as several categories of popular protests in the reform era can be detailed.  
 
In the early 1990s, mass demonstrations orchestrated by peasant farmers successfully 
protested agricultural taxes (Li, 2012). These protests ended once the state abolished rural taxes 
in 2000, only to be followed by labour unrest. In both urban and rural industries, prompted by 
privatization of township and village enterprises, workers have been actively protesting unfair 
wages and job insecurity. In 2009 alone, approximately one quarter of China’s 21.7 million 
industrial workers were involved in an estimated 30,000 protests (Yu, 2010; Wright, 2010). 
There are also continuing protests involving migrant workers, voicing grievances about 
working conditions, and unfair treatment under China’s dual-citizenship program (Le Mons 
Walker, 2008). Millions of peasants continue to struggle against domestic land grabs (Wright, 
2010). In addition, ethnic minorities in China (in particular Tibetans, Mongolians and Uighurs) 
have been actively protesting the Han Chinese influx into minority-dominated regions (Wright, 
2010). Finally, environmental protests directed toward local polluters and the authorities who 
protect them have been growing in number and size. Environmental mass protest incidents 
have increased from an estimated 8,700 in 1993 to 180,000 in 2012, or nearly 500 every day 
(Yeh, O'Brien & Ye, 2013). Clearly there is widespread overt resistance in China.  
 
In order to understand what underlies this resistance, I return briefly to the story of 
the Mandate of Heaven cited at the beginning of this dissertation and describe the concept of 
‘rules based’ resistance that is the foundation of China’s culture of contention. This leads me to 
explore the covert tactics of everyday resistance tactics prevalent in nascent civil society 
networks and they ways in which they are framing actions against the state as a backdrop on 
which to consider repertoires of resistance emerging in China’s AFNs. 
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7.2.1 The Mandate of Heaven and Rules-Based Resistance 
The Chinese term for citizen (gongmin) connotes “collective membership in the 
polity, rather than a claim to individual or inalienable rights vis-a-vis the state” (Perry, 2008, p. 
46). As such, it sits in contrast to the liberal model of citizenship in the global north with its 
focus on universal justice and inalienable individual rights that shapes the social justice critique 
of AFNs presented at the start of this chapter. Indeed, the Chinese approach to citizenship is 
closer to the republican model that sees citizens as engaging in due process of collective 
decision making (Hall & Trentmann, 2005), which informs ideas of ‘civic agriculture’ and the 
types of reflexive AFNs detailed above. Whereas in classic liberal design there is a separation 
of state and civil society, in classic republicanism, there is no social sphere between the private 
and the public realms.  The focus is on face-to-face deliberation and consensus among the 
assembled. Central to this notion in China is the view that a citizen is someone to whom 
obligations are owed through a ‘social contract’ with the state. In this sense certain types of 
contention and petitioning are encouraged. Indeed, in 1995, the state published the ‘Chinese 
Citizens’ handbook’ which in essence outlines and clarifies the role of a good citizen (Anagost, 
1997).  
 
These notions of citizenship return us to the story of the Mandate of Heaven as a 
narrative that explains Chinese political philosophy. Chinese political thought is characterized 
by “an enduring emphasis on collective socioeconomic justice” and safeguarding “people’s 
rights to subsistence and development” (Perry, 2008, p. 38-39). The people’s ‘contract’ with 
the state guarantees them a minimum standard of living and the state’s legitimacy to rule 
depends on holding up this end of the bargain. Perry notes how this notion of good governance, 
meaning the guarantee of minimal livelihoods of ordinary people, including a basic income, 
shelter, and sufficient food, predates western notions of citizenship by many centuries. This 
suggests there is an irony in speaking of China as a place of ‘weak’ civil society. The basic 
ideas behind the Mandate of Heaven story hold today, as evidenced in the way in which both 
covert and overt resistance is framed around the issue of rights to subsistence. Resistance 
framing in China seeks “welfare provision from the state” not “legal protection against the 
state” nor “demands for participation in the state” (Perry 2008, p. 45; original emphasis). 
Certainly there has been discussion of an emerging ‘rights consciousness’, but Perry responds 
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that what has been referred to as protests focused on ‘rights’, also follows the Mandate of 
Heaven political philosophy in that the protesters’ demands are typically about subsistence and 
livelihood. She clarifies that claims to rights in China express group unity versus personal 
liberty and are thus linked to responsibility for a larger community, as opposed to the 
protection of individual freedoms as in liberal democratic framing (Perry, 2008). Perry and 
others differentiate the approach to protest in China from the global north by using the phrase 
‘rules consciousness’ versus ‘rights consciousness’. In rules conscious resistance citizens trust 
in the party state and are confident in its commitment to ensuring their subsistence. Rules 
conscious resistance works to refocus or ‘call to task’ the party state, urging attention to more 
just enforcement of rules in what has been called a “rightful resistance” approach (O'Brien & 
Li, 2006). In contrast, rights-focused resistance makes claims to entitlements that are not 
guaranteed by existing rules and therefore advocates for new rules.  
 
7.2.2 Everyday Politics and Resistance 
Everyday politics are defined as “people embracing, complying with, adjusting and 
contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources 
and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized or 
direct” (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 232). These everyday forms of politics are differentiated from more 
overt forms such as demonstrations, protests or campaigns, by their low profile as they 
typically involve little organization and are carried out as daily activities by people who may 
not even consider their actions as forms of resistance. Whereas “official politics” (Kerkvliet, 
2009, p. 232) are often channeled through organizations to people in authoritative positions, 
everyday politics adopt more subtle tactics. Indeed James Scott (1985), who is perhaps best 
known for the study of everyday resistance in peasant societies, notes that there is a “vast 
territory” between compliance with hegemonic systems and overt defiance of them (p.136). 
Both Scott and Kerkvliet observe that we risk overlooking powerful forms of resistance when 
we focus only on visible and overt protests and rebellions. Instead they describe far more 
common tactics such as pilfering, slander, feigned ignorance, sabotage, deliberate ‘slow 
downs’, forms of gossip and sarcasm, and the use of the oppressor’s language in ways that 
undermine domination (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1985; Scott, 1992). In detailing these tactics, 
Scott observes the divide between language and behaviour that dominated groups assume in 
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public and that adopted behind the scenes in private or semi-private environments.  He 
distinguishes between “public transcripts” or the “open interaction between subordinates and 
those who dominate” (Scott, 1992, p. 2) and “hidden transcripts” or “discourse that takes place 
beyond direct observation by powerholders” (Scott, 1992, p. 4). Key to Scott’s argument is the 
suggestion that beyond being forms of resistance, such tactics relate to the ongoing formation 
of identities where people can see themselves as citizens with independence, power and 
agency. 
 
7.2.3 Resistance in a Context of Pervasive Uncertainty 
Since the 1980s, the liberal democratic notion of the separation of state and 
individual has grown in Chinese society and a non-government sector has exploded to tens of 
thousands of NGOs (Hsu, 2011) in fields as diverse as education, environmental health, 
housing and poverty alleviation (Spires, 2011). However, scholars hasten to add that the 
interpretation of this expansion needs to be understood beyond mere numbers and that the 
Chinese understanding of NGO and civil society remains distinct from that of liberal 
democracies in the global north, so there are many questions about what exactly ‘counts’ as an 
NGO. NGOs in China are typically characterised by alliances with government versus 
independent institutions (Hsu, 2011). Indeed, registering an NGO in China requires a 
government department to endorse and sponsor the initiative, making official status impossible 
for NGOs with desires to resist state directives.  
 
In its over arching goal of maintaining harmony, the Chinese state routinely places 
restrictions on NGO actions (Stern & O'Brien, 2012). In the face of rhetoric about “small state, 
big society”, NGOs in China work near a “hazy, shifting boundary” (2012, p. 3) where mixed 
signals about what is permitted are common (2012, p.3). Hielmann and Perry (2011) refer to 
this process as “guerrilla policy making” characterized by “continual improvisation and 
adjustment” that creates a climate of “pervasive uncertainty” for those challenging the state (p. 
12).  Indeed advocacy on sensitive issues or use of particular tactics are more likely than others 
to land an NGO in trouble. For example, the state opposes actions that focus on demands for 
rights, or resistance that seems to be building cross-class or cross-locality alliances (Bruun, 
2013; Stern & O'Brien, 2012). While sometimes the state responds to such resistance through 
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“enforced disappearances”, which seem to be increasing (Human Rights Watch, 2011), a more 
common response is to entangle groups it considers to be destabilizing forces in endless 
bureaucracy and paperwork such as disputes about taxes or missing permits (Cai, 2008). 
 
7.2.4 Environmental Non-Government Organizations (ENGOs) 
Environmental NGOs (ENGOS) account for a major proportion of active civil 
society organizations (Yang, 2005) in China. Studies of ENGOs describe how their actions 
emphasize educational activities such as lectures, workshops conferences and newsletters as 
well as pursuing accepted legal actions such as petitioning the state with an action repertoire 
that is more about publicity than protest (Yang, 2005). Building networks around particular 
issues is common, but this is typically done through personal connections versus official 
linkages across organizations to avoid drawing too much attention (Yang, 2005; O'Brien, 
2003). Generally ENGOs practice ‘embedded activism’ where their actions are taken in 
cooperation  and partnership with authorities (Ho & Edmonds, 2008; Sullivan & Xie, 2009). 
 
Yet ENGOs are also at the forefront of developing diverse collective action 
repertoires, led by activists who are educated and frequently linked internationally (Yang, 
2005). Yang (2005) suggests ENGOs can be considered as “laboratories” (2005, p. 65), where 
citizens develop and practice skills of citizenship and “test the limits of Chinese politics by 
often operating without formal registration and organizing activities without prior official 
approval” (p. 65). O’Brien (2003) echoes this view in discussing pervasive use of “boundary-
spanning” contention (p. 53) in which ENGOs use the state’s own words in the formulation of 
resistance and collective action.   
 
7.2.5 The Diffused Contention of the Internet 
Operating close to the boundary of authorized channels in China, the use of the 
internet combines the potential of mass communication with individual, covert, everyday forms 
of resistance, making it a potentially powerful tool. Goubin Yang (2009) was among the first 
scholars to study the use of the internet in China. Building on Elizabeth Perry’s notion of 
‘rules-based’ framing, Yang (2009) notes that internet ‘contention’ is characterized by 
challenges to authority by appropriating state ritual and rhetoric. He describes the ways in 
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which on-line activism in China follows historically established practices and styles of 
contention with a focus on using rhetorical approaches such as issuing open letters and 
petitions and circulating slogans (Yang, 2009).  However, he also details how the use of this 
media is rapidly escalating and diversifying, particularly among China’s urban youth, to 
include newer styles of activism that range from the prosaic to the playful. So the ‘rules’ of 
contention could be changing. Yang elaborates the concept of ‘diffused contention’ to describe 
the everyday on-line conversations among Chinese ‘netizens’ as they open up and drift 
between on-line forums as easily as the government shuts them down. He suggests that taken 
together, this on-line dissent challenges state hegemony by offering critical perspectives that 
often deconstruct the discourse in the mainstream media. 
 
Of particular interest to my research is the ways in which micro-blogging is used as a 
resistance strategy. Yang (2013) notes that when first launched in 2009, micro-blogging in 
China tended to focus on the non-political, but recent examples suggest that could be changing. 
Microblogs are open, accessible to mobile phones, and difficult to track. So they hold potential 
for connecting people in acts of resistance (Yang, 2013; Tong & Lei, 2013). Early research on 
micro-blogging in China has noted its success at building key opinion leaders and close 
linkages with the traditional media, including the potential for live broadcasting (Tong & Lei, 
2013). 
 
 7.2.6 Is the Food in the Pressure Cooker? 
There is almost no scholarship pertaining to food-related NGOs or food-related 
resistance in China, with the exception of the very recent analyses of responses to the food 
safety crisis described in the preceding chapter. I have joined colleagues in arguing that 
widespread food safety problems are motivating the formation of nascent civil society 
organizing around food as evident in China’s AFNs (Scott et al., 2014). This suggestion has 
been supported very recently by scholars arguing that China’s ongoing ‘food safety crisis’ is 
poised to evolve into a more organized form of resistance and could acquire ‘sensitive issue’ 
status, and thus could well be monitored more closely by the state, making it a particularly 
volatile context for resistors (Yang, 2013). In an analysis of Weibo micro-blogs, Yang (2013) 
concludes that the state has already begun to monitor sentiments about food quality on the 
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internet in order to anticipate crises and ensure ‘harmony’. Jacob Klein’s (2009, 2013) 
ethnographic work echoes Yang’s suggestion that there is a diffuse and hidden resistance 
emerging around food quality and safety. He describes how in private, people are highly 
critical of China’s food governance when it comes to food safety, but notes the absence of 
collectivized or organized food safety resistance making demands for change. It may be  the 
food is in the pressure cooker,  and could soon become more highly politicized.  
 
7.2.7 Everyday Contention in China  
This section has described resistance strategies used by emerging civil society 
networks and ENGOs. Rules-based resistance, everyday resistance and embedded activism are 
all forms of contention that enable people to take action in more prudent and subtle ways in an 
authoritarian context. They involve repertoires of subtle actions operating near the edge of 
what is authorized but without ‘crossing the line’. Indeed, if done in a habitual way over time, 
these forms of everyday resistance can wear at the legitimacy of a system in the long run. The 
reason for the Chinese state’s restrictions on large public gatherings (even, for example, the 
farmers’ markets I studied) is their recognition that these assemblies can evolve into overt or 
confrontational styles when different individuals and small groups have the opportunity to ‘join 
up’ ideas, grievances and experiences. As yet however, there is an absence of information on 
what we could consider food-related resistance in China. The analysis that follows details the 
resistance repertoire of China’s fledgling AFNs, and can be considered an early contribution to 
this nascent scholarship.  
 
7.3 China’s AFNs: Repertoires of Resistance 
In this chapter’s final section I draw together the preceeding discussions of food 
citizenship evidenced in global north AFNs and the everyday resistance styles that characterize 
the emerging civil society in China, to elaborate the repertoires of resistance manifest in the 
AFNs in the current study. In doing so I explore how the global north framework of food 
citizenship  from democratic contexts characterized by elaborate civil society and political 
freedom can be applied in a more contentious authoritarian state context. I find the repertoires, 
tactics and strategies of AFNs in China, to some degree mirror those of global north AFNs. In 
particular China’s AFNs demonstrate strongly reflexive and democratic decision-making 
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processes and share many of the same approaches to skill and coalition building with their 
global north sisters. However, there are also differences. In the absence of any public process 
for policy advocacy, Chinese AFNs draw more strongly on ‘everyday resistance’ and subtleties 
in how the state’s language is appropriated.  
 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First to avoid over-romanticizing resistance 
demonstrated in these networks, I draw on the social justice critique of global north AFNs to 
reveal ways in which these networks are blind to peasant justice issues. I counter this with an 
analysis of the ways in which these AFNs are using reflexive and inclusive approaches, 
coupled with a broad repertoire of everyday resistance strategies. I conclude with an illustration 
of how China’s AFNs hold promise for transformative change through their connections to 
both indigenous and global justice movements, and in this way can be seen as ‘portals’ for 
social change. 
 
7.3.1 Social Justice Critique Revisited 
At the outset of this Chapter, I outlined the social justice critique of AFNs, noting 
that AFNs can be blind to justice issues and perhaps unintentionally exclude people in 
marginalized positions whom they seek to empower. Indeed much of the global north critique 
of structural inequalities that result from ‘othering’ is mirrored in my observations of Chinese 
AFNs. While the growing interest in the social economy (Chapter 4) and interpersonal 
relations of care (Chapter 6) illustrate ways in which China’s AFNs are trying to construct 
more fair relations with peasants, it would be simplistic to suggest that these nascent networks 
have managed to challenge deep historical problems in their brief history. Indeed, my 
interviews reveal a deeply held historical distrust of peasants which works against re-
connecting with the people who grow the food in these networks.  
 
 
7.3.1.1 Peasants are Marked and Othered  
As highlighted in the discussion of care relations in the previous chapter, China’s 
AFNs privilege connecting to land and urban entrepreneurs who operate farms, versus to the 
peasants who grow the food and labour on these farms. However, it is not only the consumers 
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in these networks who display a distrust of peasant farmers, but  AFN organizers and CSA 
entrepreneurs at times also seem to contribute to a marginalization of peasants.  
 
For some of the CSA operators in these networks, peasant farmers are simply labour, 
and there is no attempt to integrate them into the decision-making on the farms. When asked 
about the involvement of peasants in the farms, these organizers replied that the peasants had 
lost traditional farming skills and that they would have very little to share in planning the work 
on the farm. This is an interesting perspective considering peasants come from families with 
hundreds of years of experience working on the land while the urban people starting these 
CSAs are new to farming. Indeed those CSA operators who come from urban rather than 
peasant backgrounds seemed blind to this othering and sometimes appeared more concerned 
about the availability of ‘cheap labour’ rather than celebrating or supporting recent state 
policies aimed at addressing rural marginalization. As one CSA operator highlighted, “It is 
hard to find workers now as the government is building factories in villages to slow 
urbanization … there is little incentive for workers to come to the city to work anymore so it is 
getting harder and harder to operate a CSA” (FCAB4). She went on to recount how she uses 
the services of a recruitment agency offered by the municipal government to help her locate 
suitable workers. 
 
This blindness to peasant othering extends beyond CSA operators. I attended a 
national CSA conference in Beijing to distribute surveys and was fortunate to sit beside a 
young Chinese university student who spoke English well and agreed to help me locate peasant 
farmers who might complete my surveys. Despite not knowing anyone in the room, she 
proceeded to point out peasant farmers to me explaining that she could identify them by their 
appearance and mannerisms, even though they appeared exactly like everyone else in the room 
to me. She explained that “They are of low quality in how they walk, dress and speak - I can 
tell by the way they are sitting that they are peasants from the countryside”, thus reading the 
suzhi (Anagnost, 2004) of people from the bodily form, clothes and speech. This evaluation of 
peasants as being of low quality is widespread. Even the central protagonists in the AFNs I 
studied, who by all other accounts I consider as taking strongly egalitarian positions, at times 
seemed equally blind to peasant marginalization and injustice. For example, one of the buying 
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club organizers explained that she procures only from CSA farms operated by urban people 
and not peasant farmers because “they are hard to inspect and monitor because they don’t have 
the environmental ideology”(BCB1). 
 
I could share many more examples of the ‘othering’ in these networks and the 
marginalization of peasants in China generally, but for this purpose it is sufficient to say that 
these AFNs are largely mirroring the situation in the global north and that China’s AFNs can 
reveal social injustice based on entrenched inherited inequities. Certainly there are efforts to 
address injustices in these networks through charitable acts. Farmers’ markets use money 
raised from food sales to purchase food for peasants living in poor districts as well as to 
subsidize peasant farmers to attend training events and workshops. However, these localized 
approaches or ‘band aids’ do not fundamentally challenge structural conditions or cultural 
discourse, such as suzhi, that perpetuate marginalization. In the sections that follow, I explore 
the ways in which a more transformative politics are beginning to take shape in these networks, 
built on reflexive ethics and everyday resistance strategies.   
 
7.3.1.2 Evidence of Reflexive Justice 
As discussed at the outset of this Chapter, reflexivity or a politics of respect, is seen 
as an important aspect of AFNs seeking to embrace social justice concerns (Goodman et al., 
2012). A reflexive process is one in which people are conscious of deficiencies and deliberate 
about their underlying assumptions and practices. A reflexive approach brings people together 
in open and inclusive processes. In this section, I argue that these networks demonstrate 
reflexivity in their attention to inclusivity and joint decision-making and as sites of struggle 
among diverse interests and emphasizing process over vision. Global north scholars remind us 
that it is through civic engagement and bringing together diverse perspectives that the 
alternative is advanced and perpetuated (Goodman et al., 2012).   
 
 
7.3.1.2.1 Spaces of Struggle  
Indeed, Chinese AFNs are demonstrating a commitment to inclusive and 
participatory process and are trying to broadly engage producers, consumers, peasants, 
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entrepreneurs, officials, media and many other people into assemblages that are non 
hierarchical, open-ended and networked. One of the farmers’ market organizers continued to 
refer to these AFNs as offering a “platform” through which people assemble, discuss and 
develop initiatives noting that “Production and sales connection is only a small part of our 
market. Every year thousands of consumers come. We know this is not enough to change the 
big environment. But we offer this platform to let people know more about organic and about 
peasant farming. Some of these people will invent new activities to put on this platform, so it 
will never be just a farmers’ market” (FMB1).   
 
A reflexive approach embraces the struggles inherent in bringing diverse 
perspectives together. This is emulated by the process one of the buying clubs used to arrive at 
their particular definition of organic and the choice of vegetable suppliers. The club organizer 
explained how they needed to bring different perspectives together and talk them through. 
Some of her members wanted to be guaranteed that the farms they sourced from were only 
using inputs produced on the farm. But the farmers in their meetings told them this would be 
impossible and that they needed to use manure from other farms. Meanwhile the extension 
experts from the university who came to the meeting advised them that they needed to rely on 
chemical fertilizer or there would be no food produced for their club to procure. In the end, 
they arrived at a set of practices that described criteria for off farm inputs and prohibited 
chemical fertilizer, and accepted that this might mean lower yields. Their story demonstrates 
the tradeoffs made by bringing different perspectives together in an open and reflexive process.  
 
7.3.1.2.2 Process over Vision  
In several ways AFNs in China demonstrate reflexive justice in the ways in which 
they focus on process over vision and reflect consciously about their deficiencies. For example 
when I asked one of the famers’ market coordinators about the ways in which peasant farmers 
in particular use the “platform” of the market she confirmed my observation that most of the 
people volunteering to organize the market, most of the sellers, and most of the buyers are 
middle class urban residents. However, she went on to explain: 
You need to understand the situation in China about the peasant. No one trusts 
peasants. Most of the people who come to buy at the market would never buy their 
170 
 
goods. We want to change this. But we have only been doing this for three years 
and peasants have been oppressed in China for much longer than that.  We know 
we need to expand in numbers and build trust. After that, we don’t know. We will 
have to talk and consider. We have already gone to farms to meet with peasants 
and invited them to sell at the market. If people can begin to buy directly from a 
few peasants in these markets they will understand that they are not dirty and 
backward. They are efficient and hard working. We want to change things in 
China, but we can only walk one step at a time and cross the river by feeling the 
stones (FMB1). 
 
This openness to ideas and commitment to participatory process is further illustrated by 
the way the AFN volunteers position themselves as receptive to new ideas and actions. One of 
the market volunteers described how sometimes people come forward with “different” ideas 
that at first seem perhaps a little “strange” and quite removed from the operation of the market. 
But after discussion, they find a way to move forward on these ideas. She explained that often 
these different ideas end up revealing the “fun” side of food, noting that their orientation has 
been to offer celebrations with food and festivals that connect people with local art and artists. 
Indeed, a review of their on-line calendar of events, coupled with the way they are 
continuously featured in media accounts, suggests a vibrancy about food. She described how 
her original “serious” approach has changed and how she has come to embrace the celebratory 
aspects of their work, asking: “Who wants to join something that is old and boring? Plus, who 
wants to volunteer their time in activities they don’t enjoy? Of course we do this because we 
are having fun, and we want others to have fun too” (FMB1).  
 
Reflexivity is a struggle and not all the encounters and debates in these 
heterogeneous processes conclude positively. On one of my visits, there had just been a 
significant disagreement between a central CSA organizer and other operators at her CSA. She 
felt they were moving more toward a business approach and focusing on production and 
member engagement and that they were losing sight of the underlying marginalization of 
peasants that drew them to start the CSA in the first place. The struggle was not resolved 
amicably, and the tension was obvious in several of the meetings I attended. In the end, she 
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moved on to remain involved in the network through a new CSA that experiments with new 
ways of empowering peasant farmers. Of course, the process has a positive character as well. 
The concern was ‘tabled’ in a way in which everyone was allowed to ‘save face’, while  the 
elephant in the room was at least named. 
 
7.3.1.2.3 Instrumental and Egalitarian 
These examples reveal producers and consumers in these networks as self-aware, 
ethical actors who are actively constructing these networks as communities of practice. It is 
worth noting that all of the interviewees I spoke with, regardless of their role in the network 
(farmers, consumers, organizers) used the collective pronoun “we” in describing involvements, 
suggesting a feeling of ‘being in common’ with others. These and other examples depict the 
struggle in these AFNs to build a politics that expands opportunities for peasants and others 
through attention to reflexive practice. They demonstrate inclusive if not difficult dialogue that 
is attempting to bring together multiple perspectives, and the challenges in doing so. Global 
north scholars writing on the importance of reflexivity to social justice describe this process as 
“unfixed” or “dry eyed about ideals” (Goodman et al., 2012, p. 156-157). Such reflexivity is 
about struggling with different perspectives and options that arise from bringing diverse groups 
to the same table, rather than bringing like-minded people together. In essence, these responses 
demonstrate how Chinese AFNs are trying to be simultaneously instrumental and egalitarian. 
We see an ideology of the market and blindness to class inequality as well as reflexivity and a  
commitment to inclusive open process.  
 
7.3.2 Everyday Resistance Strategies  
The preceding discussion describes a way of working evident in these networks. In 
the following sections I look at the particular resistance practices or repertoire of Chinese 
AFNs, or how dissent is articulated. I observe that in general these are often subtle strategies of 
everyday resistance grounded by a rules consciousness (Perry, 2008). Some of these strategies 
parallel what we might call ‘community organizing’ strategies of global north AFNs and thus 
they are familiar to us. Yet, we need to remind ourselves of the context of pervasive 
uncertainty in China which these actions are situated. Indeed, operations at one of the farmers’ 
markets in this research was shut down by the state a few months prior to my interviews 
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because too many people would be gathering in a location close to where a state assembly was 
going to be held. When I asked one of the market organizers if she ever worried about state 
repression, she smiled and told me that many of her co-volunteers suggest that she should be 
worried and tell her to “hide your ambition for fighting against the system”. With a 
demonstration of remarkable strength she responded “Hide? Why? I have done nothing wrong. 
I am simply living in this world.” (FMB1) 
 
7.3.2.1 Slogan Adoption  
 For AFNs in the global north, efforts to advocate for policy changes is a central 
strategy for challenging hegemony (Koc et al., 2008; Lamine et al., 2012; Renting et al., 2012). 
In China of course, there are limited opportunities to participate directly in such processes. 
Instead in these AFNs we see that advocacy takes more subtle forms. As noted earlier, Scott 
(1992) describes the use of “public transcripts” or the “open interaction between subordinates 
and those who dominate” and “hidden transcripts” or “discourse that takes place beyond direct 
observation by power holders” (p. 2-4). In practice the difference can be rather understated as 
the following on-line conversations illustrate. 
 
Throughout interviews and in blog posts, there was a continual reference to, and 
adoption of, government slogans and rhetoric, seemingly at every available opportunity. Indeed 
it was rare that an interview concluded without me making note of a government slogan. 
Throughout the period of this research, two slogans in particular were embraced and 
extensively shared within AFN communications. The phrase “ecological civilization” was 
announced in a speech of the 16
th
 party congress in 2005 by Wen Jiabao, and re-confirmed in 
2007 at the 17
th
 party Congress by Hu Jintao. The phrase, “beautiful China”, was introduced as 
a central state slogan by Xi Jinping in April 2013. I spent quite a lot of time trying to get 
people to talk about the meanings behind these often used phrases but this proved difficult. 
Interpreters simply used the phrase to explain the phrase and indicated that this was the state’s 
direction. Finally one interpreter explained to me that these are slogans that really can mean 
whatever the state needs them to mean at any given time, noting that they “mean everything 
and nothing, like the famous phrase, ‘with Chinese characteristics’.” 
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I suggest that this slogan adoption is a way that activists can demonstrate support for, 
and alignment with government food related policy, yet criticize it at the same time. For 
example, sometimes people identified a policy in another country that they saw as desirable 
and then it would be linked to one of these Chinese state slogans, suggesting an ideological 
alignment. For example one blogger noted: “Allotments and community gardens in the US are 
farmland in the city for citizens and communities to rent and plant and some municipalities 
support this. Our government and developers could think this idea through and open up more 
land for citizens to use as farmland to help ensure food for China’s ecological civilization”. 
The tactic is part of the embedded activism approach where alignment with political rhetoric is 
key to maintaining productive relationships with the state. Some AFN organizers reflected 
quite openly on the strategy noting that “the reform policy of the country leads to the 
detachment of peasant from villages and we are trying to help them solve this, but some might 
worry about gathering of people together at the farmers’ market because it could lead to 
unrest. It can’t get too big. On the other hand, we think the government could be brought to 
support this. So to fit in we stay with the government and use their words so they will see us as 
allies.” (BCB1) 
 
7.3.2.2 Use of Sarcasm 
Sarcasm and mockery are classic forms of everyday resistance (Scott, 1985). The on-
line posts of AFN bloggers I monitored made extensive use of sarcasm, revealing their 
resistance to the state’s policy directions. Indeed Yang (2009) notes that the internet has helped 
to escalate open mockery of official pronouncements in the way that state rhetoric is frequently 
re-appropriated. To illustrate, one of the CSA farms posted a commentary on a central 
government document referred to as “Central Document No 130 on the Three Rurals”. The 
particular policy document the blogger refers to pledges to speed up agricultural modernization 
through subsidies to farmers. In discussing the document, AFN bloggers were clear to celebrate 
the focus of the government on improving livelihoods saying, “Beautiful China once again 
shows how proud we are of our farmers” but then the blogger added a note that is open to 
                                                 
30
 The title of Central Document No 1 refers to the central or key policy document of the current leadership and 
typically when announced, introduces a new slogan. The ‘three rurals’ refers to the interwoven nature of  three 
‘problems’ (wenti) of peasants (nongmin), rural society (nongcun) and agriculture (nongye)  which became 
foundational to state rural policy in the 1980s. The configuration argues that rural wellbeing and surplus labour, 
rather than simply agricultural production, are key to development of rural China. 
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mixed interpretation: “how great it is that now for seven years in a row our government has 
been helping small family farmers. We know how much our separate bowls families benefit 
from these subsidies” (FCSAB4). The reference to ‘separate bowls’ refers to the move from 
collective to household responsibility systems (outlined in Chapter 4) which literally translated 
means a move from ‘eating from one bowl’ to ‘eating from separate bowls’. The above 
commentary and ensuing responses can be interpreted as either authentic support for 
industrialization of agriculture and productivism or a commentary of resistance using sarcasm.  
 
7.3.2.3 Use of the Internet  
Criticism of state policy is not always so muted or hidden. Indeed in the protection of 
private interviews (where recording was seldom permitted by interviewees) many participants 
voiced open criticism of state policy. AFN organizers spoke critically about the lack of funding 
for organic agriculture noting that the state was only interested in funding large “Dragon 
Head” enterprises and not helping small peasant farmers. I also heard frequent criticism of the 
state’s policies on land compensation and the corruption involved. In particular, interviewees 
criticized policies that deny equal benefits to migrants in the city and environmental policies 
such as subsidies for chemical pesticides and fertilizers. In addition there were many overt 
criticisms of the organic regulations and their enforcement as discussed in Chapter 5. However, 
the most significant criticism was voiced in reference to the state’s inability to ensure safe food 
and the uselessness of food safety regulations and corrupt enforcement. What is striking is that 
frustration with the state’s food safety governance was raised by every person I interviewed, 
even though none of my questions directly asked about this. Indeed, the extent of this dissent 
took me by surprise. 
 
This dissent was also evident in internet postings. Beyond simply a recruitment and 
information dissemination tool, use of the internet, in particular the Weibo microblogs I 
monitored, can be seen as a foundational tool of resistance where people step out from behind 
the sarcasm and subtleties described above. In line with Yang’s (2013) recent analysis of 
internet contention, I found bloggers to engage with food safety issues in particularly openly 
critical ways. The following are a few examples of posts: 
 
175 
 
We are tired of all the talk of food safety - its ridiculous - every day there is a new 
problem and the government is doing nothing. They are irresponsible. But they 
have their own special food supply so they don’t care about us.(IB1) 
 
There is corruption everywhere. Officials know about these problems and they 
accept bribes and leave the practices continue. It is embarrassing for me to say this 
to you. (FS1)  
 
I don’t understand how Chinese people can do this to other Chinese people - 
deliberate adulteration of food - but worse than that, I cannot understand why the 
government does nothing. Someone should resign. (OG1) 
 
These echo findings in Yang’s (2013) research. He cites remarkably similar postings such as: 
 
There is too much talk about food safety, too much already. It’s hopeless. 
Manufacturers still do as they like. The supervisory agencies are still absent. 
Common folks – just pray for your own luck.  
 
We don’t have the safe “specially provided foodstuffs” available to the privileged. 
We can only toughen up our own stomachs. Perhaps eventually we will evolve into 
some alien forms. 
 
 Yang has conducted extensive research on Chinese resistance and the internet. He 
underscores the significance of these food safety responses, which may appear rather benign to 
those of us participating in global north AFNs. However, Yang notes that in China’s political 
context, some of these posts may trigger large-scale social disturbances that indeed threaten 
regime security; as one poster suggested: “If the food safety problem is still not solved in 
China, it will surely become the biggest problem affecting harmony and stability.  
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7.3.2.4 Evasion and Avoidance  
In Scott’s (1985) description of everyday resistance strategies, evasion and avoidance 
tactics figure proximately. In the current study, evasion can be seen in the way that one of the 
farmers’ markets has no fixed location and keeps moving around in an effort to ‘stay under the 
radar’. The volunteers explained that they are “technically illegal” as they are neither registered 
as an official NGO nor as a private business. Registering as an NGO and then running a CSA, 
farmers’ market or buying club as a ‘social enterprise’ would be “impossible” because they 
have not identified a bureaucrat who would endorse them, and this is necessary in the 
registration process. Registering as a business would be possible, but they resist this because 
they do not see themselves as a for-profit entity. This greyness of their status presents 
challenges each time they organize a farmers’ market because it prevents them from accessing 
the necessary permits for a public gathering. They have elected to operate through evasion 
where for each market (weekly throughout most of the year) they find another registered 
business, like a store or office, who has the necessary registration status and is willing to 
position the market as one of their events and arrange for the necessary permits. This evasion 
reinforces the observations of resistance scholars in China who note that organizations and 
networks are demonstrating dissent by operating close to the boundary that divides permitted 
from not permitted and by operating without necessary approvals (Yang, 2005).  
 
7.3.2.5 Pilfering or Poaching 
The resistance strategies described above, with the exception of a few peasant 
farmers whose internet posts I followed, are practices of urban educated individuals in key 
organizing roles in these AFNs. There is however, one particular example that illustrates 
everyday resistance strategies of peasant farmers in these networks. Indeed pilfering or 
poaching is a key everyday resistance strategy observed and documented by Scott (1985). One 
CSA operator described how the peasant whose land she leases would repeatedly “raid” the 
CSA farm and take whatever he wanted in what felt to her like an effort to subvert her project. 
She explained to me that from his perspective, he believed he was entitled to the produce from 
the land, since as a peasant farmer, he was the holder of the land use rights. She tried to explain 
to him that in leasing the land to her he was re-assigning those rights, but the pilfering 
continued. In describing the tactic she noted that such pilfering is to be expected, suggesting it 
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is a frequently used strategy which subtly resists the loss of land rights. She explained, “It is 
just what they do - it is their way of maintaining power in our relationship”. In the end, the 
peasant and CSA operator worked out a compromise where “I plant for him his own small 
garden in a corner of the property near his house, and I tend it for him, and he can harvest as 
he likes” (FCSAB3).  
 
7.3.2.6 Facilitating Voice 
In the global north, policy advocacy as undertaken by AFNs frequently involves 
community-based processes which ‘give voice’ through democratic process to diverse 
community members often through grassroots research and consultation projects which 
organizations then use as basis for policy advocacy (Koc et al., 2008). In China such 
consultation has not been part of the ethic of developing policy. When I asked people if they 
had been involved in the process to create the state’s organic standard for example, several 
different AFN participants looked at me rather incredulously and I realized it was a naïve 
question. In this context, I suggest it is quite remarkable that AFNs embrace nascent 
community consultation processes. For example, one of the farmers’ market organizers used 
the coincidence of our presence in China to organize a community meeting in which we could 
help to “encourage” AFN participants with examples of AFNs and organizing activities from 
Canada. Far from being simply a venue for us to present information however, the meeting 
evolved into a forum where different perspectives were collated and the farmers’ market 
volunteer prepared a document summarizing issues and themes important to China’s emerging 
AFNs. On a subsequent visit, she showed the document to me and explained that it is their 
“version of your people’s policy process”31 that “starts to organize our views of what is needed 
in China and the work that AFNs can do” (FMIB1). In a second example, one of the CSAs 
conducted a fledgling study of CSAs in China, documenting how many there are, and their 
types, and also exploring people’s motivations for joining and concerns with the dominant food 
system. They shared their findings on-line, through their CSA newsletter, and at the CSA 
conference in Beijing. Subsequently this fledgling work was taken up by academics and 
                                                 
31
 One of the examples we shared in our presentation to the group was of Food Secure Canada’s process of 
grassroots organizing through its Peoples Food Policy project. 
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enhanced and has become the early stages of a Chinese academic scholarship on AFNs (Chen, 
2013a, 2013b). 
 
7.3.2.7 Building Guanxi  
AFN volunteers invest significant time enlarging their networks by forging ties with 
members of other nascent civil society groups, environmental NGOs and the media. However, 
the relationships with academic allies and representatives of the state seem particularly well 
developed. Several CSAs are connected to local government officials (FCSAJ2, FCSAB4, 
FCSAB6, and FCSAB3). For example, one operator described how a local government 
representative seemed quite interested in the CSA noting that even though he “can offer us 
nothing we need…. right now he can only offer us a reduced price on fertilizer, but we don’t 
need that …. He will still be useful to us one day, so we keep inviting him to events and we 
bring him food because we are cultivating guanxi with him” (FCSAB6). For another farm, the 
relationship or “guanxi” cultivated with local officials paid off when the land they use was 
threatened by expropriation. She described: “See all these apartments - a few years ago this 
was a village. It is now gone, and here we are left, one little farm in the middle of this.... We 
would be gone too, except for guanxi we had built with some local officials” (FCSAB3). In 
another example, a farmers’ market volunteer explained how she was building a relationship 
with the state’s representative to IFOAM because he was influential and would be able to 
“assist them somehow in the future” (FMB1). Apparently she was right. As I noted in Chapter 
4, some of the farms in these networks are now working with IFOAM on developing a 
Participant Guarantee System (PGS) of organic verification.  
 
Cultivating relationships and building networks with academics seems to be a 
particular strategy with student projects and jointly organized conferences being common to 
several of the CSAs. For example, one quite influential academic is a strong supporter of the 
CSA approach and of AFNs. Dr. Wen Tienjun is a previous Dean of the Institute of Advanced 
Studies for Sustainability and the School of Agronomics and Rural Development at Remnin 
University and former advisor to the state council on rural development. He is credited with the 
formulation of the foundational ‘three rurals’ policy mentioned above and has continued as a 
strong advocate of positioning rural wellbeing in China beyond the question of agricultural 
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production (Wen, 2007; Wen et al., 2012). Dr. Wen spoke passionately about rural reform in 
China at both the CSA conference and the South-South development conference I attended as 
part of my fieldwork, and from the reaction of the audience I suggest he is seen as a kind of 
‘academic leader’ of the AFN movement and offers it some legitimacy. He is also a leading 
protagonist of the indigenous rural re-development movement known as New Rural 
Reconstruction (Day, 2008; Hale, 2013) that is entangled with these AFNs as discussed below. 
 
7.3.2.8 Trans-Local Linkages and Frame Bridging 
The linkages being built by AFN participants extend beyond China and include a 
widening range of connections with like minded organizations and networks around the world.  
This heterogeneous alliance development is precisely the kind of process that scholars argue is 
most provocative to the Chinese state (Heilmann & Perry, 2011; Yang, 2009). While the state 
has been tolerant towards resistance that is limited to particular locations or isolated incidents 
or groups with small participation, large heterogeneous linked processes are seen as a threat to 
the  state’s hegemony. I argue that these global connections are examples of ‘frame bridging’ 
described by social movement scholars. Frame bridging refers to the process of building 
ideologically congruent discourse and practices or ‘frames’ that join up otherwise unconnected 
actors. I described earlier how diverse coalitions and networks are being built by AFNs in other 
parts of the world. The difference in this process for Chinese AFNs however, is that these 
linkages are through personal (guanxi) versus organizational connections in order to avoid the 
risk inherent in forming official and overt multi-network movements. In this way China’s 
AFNs, while not engaged in transnational movements officially, are positioned as portals to a 
wide diversity of global movements for individuals interested in pursuing connections. 
 
Some of these linkages have been advanced by a strong orientation to global north 
models that is endorsed by the state as part of its ‘opening ’. This approach has encouraged the 
drawing in of knowledge, experience and information from outside and indigenizing these with 
‘Chinese characteristics’. For example, two leading organizers in the AFNs I studied have 
strong affiliations with specific international NGOs. Moving beyond these particular and 
official connections, I uncovered a number of personal connections to global food and 
environmental justice movements, where there is an entanglement of relations that is difficult 
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to unpack. Perhaps the strongest example of this is the entanglement between the New Rural 
Reconstruction movement, global food justice movements, and the AFNs.  
  
New Rural Reconstruction (NRR) is a decade old re-articulation of a populist 
movement which existed prior to the Mao era and focuses on developing new directions for 
Chinese rural society. NRR is neither intellectual nor overt rural dissidence against the state. 
Most of the movement’s organizers (perhaps with the exception of a younger and more radical 
fraction) avoid contentious politics and emphasize harmonious relations. NRR is both an 
academic critique of capitalist economics and a set of practical experiments and projects that 
are focused on re-building rural-urban relations around agroecological production and reviving 
rural traditions. Academics associated with NRR argue that the problems of rural China cannot 
be understood simply through an economic lens. Rather rural social life needs to be ‘re-
constructed’. The movement’s projects are diverse and include establishing rural credit unions, 
farm supply cooperatives, a distillery, a performing arts troupe, childrens’ centres, thrift stores, 
pro bono legal services, and a wide diversity of ecological farm cooperatives (many of whose 
products are found at the farmers’ markets and CSAs I visited). In many ways, NRR is what 
we might call a community economic development movement that links together social, 
economic and environmental goals through grassroots experiments and initiatives. 
 
NRR intersects with AFNs in complex ways. First, several of the CSAs instrumental 
to forming these AFNs are operated by individuals who are also taking key roles in the broader 
NRR movement. Thus these CSAs and by extension the broader AFNs are part of the 
experimental work of the NRR movement. Second, at several CSAs, young people who have 
grown up in urban areas but have rural ties, have been developing farming skills with the 
intention of “returning to the countryside” (NGOHK1) to start ecological farms and bridge 
urban-rural difference. One of the NGOs I interviewed described this as a “fast growing and 
new phenomenon evolving out of AFNs and NRR in China” that they want to further study, 
understand and support because it opens up “many new possibilities and hope for rural 
China”. These projects, which were showcased in both the CSA conference and the South-
South conference I attended as “young people return to the countryside” projects, are 
developing as central experiments of the NRR movement.The project surprises and interests 
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Chinese NGOs and academics because it contrasts with the prevailing urban perspectives that 
see the rural as backward, fuelled by the memory of harsh times in the countryside in the Mao 
era.  
 
Through this close association with NRR, AFNs become a portal, or a path to 
linkages with trans-global food justice movements, that otherwise have no official presence in 
China. Indeed in research on NRR in China, Alexander Day (2008) and Matthew Hale (2013) 
describe these connections and illustrate the ways in which the NRR movement resonates 
strongly with non-Chinese movements such as the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Landless Workers 
Movement (MST) in Brazil and La Via Campesina, highlighting attendance at conferences, 
meetings and anti-WTO protests outside of China. Representatives from these global justice 
movements were present at the South-South conference I attended and it was clear that many 
AFN organizers have established personal relationships with these groups. In this way China’s 
AFNs open the door to participation in global justice movements while remaining under the 
state’s radar.  
 
This analysis opens up our understanding of advocacy and political action to reveal 
subtle yet powerful forms of everyday resistance around food that occupy the large space 
between compliance with hegemony and overt defiance. China’s AFNs work at a ‘hazy, 
shifting boundary’ (Stern & O’Brien, 2012, p. 3)  between permitted and prohibited, and a 
climate of “pervasive uncertainty” (Heilman & Perry, 2010, p. 22). This section has revealed a 
diverse repertoire of everyday resistance strategies being rehearsed and practiced within 
China’s AFNs. Strategies include appropriating government slogans, sarcasm and mockery, 
evasion and avoidance of state requirements, building connections and pilfering. Given its 
diffused nature, the internet in particular provides new possibilities for more overt dissent as 
the growing contention around food safety governance suggests. I’ve also highlighted how 
these networks are using nascent community organizing strategies to facilitate grassroots 
participation in a context where there is limited ‘bottom up’ policy process. Finally I described 
how entanglements between these AFNs, the New Rural Reconstruction movement and trans-
global food justice movements open up possibilities to join with global food justice groups that 
have no official presence in China. 
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7.5 From a Window to a Portal  
This chapter has argued that AFNs are not simply sites of material transactions. They 
are also places where community is being built and hegemony is being challenged. Consumers 
and producers are working together in these networks, in market-based as well as civil society 
relations, to articulate everyday resistance for social change. While these are on one hand 
‘market-based’ networks, I suggest that ‘voting with your chopsticks’ does not capture the 
identity and relations of China’s AFNs. Rather these are networks where ‘food citizens’ are 
being enacted, decentering private needs and centering actions for the public good by calling 
the state to task using subtle forms of everyday resistance. 
 
I began by detailing the ‘social justice critique’ of AFNs and described how networks 
in the global north can be blind to privilege and marginalize the very people whom they seek to 
empower, underscoring the need to transform structural conditions and deep historical 
problems that marginalize many. This idea of moving beyond the market is being reflected in 
AFN discourse on ‘food citizens’ and ‘civic networks’ that sees these networks as moving 
beyond the market to embrace non market relations and institutions that centre common 
interests and collective action in addition to private and material action of growing and 
procuring food. Drawing on a set of recent descriptions of AFNs from Europe and from 
Ontario, I illustrated how networks are articulating collective agency through open and 
inclusive practices, building diverse networks, strengthening capacities and skills, building 
broad coalitions and engaging in policy advocacy. 
 
In examining China’s AFNs, I found a mirroring of the global north social justice 
critique. In China, while the growth of the urbanized middle class, and their desire for higher 
quality food, makes these alternative networks possible, it also shapes them in a way that 
subjugates peasants and privileges entrepreneurs. There is a deep historical distrust of peasants 
which works against re-connecting with the people who grow the food, and raises fundamental 
questions about food justice in these networks. In this context, it seems that these alternative 
networks can be instruments of exploitation and domination of peasants just like the system 
they reject. In China, the industrialized production of ‘cheap food’ and the alternative 
production of ‘quality food’ can both be blind to privilege and subjugate peasants. 
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Yet these are remarkably reflexive networks where struggle to address underlying 
inequities is evident. I described how these AFNs are working to engage diverse interests and 
focus on open deliberative and imperfect processes. They sit in an authoritarian context where 
there is no historical separation between the private and the public, and the boundary between 
what is permitted and prohibited is in constant flux. China’s AFNs offer platforms for people 
to come together, through food provisioning, and then build connections and skills for social 
change. The networks described here demonstrate how we can widen the lens on the ‘food 
citizen’ to include a broad range of everyday resistance strategies, drawing primarily on 
approaches that are covert in the context of pervasive uncertainty. I described a broad 
repertoire of everyday resistance strategies including appropriating government rhetoric, 
sarcasm and mockery, evasion and avoidance of state requirements, building connections and 
pilfering. Given its diffused nature, the internet in particular provides new possibilities for 
more overt dissent as the growing contention around food safety governance suggests. I also 
highlighted how these networks are learning and using nascent community organizing 
strategies in a context where there are no public policy development processes. I detailed how 
these AFNs are highly connected and trying to draw support at diverse scales including both 
indigenous rural development movements and foreign NGOs. I concluded with an illustration 
of how these AFNs offer a portal through which people can connect to trans-global food justice 
movements that have no official presence in China.  
 
In a landmark paper, Allen et al. (2003) introduced the the analogy of tectonic plates 
to ask, “To what degree do [AFNs] seek to create a new structural configuration – a shifting of 
plates in the agrifood landscape – and to what degree are their efforts limited to incremental 
erosion at the edges of the political-economic structures that currently constitute those plates?” 
(p. 63, emphasis mine). In response, I suggest China’s AFNs demonstrate neither a collision of 
tectonic plates, nor erosion at the margins. Indeed, these networks are articulating a space of 
everyday resistance that lies between overt hegemonic challenge and isolated private actions. 
Framed in the context of an authoritarian state, China’s AFNs are revealing a repertoire of 
resistance strategies of the mundane, subtle, low profile and mostly ‘under the radar’ sort. 
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8.0 The Beginning 
 
Scholars studying AFNs have struggled with question of whether these initiatives are 
a type of utopian entertainment for a few middle class consumers or the beginning of a political 
struggle that configures new food system relations (Goodman & DuPuis, 2002). My response 
is that in China, they are both. This research has presented an early account of new forms of 
producer-consumer provisioning networks emerging in peri-urban China. I have explored the 
‘alternativeness’ of these networks along economic, ecological, interpersonal and political 
dimensions, using four different theoretical perspectives – diverse economies, functional 
integrity, ethics of care and everyday resistance. The findings complicate dualisms and binary 
thinking, and I have argued that instead of fitting into the ‘either or’ categories, China’s AFNs 
need be seen as hybrid systems with a ‘yes and also’ nature.   Shaped by strong imaginaries of 
traditional Chinese agriculture, these AFNs are economically diverse and reveal re-connections 
between people and land and a repertoire of everyday resistance strategies.  
 
In Chapter two, I introduced the concept of AFNs and developed my theoretical and 
empirical approach. Here I reiterated calls in the global north scholarship for ‘opening up’ how 
we think of AFNs and moving beyond binary thinking to consider how these networks 
articulate hybridity and diversity. I adopted a post-structural political economy approach to 
accomplish this and introduced four dimensions to the study of these networks – economic, 
ecological, interpersonal and political. Drawing on four different theoretical perspectives, I 
developed a set of empirical ‘lenses’ as analytics. Finally, I described a multi-case, multi-
method approach to study AFNs in peri-urban China.  
 
Following this, in Chapter 3, I detailed how diverse food initiatives including CSA 
farms, buying clubs and farmers’ markets, are coalescing into networks in China’s peri-urban 
landscape. I positioned these networks as emerging in a contradictory place. Economic and 
social reforms have contributed to China’s emergence as the world’s largest food economy. 
Yet its transitional food system remains a hybrid of traditional and modern firms, farms and 
institutions. To help us understand the AFNs in this landscape, I introduced a typology that 
shows the diverse motivations behind their emergence. AFNs in China have been initiated, 
185 
 
primarily, by an educated, urban middle class group, responding to concerns about the loss of 
traditional agriculture, environmental degradation and a pervasive ‘food safety crisis’. 
However, these motivations are not shared by all the affiliates in these networks. Some 
network participants, notably ‘weekend farmers’ who visit farms to join in food production, 
appear motivated by a traditional pastoral that elicits a powerful set of ideas and nostalgia 
about historic farming in China. They share this value of tradition and a care for land with 
AFN farmers, but are not motivated by the same environmental concerns. Further, these 
participants, along with buyers at the farmers’ markets, and most members at CSAs and buying 
clubs, engage in AFNs out of a concern for food safety and a need to procure food they 
understand to be safe for themselves and their families. In this way, AFNs sit in a contradictory 
place where multiple motives circulate. 
 
Building on this description, each of the subsequent chapters (Chapters 4-7) drew on 
a different analytic to explore China’s AFNs. These four chapters developed the argument that 
AFNs can be understood as hybrid relations, in particular: economic hybrids of capitalist and 
other-than-capitalist forms, ecological hybrids of traditional and modern practices, consumer-
producer entanglements, and political hybrids of market and civil society relations of 
resistance. Further, these four chapters revealed a set of economic, environmental, cultural and 
political characteristics in the China context, that work in contradictory ways to explain the 
particular forms these AFNs take. In this concluding chapter, I re-visit these conditions and 
summarize the ways in which they shape China’s AFNs, and reflect on how these AFNs might 
inform global north theory and practice. 
 
8.1 Conditions Shaping China’s AFNs 
This research reveals a particular assembly of economic, environmental, cultural and 
political conditions or characteristics of China’s context, that reinforce the initiator’s motives 
and drive the formation of these alternatives, and/or restrain their articulation and serve to 
perpetuate mainstream food relations. In this way, China’s AFNs are simultaneously being 
supported and held back by these conditions, as illustrated in Figure 9. However, this 
constellation of conditions doesn’t appear as a set of cause and effect relations that can be 
quantified. Nor do I present these ‘driving and restraining’ factors with the goal of using them 
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to predict the future course of China’s AFNs. Indeed, these conditions are always shifting, and 
both shape, and are shaped by, China’s developing AFNs. So the future is open. But for the 
present, this particular set of conditions helps to explain why China’s AFNs take the forms that 
they do.   
In interrogating China’s AFNs, as discussed in Chapter 2, I have tried to bridge a 
conceptual divide between research that focuses on agro-food production from a political 
economy perspective and that which focuses on consumption using a cultural theory 
perspective. Such a hybrid approach reveals AFNs as influenced by an interaction of political-
economic or structural conditions, as well as social-cultural factors, such as systems of 
meaning, values and beliefs. The result is the diverse mix of economic, environmental, cultural 
and political characteristics of the contemporary China context, that influence these AFNs 
shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Conditions Shaping China’s AFNs 
Source: this author 
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Economic changes and globalization in China’s process of reform both drive and 
restrain the development of AFNs. Agrarian reforms, specifically the egalitarian distribution of 
land and the hukou approach to citizenship, set the stage for China’s explosive economic 
growth in the reform period. Not only did these changes open the door to capitalist relations 
and the development of a middle class, they also made land available for AFN initiation. On 
one hand, China’s AFNs are made possible by urbanization and a middle class in pursuit of 
better food quality. But on the other, their consumerist and individualist ethics present 
challenges for AFN development. The impacts of globalization and China’s ‘opening’ are also 
mixed. While these processes have presented challenges for smallholder agriculture, at the 
same time global connectedness makes it possible for egalitarian minded urban consumers, to 
draw AFN models and supports from the global north. 
 
China’s reforms have been underpinned by an uncritical view of science and 
technology, and a preoccupation with food security that have reinforced a productivist 
approach to agriculture as the foundation of the socialist market economy. Embracing 
productivism wholeheartedly has resulted in negative environmental impacts. China’s 
productivist legacy is only just being revealed, and the very changes that helped production 
soar to meet food security goals, may now be posing the barriers to meeting those goals in the 
future. While the resulting environmental degradation is a strong motivator for the formation of 
AFNs, the strong ideology about productivism, technology, and need to be food secure, shapes 
and limits the ecological practices in China’s AFNs. Further, the dream of agricultural 
modernization and the state’s focus on food security through science and technology has driven 
traditional agriculture to the margins, paradoxically recalling a traditional pastoral or idyll that 
motivates urban producers and consumers alike. 
Cultural conditions are also strong influencers of China’s AFNs, often working in 
contradictory ways. By ‘cultural conditions’, I mean the meanings, beliefs, ideas and practices 
of everyday life. This research has identified three cultural threads, or sets of meanings, that 
intersect in complex ways with political economic conditions, to give China’s AFNs their 
particular characteristics. As noted in Figure 9, the traditional Chinese pastoral or rural idyllic, 
the discourse of suzhi (quality), and the traditional practice of guanxi, suggest a central, and 
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often overlooked, role for such cultural tropes in explaining AFNs, in China as well as the 
global north. 
 
Lastly, the top-down decision-making, and pervasive uncertainty of the authoritarian 
state has profound influences on the development of AFNs. The absence of civil society 
institutions, the bureaucratic requirements for NGO registration, and the seemingly excessive 
state oversight of mundane activities like holding farmers’ markets, no doubt have slowed the 
development of civil-society based food alternatives in China. Yet, at the same time, the 
absence of civil society institutions and the state’s top down decision making, are prompting 
democratic action in these networks such as civil society organizing, bottom-up standard 
development, and acts of everyday resistance. Indeed China’s unique context shapes AFNs in 
complex ways. I offer four narratives that describe how these conditions interact to articulate 
four different types of hybrid relations in these AFNs.  
 
8.2 Economic Hybrids of Capitalist and Other-than-Capitalist Forms 
Agrarian reform in China, in particular the commons approach to land and the dual 
urban-rural citizenship provided by the hukou, shapes the economic relations in these networks 
to take diverse and hybrid forms. Drawing on the diverse economies approach, in Chapter 4, I 
detailed the hybridity of capitalist and other-than-capitalist relations in these networks. While 
instrumental and pragmatic relations, led by young urban ‘entrepreneurs’ are indeed 
proliferating in China’s AFNs, these profit-oriented forms do not eclipse other ethics. 
Motivated to repair urban-rural inequities, the protagonists in these networks are supporting 
and re-building peasant forms of agriculture which focus on livelihoods and re-investment of 
surpluses into the farm’s ecology. The young, initiators of CSA farms in these networks are 
able to earn a living from farming, without privileging capitalism. AFNs in China are 
characterized by economic diversity. Capitalist relations involving waged labour, financial 
investment and surplus extraction co-exist in exchange relations with peasant economies 
characterized by self-labour, self-provisioning, a focus on livelihoods, and attempts to 
empower the peasantry by building rural-urban connections and markets. The result is an 
entanglement of capitalist and other-than-capitalist relations in which we see the persistence of 
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the peasantry, de-peasantization and re-peasantization processes occurring harmoniously and 
simultaneously.  
 
These AFNs are evolving in a context where smallholder production is dominant, 
and where land consolidation cannot readily occur in the context of a commons approach to 
land and China’s unique hukou citizenship system. As a result, entrepreneurs in urban areas 
have access to peri-urban land through land leases, facilitating urban initiation of AFNs. The 
land-labour relations in these networks are a reversal from those studied in global north AFNs, 
and reveal the fundamental role that agrarian history and land tenure has in shaping 
alternatives. Public land ownership, where entrepreneurs need to negotiate for land access with 
peasants, who hold usage rights, complicates land-labour relations based on private land tenure 
in the global north. The effect is that the small farms in China’s AFNs are ‘normalized’ in this 
landscape of other similarly scaled farms. Unlike in the global north, where small farms are 
dwindling in numbers and are marginalized by land consolidation processes, there is nothing 
‘niche’ or ‘fringe’ about the economics of CSA farms in China’s small farm context. Certainly, 
China’s accelerated global trade has introduced vertical consolidation and ‘supermarketization’ 
processes. But at least in the present, land policies have the effect of buffering those processes. 
The growing middle class, made possible by China’s ‘opening’ to global trade, provides both 
the initial impetus and sustaining resources for these AFNs. The emergence of an educated, 
globally aware and connected social group, open to the influence of global north alternatives, 
initiated these networks by indigenizing CSAs, buying club and farmers’ market models 
imported from the global north. Further, following the ancient practice of guanxi, these AFNs 
grow quickly in what seems like a cultural aptitude for both personal and electronic networked 
relations.  
 
China’s growing middle class, with its rising disposable income and concern for food 
quality, also provides the members and buyers in these networks. Yet, here we see the 
contradictory influence of China’s cultural context. Despite the strong motives of the AFN 
initiators for food alternatives that bridge urban-rural differences and are more fair for peasant 
farmers, China’s pervasive suzhi discourse perpetuates a view of the peasantry as backward 
and uncivilized. The result is that it is difficult to foster direct market relations between 
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peasants and urbanites, necessitating instead AFNs that are configured around urban 
entrepreneurs and new peasants as intermediaries in the buying clubs, farmers’ markets and 
most of the CSAs. The powerfully egalitarian commons approach to land that sits at the 
foundation of these networks and makes them possible, is trumped by the cultural discourse of 
suzhi which excludes the very peasant farmers whose practices are idealized. China’s peasants 
are dispossessed not materially, but rather through discourse.   
 
8.3 Ecological Hybrids of Traditional and Modern Production 
China’s AFNs are constructing meanings of ‘organic’ and ecological in the context 
of a state-led, top-down approach to ecological sector governance and standardization. The 
path of agricultural modernization in China has followed a model of technologically-driven 
productivist agriculture, driven by an obsession with food security, and in this context 
traditional agriculture has been driven to the margins. China’s AFNs are challenging the state’s 
version of ecological agriculture by seeking to re-kindle the traditional agricultural practices it 
has abandoned. Drawing on a powerful cultural idyll of traditional farming, China’s AFNs 
adopt a philosophy that traditional practices can be re-articulated with modern practices in a 
type of ecological hybridity. The farmers in these networks draw on seed and species 
biodiversity and minimize externally sourced inputs through a reliance on closed loop 
approaches. At the same time however, these AFNs are strongly influenced by the dominant 
productivist ideology of the state and associated market pressures, resulting in the absence of 
some key ecological practices that protect soil resources. In the absence of organized civil 
society or government support, these producers, many of whom are new to farming, are 
challenged to identify and learn about traditional and/or ecological farming practices. In 
response, farmers and consumers are supporting each other in these networks to build food 
skills and celebrate both traditional and modern ecological practices. 
 
Further, reacting to a widespread distrust of state-led organic and ecological 
agriculture institutions and their official policies, both producers and consumers in these AFNs 
are forging bottom-up responses. Producers are working to build the transparency consumers 
seek through extensive on-line and on-farm information sharing. Meanwhile, consumers 
starting buying clubs and farmers’ markets in these networks, are resisting and reconfiguring 
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state standards by constructing their own meaning of ecological and organic based on reflexive 
civic processes and forms of participatory standard governance. This producer-consumer co-
construction of standards in China’s AFNs does not result from a ‘weak state’ acting in concert 
with agri-business to ‘water down’ standards (as in the ‘organic lite’ critique in the global 
north). Rather, the evidence suggests the opposite. In China, the state has acted to address 
widespread corruption and fraud in organic governance by enacting strong standards, in effect 
setting the bar ridiculously high with requirements for an inspection every time a seed is 
planted, knowing that farmers can’t possibly comply. Citing examples of corruption, 
participants in these AFNs distrust the state’s standard setting mechanism and the bureaucracy 
charged with its enforcement. Ironically, in what can be understood as a form of everyday 
resistance, the state’s authoritarian, ‘top down’ approach to policy development is motivating 
the formation of nascent civil society action to develop standards in which producers and 
consumers can place their trust.  
 
Again, we see the contradictory influences of culture. For both producers and many 
consumers, a pastoral idyll of traditional Chinese farming elicits a powerful set of ideas and 
nostalgia that shapes practices in these networks. This idyll draws on cultural representations 
of clean environments, harmonious relations with nature, authentic rurality and life at a slower 
pace. These are not just ideas people think about. They are ideas that shape practices and 
actions. The impact of the Chinese pastoral is revealed in the production practices adopted by 
CSA farmers and is a primary motivator for urbanites to connect to these networks as weekend 
farmers. In these networks, modernity is integrated with tradition, not positioned against it. 
Yet, ideals prove insufficient. Traditional practices are selectively adopted in these networks 
and most of the urban farmers are self-taught and lack knowledge and skills for strong 
ecological production. This skill deficit is exasperated by the state’s focus on technological 
solutions and the absence of state or other civil society support and extension services.  
 
However, CSA operators are not facing these educational challenges alone. 
Organizers of farmers’ markets, buying clubs, NGOs, some academics, as well as some CSA 
members are strong supporters of organic practices, and AFNs are working to fill this 
knowledge and skill void for themselves. On one hand, strong guanxi networks help these new 
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peasants draw training and support from multiple places. But, ironically, the urban producers 
seeking to re-cover farming traditions, don’t seek advice from the peasant farmers working on 
their farms. A discourse of quality (suzhi) that portrays peasants as low quality and uncivilized 
exists in these AFNs and leads to peasant marginalization. So farming traditions are embraced, 
but traditional farmers are not. 
 
8.4 Producer-Consumer Entanglements 
In the context of persistent concerns with food quality, participants in China’s AFNs 
are drawn into diverse complex interpersonal relations and reconnections. China’s food safety 
crisis, and the AFNs responding to it, are situated in a cultural battleground, where complex 
pressures toward privatization, urbanization and the rise of consumerism are all encouraging a 
shift to a more individualist and disconnected society. Social disconnections from collectives 
and work units in the reform period have forced people to take on greater responsibilities and 
engage with the competitive forces of the market and assume greater risk. Yet, unlike in the 
global north, the persistence of state control in China means this individualization is only 
partial and the individual’s rights and identity remain dependent on the state. In the resulting 
social anxiety about food, people are coming to China’s emerging AFNs out of mistrust of the 
dominant food supply. However, instead of developing relations of care and reconnections 
with producers in these networks, consumers’ motivation to care for themselves and their 
families, and procure healthy safe food, draws many of them into an ethics of care involving 
land. On almost all of the CSAs I visited, operators set aside a portion of the land, sometimes 
as much as one third of the farm, on which consumers and members can enjoy respite from the 
city and grow their own food. Motivated by the same rural idyll that influences the CSA 
operators, the construction of these ‘weekend farmers’ complicates the identities of a passive 
consumer and an autonomous producer in the marketplace and articulates an integrated and 
more holistic identity of ‘co-producers’.  
 
Yet, China’s AFNs are caught in a space where these cultural conditions shape them 
in contradictory ways. On one hand, suzhi, a discourse about population quality, circulates in 
these networks and amplifies a distrust of peasant farmers. Suzhi stands in for social class and 
reflects the shifting power dynamics evolving within expanding capitalism. It exemplifies the 
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individualization and weakening of social bonds or ‘untying’ in the reform period and works in 
opposition to the egalitarianism of traditional Chinese ethics. However, while suzhi discourse 
strongly illustrates the growing individualism in contemporary China, and marginalizes 
peasants and perpetuates distrust in China’s AFNs, guanxi relations have the opposite effect 
and help to build trust and social bonds in these networks. 
 
Guanxi networks are evident in the extensive informal networks that link people in 
these AFNs. Despite the challenges with building trust in these networks, CSA operators, 
farmers’ markets volunteers and buying club organizers seem undaunted and persevere with 
continuous activities and ongoing internet posts through which they reach out to consumers, 
seeking to build reconnections around traditional food skills and environmental issues. There is 
an impressive repertoire of festivals, workshops, events, conferences and other activities 
practiced in these AFNs, with the goal of building trust and reconnecting rural and urban, and 
producer and consumer. As with the weekend farmers, identities of producer and consumer 
become blurred and entangled for the AFN organizers as well. They first approach AFNs as 
consumers and their role gradually changes and they became producers responsible for 
growing food and reconnecting others with food. 
 
In this context of pervasive distrust in food and state food governance, AFNs become 
‘windows’ through which people can glimpse different kinds of reconnections and care ethics, 
that for many result in an entanglement of producer-consumer identities and a nascent civil 
society organizing.  
 
8.5 Hybrids of Market and Civil Society 
China’s AFNs are not only sites of material transactions. They are also places where 
community is being built and the state is being challenged, although in subtle and covert ways. 
They are moving beyond market relations to work toward transformative change. These are 
networks where new ‘food citizens’ are being enacted, as these nascent networks begin to fill a 
civil society void and find opportunities to have influence on broader food system issues under 
the shadow of an authoritarian state. 
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While the growth of the urbanized middle class, and their pursuit of higher quality 
food, makes these networks and their acts of resistance possible, it also shapes them in a way 
that privileges entrepreneurs and subjugates peasants. There is a deep historical distrust of 
peasants in these networks raising fundamental questions about food justice. AFN organizers 
can be blind to privilege, and their charitable acts, though well intentioned, do little to 
challenge structural conditions that perpetuate peasant marginalization in China.  
 
These are however reflexive networks, struggling to address these food justice 
problems through engaging diverse interests in open processes. In the context of pervasive 
uncertainty, these networks are developing a broad repertoire of everyday resistance strategies 
such as, bloggers employing sarcasm in their use of state rhetoric and slogans, buying clubs 
avoiding business registration, farmers’ markets evading bureaucratic requirements, and 
peasants pilfering food they believe is rightfully theirs. These mundane forms of resistance 
flourish in a context where the boundary between what is permitted and risky is constantly 
shifting. The actions of China’s AFNs remind us that hegemony is never total, and their 
repertoire opens up our understanding of ‘opposition’ to reveal subtle yet powerful forms of 
everyday resistance around food that occupy the large space between compliance and overt 
defiance. 
 
This everyday resistance is directed at the state and comes in the form of seeking, 
primarily, better rules and better enforcement regarding food safety and civic development of 
food quality standards. This is not the same anti-globalization resistance that motivates AFNs 
in the global north. Indeed, here in a context where the memory of state-regulated food choices 
is still fresh, AFN organizers and participants welcome the diverse food choices that China’s 
globalization is bringing. They have benefitted from China’s ‘reform and opening’, and there 
seems to be, at least in the short term, a disarticulation between the problems that prompted the 
formation of these AFNs (e.g. food safety crisis, ecological degradation, loss of traditional 
farming) and China’s food globalization. 
 
Regardless, through forms of everyday resistance China’s AFNs are acting to secure 
control over food for themselves, in the context of top down state policy. They have buffered 
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themselves from the uncertainties of a global food system, as well as the uncertainties of unsafe 
domestic food supplies, by establishing direct-to-consumer modes of exchange that emphasize 
livelihoods, connections and ecological relations. They are acting to take back control of food 
quality standards and re-kindle traditional practices.  Further, in front of state’s opposition to 
alliances that focus on demanding rights, China’s AFNs have built trans-global informal, 
guanxi relations. A predisposition toward informal guanxi relations aids the initiators in these 
AFNs in bridging scales and drawing extensively on both personal and electronic networks. 
These networks are the foundation for AFN resistance, and in a context where information is 
highly controlled, they provide access to information as well as the means for information 
distribution and organizing.  
 
8.6 How are these findings instructive?  
As an early exploration into alternative food relations in an authoritarian state 
context, these findings move theorizing forward on alternative food relations as a global 
phenomenon. As a ‘first look’ however, the research raises more questions than offering 
answers and suggests some discordant concepts with current AFN theoretical assumptions 
which need to be followed by future research. 
 
8.6.1 Land and Agrarian History Matter 
AFN theorizing and case study work is drawn almost exclusively from histories of 
private land relations and the resulting path of firm and farm consolidation, to which many 
AFNs respond. Examination of AFNs in China however, lays bare the fundamental role that 
agrarian history and land tenure has in shaping these alternatives. Public land ownership, where 
entrepreneurs need to negotiate for land access with peasants who hold land rights complicates 
land-labour relations that underlie global north AFN theory and further examination of 
economic relations in different land tenure contexts is needed.  
 
8.6.2  New Politics of Local-Global  
An intriguing aspect to this research is that throughout my interviews, the concept of 
‘local food’ was never mentioned. This contrasts with action and research in global north 
AFNs, where ‘the local’ is either reified an/or critiqued. While the AFNs I examined are all 
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procuring and exchanging local food, they are neither pursuing a local ideology that reifies 
scale, nor are they local out of necessity. There is a pragmatic, rather than utopian 
understanding of place in these networks. In contrast to defensive localism, and perhaps 
influenced by China’s ‘opening’ experience, there is a strong orientation to search for 
knowledge, experience, and information from beyond China and re-mix these with ‘Chinese 
characteristics”. The ways in which China’s AFNs practice a politics that is rooted in place but 
also looks outward supra-nationally warrants further research. 
 
8.6.3 New Spaces of Resistance 
As China’s AFNs join others from the global north in ‘moving beyond the market’, 
they reveal new ways to think about resistance. They challenge assumption of an independent 
civil society sphere where non state actors can gather, discuss and challenge policy, that 
underlies AFN theorizing. The examples described here call for an extension to the ways in 
which AFN scholarship understands citizenship, and suggest that actions for the common good 
can take place at all scales, from the personal to the global, as well as through diverse styles - 
from the overt to the everyday. China’s AFNs reveal that hegemony is never total. Even in the 
absence of organized civil society and in a context of pervasive uncertainty, resistance finds its 
space. The everyday resistance repertoires detailed here suggest that space, between 
domination and overt defiance is large, and worthy of further exploration in different contexts. 
It could be fruitful to bring theories of everyday resistance into global north AFN theorizing. 
 
8.6.4 Opening Up the Black Box of Agrarian Myths 
A cultural imagery of the rural idyll is a strong motivator in China’s AFNs. Certainly 
‘American pastoralism’ is also powerful trope in North America, with deep cultural roots, with 
an imaginary of a ‘yeoman’ farmer in touch with nature, working a small plot on the frontier, 
rejecting industrialism and pollution (Press & Arnould, 2011). Indeed these ideals motivated 
the ‘back to the land’ movement in the 1970s so we know they can be powerful forces that 
engage people. At the same time, however, such romanticism can mask contradictions and 
inequities. In the rural imaginary that attracts us to the CSA for example, we might disregard 
its middle class bias, and social exclusion. Opening up the black box of the rural idyll in the 
global North and how it intersects with political, economic and environmental conditions, in 
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particular social justice issues and land tenure, could be a fruitful line of research contributing 
to how we theorize alternative food relations. Can such imagery be a transformative force? 
 
This research represents a first account of producer-consumer, co-constituted food 
provisioning and procurement networks emerging in China’s peri-urban areas. As a ‘first look’ 
I have favoured breadth over depth in my choice to use four different lenses to examine the 
alternativeness of these AFNs. My findings reveal economic, ecological, interpersonal and 
political diversity, and call for further investigation of these dimensions. Further, I have 
identified a set of ‘Chinese characteristics’ that shape these AFNs along those dimensions. 
These characteristics are informed by both political economic as well as cultural theory and 
include economic, environmental, cultural and political conditions. The findings give us a 
glimpse at AFNs beyond the global north, but also serve as a mirror to reflect some discordant 
concepts and theoretical assumptions that need further investigation. This ‘first look’ at these 
networks sees state and capital dominance matched by possibilities or ‘openings’ that start to 
reveal how different production and consumption might be arranged.  
 
“In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, in the expert’s mind there are few.” 
Zen master Shunry Suzuki 
 
  
198 
 
References Cited 
 
Adams, D., & Salois, M. (2010). Local versus organic: A turn in consumer preferences 
and willingness-to-pay. Renewable Agriculture and Food System, 25(4), 331-341. 
 
Allen, P. (2010). Realizing justice in local food systems. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 3, 295-308. 
 
Allen, P. (2008). Mining for justice in the food system: perceptions, practices, and 
possibilities. Agriculture and Human Values, 25(2), 157-161. 
 
Allen, P., FitzSimmons, M., Goodman, M., & Warner, K. (2003). Shifting plates in the 
agrifood landscape: the tectonics of alternative agrifood initiatives in California. Journal of 
rural studies, 19(1), 61-75. 
 
Allen, P., & Guthman, J. (2006). From "old school" to "farm-to-school": 
Neoliberalization from the ground up. Agriculture and Human Values, 23, 401-415. 
 
Allen, P., & Sachs, C. (2007). Women and food chains: The gendered politics of food. 
International Journal of Sociology of Food and Agriculture, 15(1), 1-23. 
 
Amin, A. (2009). The Social Economy: International Perspectives on Economic 
Solidarity. London:Zed, 266 pp. 
 
Amin, A. (2002). Spatialities of globalization. Environment and Planning A, 34(3), 385-
399. 
 
Anagnost, A. (2008). From ‘class’ to ‘social strata': grasping the social totality in reform-
era China. Third World Quarterly, 29(3), 497-519.  
 
Anagnost, A. (2004). The corporeal politics of quality (suzhi). Public Culture, 16(2), 
189-208. 
 
Anagost, A. (1997). National Past-times: Narrative, Representation, and Power. 
London: Duke University Press, 227 pp. 
 
Andree, P., Dibden, J., Higgins, V., & Cocklin, C. (2010). Competitive productivism and 
Australia's emerging 'alternative' agri-food networks: producing for farmers markets in Victoria 
and beyond. Australian Geographer, 41(3), 307-322. 
 
Balazs, B. (2012). Local food system development in Hungary. International Journal of 
Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19(3), 403-421. 
 
199 
 
Ballamingie, P., & Walker, S. (2013). Field of dreams: Just food's proposal to create a 
community food and sustainable agriculture hub in Ottawa, Ontario. Local Environment: The 
International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 18(5), 529-542. 
 
Barnett, C. (2010). The politics of behaviour change. Environment and Planning A, 
42(8), 1881-1886. 
 
Bedore, M. (2010). Just Urban Food Systems: A New Direction for Food Access and 
Urban Social Justice. Geography Compass, 4(9), 1418-1432. 
 
Best, H. (2008). Organic agriculture and the conventionalization hypothesis: A case 
study from West Germany. Agriculture and Human Values, 25(1), 95-106. 
 
BioFach China (2013). Development and Policy of Organic Market in China. 2 pp. 
 
Blay-Palmer, A., Landman, K., Knezevic, I., & Hayhuyrst, R. (2013). Constructing 
resilient, transformative communities through sustainable "food hubs". Local Environment: 
The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 18(5), 521-528. 
 
Blue, G. (2009). On the politics and possibilities of locavores: Situating food sovereignty 
in the turn from government to governance. Politics and Culture, 2, 68-79. 
 
Born, B., & Purcell, M. (2006). Avoiding the local trap. Journal of Planning Education 
and Research, 26(2), 195-200. 
 
Borras, S. (2010). The Politics of Transnational Agrarian Movements. Development and 
Change, 41(5), 771-803. 
 
Brown, C., & Miller, S. (2008). The impacts of local markets: a review of research on 
farmers' markets and community supported agriculture (CSA). American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 90(5), 1298-1302. 
 
Brown, L. (1996). Who will feed China? The Futurist, January, 14-18. 
 
Brunori, G., Rossi, A., & Malandrin, V. (2012). Co-producing transition: Innovation 
processes in farms adhering to solidarity-based purchase groups (GAS) in Tuscany, Italy. 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 18(1), 28-53. 
 
Bruun, O. (2013). Social movements, competing rationalities and trigger events: The 
complexity of Chinese popular mobilizations. Anthropological Theory, 13(2), 249-266. 
 
Buck, D., Getz, C., & Guthman, J. (1997). From farm to table: the organic commodity 
chain in Northern California. Sociologia Ruralis, 37(1), 3-20. 
 
Burch, D., & Lawrence, G. (2007). Supermarkets, producers and audit technologies: The 
constitutive micro-politics of food, legitimacy and governance. In D. Burch & G. Lawrence 
200 
 
(Eds.), Supermarkets and Agri-Food Supply Chains: Transformations in the Production and 
Consumption of Foods, 131-153, Cheltenhalm: Edward Elgar,  
 
Busch, L. (2011). The private governance of food: equitable exchange or bizarre bazaar? 
Agriculture and Human Values, 28(3), 345-352. 
 
Cai, Y. (2008). Local governments and the suppression of popular resistance in China. 
China Quarterly, 193, 24-42. 
 
Cameron, J. (2010). Business as usual or economic innovation?: Work, markets and 
growth in community and social enterprises. Third Sector Review, 93-108. 
 
Cameron, J., & Gordon, R. (2010). Building Sustainable and Ethical Food Futures 
through Economic Diversity: Options for a Mid-Sized City. Paper presented at the Policy 
Workshop on The Future of Australia's Mid-Sized Cities Latrobe University, Bendigo, 
Victoria. 
 
Campbell, H. (2009). Breaking new ground in food regime theory: corporate 
environmentalism, ecological feedbacks and the 'food from somewhere' regime? Agriculture 
and Human Values, 26, 309-319. 
 
Cao, L., Tian, W., Wang, J., Malcolm, B., Liu, H., & Zhou, Z., et al. (2013). Recent food 
consumption trends in China and trade implications to 2020. Australian Agribusiness Review, 
21, 14-44. 
 
Carter, C., Zhong, F., & Zhu, J. (2012). Advances in Chinese agriculture and its global 
implications. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 34(1), 1-36. 
 
Chan, A. (2011). Unionizing Chinese Walmart stores. In A. Chan (Eds.), Walmart in 
China, 199-217, Ithica NY: Cornell University. 
 
Chen, R. (2013). Discovering distinctive east Asian STS: An Introduction. East Asian 
Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal, 6(4), 441-443. 
 
Chen, W. (2013a). Perceived value of a community supported agriculture (CSA) working 
share: The construct and its dimensions. Appetite, 62, 37-49. 
 
Chen, W. (2013b). Perceived value in community supported agriculture (CSA): A 
preliminary conceptualization, measurement, and nomological validity. British Food Journal, 
115(10), 1428-1453. 
 
Chen, X., & Chen, C. (2004). On the intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management, 21, 305-324. 
 
Cheng, H. (2012). Cheap capitalism: A sociological study of food crime in China. British 
Journal of Criminology, 52, 254-273. 
201 
 
Chiffoleau, Y. (2009). From Politics to Co-operation: The Dynamics of Embeddedness in 
Alternative Food Supply Chains. Sociologia Ruralis, 49(3), 218-235. 
 
Childs, J. (2003). Transcommunality: From the Politics of Conversion to the Ethics of 
Respect. Philidelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 256 pp. 
 
Christiansen, F. (2009). Food security, urbanization and social stability in China. Journal 
of Agrarian Change, 9(4), 548-575. 
 
Clarke, N., Bloke, P., Barnett, C., & Malpass, A. (2008). The spaces and ethics of 
organic food. Journal of Rural Studies, 24, 219-230. 
 
Cox, R. (2010). Some problems and possibilities of caring. Ethics, Place and 
Environment, 13(2), 113-130. 
 
Cox, R., Holloway, L., Venn, L., Dowler, L., Hein, J., & Kneafsey, M., et al. (2008). 
Common ground? Motivations for participation in a community-supported agriculture scheme. 
Local Environment, 13(3), 203-203. 
 
Day, A. (2008). The end of the peasant? New rural reconstruction in China. Boundary 2, 
35(2), 49-73.  
 
DeLind, L. (2003). Considerably more than vegetables, a lot less than community: The 
dilemma of community supported agriculture. In J. Adams (Eds.), Fighting for the Farm: 
Rural America Transformed, 192-206, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
DeLind, L., & Bingen, J. (2008). Place and civic culture: re-thinking the context for local 
agriculture. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 21, 127-150. 
 
Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2005). The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. (3 ed.). 
Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 1210 pp. 
 
Dixon, J. (2011). Diverse food economies, multivariant capitalism, and the community 
dynamic shaping contemporary food systems. Community Development Journal, 46(51), i20-
i35. 
 
Dong, L., & Tian, K. (2009). The use of western brands in asserting Chinese national 
identity. Journal of Consumer Research, 36(3), 504-523. 
 
Dubuisson-Quellier, S., Lamine, C., & Velly, R. (2011). Citizenship and consumption: 
Mobilisation in alternative food systems in France. Sociologia Ruralis, 51, 304-323. 
 
Dunford, M., & Li, L. (2010). Chinese spatial inequalities and spatial policies. 
Geography Compass, 4(8), 1039-1054.  
 
202 
 
DuPuis, E., Harrison, J., & Goodman, D. (2011). Just food? In A. Alkon & J. Agyeman 
(Eds.), Cultivating Food Justice: Race, Class, and Sustainability, 283-307, Massachusetts:The 
MIT Press. 
 
DuPuis, E., & Goodman, D. (2005). Should we go "home" to eat?: toward a reflexive 
politics of localism. Journal of Rural Studies, 21, 359-371. 
 
DuPuis, M., & Gillon, S. (2009). Alternative modes of governance: Organic as civic 
engagement. Agriculture and Human Values, 26(1-2), 43-53. 
 
Egelyng, H., De Abreu, L., Li, L., & Fonesca, M. (2013). Comparative institutional 
analyses of certified organic agriculture conditions in Brazil and China. In N. Halberg & A. 
Muller (Eds.), Organic Agriculture for Sustainable Livelihoods, 203-222, Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge. 
 
Ellis, E., & Wang, S. (1997). Sustainable traditional agriculture in the Tai Lake Region 
of China. Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 61, 177-193. 
 
Fan, M., Shen, J., Yuan, L., Jian, R., Chen, X., & Davies, W., (2012). Improving crop 
productivity and resource use efficiency to ensure food security and environmental quality in 
China. J Exp Bot, 63(1), 13-24. 
 
Feagan, R. (2007). The place of food: Mapping out the "local" in local food systems. 
Progress in Human Geography, 31(1), 23-42. 
 
Feagan, R., & Henderson, A. (2009). Devon Acres CSA: local struggles in a global food 
system. Agriculture and Human Values, 26(3), 203-217.  
 
Feagan, R., & Morris, D. (2009). Consumer quest for embeddedness: a case study of the 
Brantford farmers' market. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 33, 235-243. 
 
Fickey, A. (2011). ‘The Focus Has to be on Helping People Make a Living’: Exploring 
Diverse Economies and Alternative Economic Spaces. Geography Compass, 5(5), 237-237. 
 
Fridell, M., Hudson, I., & Hudson, M. (2008). With friends like these: The corporate 
response to fair trade coffee. Review of Radical Political Economics, 40(1), 8-34. 
 
Fridman, J., & Lenters, L. (2013). Kitchen as food hub: Adaptive food systems 
governance in the City of Toronto. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice 
and Sustainability, 18(5), 543-556. 
 
Friedland, W. (1984). Commodity systems analysis: An approach to the sociology of 
agriculture. Research in Rural Sociology and Agriculture, 1, 221-236. 
 
Friedmann, H. (2009). Discussion: moving food regimes forward: reflections on 
symposium essays. Agriculture and Human Values, 26, 335-344. 
203 
 
Friedmann, H., & McNair, A. (2008). Whose rules rule? Contested projects to certify 
'local production for distant consumers'. Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(2-3), 408-434. 
 
Friedmann, H., & McMichael, P. (1989). Agriculture and the state system: the rise and 
fall of national agricultures, 1870 to the present. Sociologia Ruralis, 29(2), 93-117. 
 
Fuchs, D., Kalfagianni, A., Clapp, J., & Busch, L. (2011). Introduction to symposium on 
private agrifood governance: Values, shortcomings and strategies. Agriculture and Human 
Values, 28, 335-344. 
 
Fuller, D., Jonas, A., & Lee, R. (2010). Introduction. In D. Fuller, A. Jonas & R. Lee 
(Eds.), Interrogating Alterity: Alternative Economic and Political Spaces, xiii-xxxi). Surrey: 
Ashgate. 
 
Galt, R. (2013). The moral economy is a double-edged sword: Explaining farmers' 
earnings and self-exploitation in community-supported agriculture. Economic Geography, 
89(4), 341-365. 
 
Garnett, T., & Wilkes, A. (2014). Appetite for Change: Social, economic and 
environmental transformations in China's food system. Food Climate Research Network, 
165pp. 
 
Gerth, K. (2003). China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 353pp. 
 
Gibbert, M., & Ruigrok, W. (2010). The 'what" and "how" of case study rigor: Three 
strategies based on published work." Organizational Research Methods. Organizational 
Research Methods, 13(4), 710-737. 
 
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2006). A Postcapitalist Politics. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minneapolis, MN:Minnesota Press, 276pp. 
 
Gibson-Graham, J. (2001). Community Economies Collective. Retrieved February 1, 
2014, from http://www.communityeconomies.org 
 
Gibson-Graham, J. (2008). Diverse economies: performative practices for 'other worlds'. 
Progress in Human Geography, 32(5), 613-632. 
 
Gibson-Graham, J. (2005). Surplus possibilities: post development and community 
economies. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 26, 14-26. 
 
Gibson-Graham, J. (1996). The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique 
of Political Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 348pp. 
 
Gilley, B. (2012). Authoritarian environmentalism and China’s response to climate 
change. Environmental Politics, 21(2), 287-307. 
204 
 
 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Giovannucci, D. (2005). Organic Agriculture and Poverty Reduction in Asia: China and 
India Focus, Report No 1664. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
 
Gold, T., Guthrie, D., & Wank, D. (2002). An Introduction to the study of Guanxi. In T. 
Gold, D. Guthrie & D. Wank (Eds.), Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture and the 
Changing Nature of Guanxi, 3-22, Cambridge: University Press. 
 
Gomiero, T., Pimentel, D., & Maurizio, P. (2011). Is there a need for a more sustainable 
agriculture. Critical Reviews in Plant Sciences, 30, 6-23. 
 
Goodman, D., DuPuis, E., & Goodman, M. (2012). Alternative Food Networks: 
Knowledge, Practice and Politics. Abingdon: Routledge, 308pp. 
 
Goodman, D., & DuPuis, M. (2002). Knowing food and growing food:beyond the 
production-consumption debate in the sociology of agriculture. Sociologia Ruralis, 42, 5-22. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddeness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510. 
 
Guthman, J. (2011). “If they only knew”: The unbearable whiteness of alternative food. 
In A. H. Alkon & J. Agyeman (Eds.), Cultivating Food Justice: Race, Class and Sustainability, 
263-281, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Guthman, J. (2008). Thinking inside the neoliberal box: the micro-politics of agro-food 
philanthropy. Geoforum, 39(3), 1241-1253. 
 
Guthman, J. (2004). The trouble with 'organic lite' in California: a rejoinder to the 
'conventinalization' debate. Sociologia Ruralis, 44(3), 301-316. 
 
Guthman, J. (2000). Raising organic: An agro-ecological assessment of grower practices 
in California. Agriculture and Human Values, 17, 257-266. 
 
Halberg, N. (2012). Assessment of the environmental sustainability of organic farming: 
Definitions, indicators and the major challenges. Canadian Journal of Plant Science, 92(6), 
981-996. 
 
Halberg, N., & Muller, A. (2013). Organic agriculture, livelihoods and development. In 
N. Halberg & A. Muller (Eds.), Organic Agriculture for Sustainable Livelihoods, 1-20, New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Hale, M. (2013). Tilling sand: Contradictions of the "social economy" in a Chinese 
movement for alternative rural development. Dialect Anthropology, 37, 51-82. 
205 
 
 
Hall, J., & Trentmann, F. (2005). Civil Society. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 272 pp. 
 
Hansen, M., & Svarverud, R. (2013). 'i'China: The rise of the individual in modern 
Chinese society. Philosophy of East and West, 63(2). 
 
Hansen, M., & Syarverud, R. (2010). iChina: The Rise of the Individual in Modern 
Chinese Society. Copenhagen: Nias Press. 
 
Harcourt, W. (2013). The future of capitalism: a consideration of alternatives. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 1-22. 
 
Harris, E. (2009). Neoliberal subjectivities or a politics of the possible? Reading for 
difference in alternative food networks. Area, 41(1), 55-63. 
 
Harroway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the 
privilege of partial perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575-599. 
 
Harvey, D. (2004). The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession. Socialist 
Register 40: 63-87.. 
 
Hassanein, N. (2003). Practicing food democracy: A pragmatic politics of 
transformation. Journal of Rural Studies, 19, 77-86. 
 
Heilmann, S., & Perry, E. J. (2011). Embracing uncertainty: Guerrilla policy style and 
adaptive governance in China. In S. Heilmann & E. Perry (Eds.), Mao's Invisible Hand: The 
Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, 1-29, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Hendrickson, M., & Heffernan, W. (2002). Opening spaces through relocalization: 
Locating potential resistance in the weakness of the global food system. Sociologia Ruralis, 42, 
347-368. 
 
Higgins, V., Dibden, J., & Cocklin, C. (2008). Building alternative agri-food networks: 
Certification, embeddedness and agri-environmental governance. Journal of Rural Studies, 24, 
15-27. 
 
Higgins, V., & Larner, W. (2010). Standards and standardization as a social scientific 
problem. In V. Higgins & W. Larner (Eds.), Calculating the Social: Standards and the 
Reconfiguration of Governing, 1-17, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hill, S., & MacRae, R. (1992). Organic farming in Canada. Agriculture, ecosystems & 
environment, 39(1), 71-84. 
 
Hinrichs, C. (2003). The practice and politics of food system localisation. Journal of 
Rural Studies, 19, 33-45. 
206 
 
 
Hinrichs, C. (2000). Embeddedness and local food systems: notes on two types of direct 
agricultural market. Journal of Rural Studies, 16, 295-303. 
 
Ho, P., & Edmonds, R. (2008). China's Embedded Activism: Opportunities and 
Constraints of a Social Movement. Routledge, 258 pp. 
 
Holdaway, J. (2013). Environment and health research in China: The state of the field. 
The China Quarterly, 1-22. 
 
Holdaway, J., & Husain, L. (2014). Food Safety in China: A Mapping of Problems, 
Governance and Research. Forum on Health, Environment and Development (FORHEAD), 83 
pp. 
 
Holloway, L. (2002). Virtual vegetables and adopted sheep: Ethical relation, authenticity 
and internet-mediated food production technologies. Area, 34, 70-81. 
 
Holloway, L., Kneafsey, M., Cox, R., Venn, L., Dowler, E., & Tuomainen, H. (2007). 
Beyond the 'alternative'-'conventional' divide? Thinking differently about food production-
consumption relationships. In D. Maye, L. Holloway & M. Kneafsey (Eds.), Alternative Food 
Geographies: Representation and Practice , 77-93, Oxford: Elsevier. 
 
Holloway, L., Kneafsey, M., Venn, L., Cox, R., Dowler, E., & Tuomainen, H. (2007). 
Possible food economies: a methodological framework for exploring food production--
consumption relationships. Sociologia Ruralis, 47(1), 1-19. 
 
Horlings, L., & Marsden, T. (2014). Exploring the 'new rural paradigm' in Europe: Eco-
economic strategies as a counterforce to the global competitiveness agenda. European Urban 
and Regional Studies, 21(1), 4-20. 
 
Howard, P. (2009). Consolidation in the North American organic food processing sector, 
1997 to 2007. International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 16(1), 13-30. 
 
Howard, P., & Allen, P. (2006). Beyond organic: Consumer interest in new labeling 
schemes in the Central Coast of California. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 30(5), 
439-451. 
 
Hsing, Y. (2010). The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in 
China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 250 pp. 
 
Hsu, C. (2011). Even further beyond civil society: The rise of internet-oriented Chinese 
NGO. Journal of Civil Society, 7(1), 123-127. 
 
Hu, D., Reardon, T., Rozelle, S., Timmer, P., & Wang, H. (2004). The emergence of 
supermarkets with Chinese characteristics: challenges and opportunities for China’s 
agricultural development. Development Policy Review, 22(5), 557-586. 
207 
 
 
Huang, J., Wang, S., Zhi, H., Huang, Z., & Rozelle, S. (2011). Subsidies and distortions 
in China's agriculture: Evidence from producer-level data. Australian Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, 55(1), 53-71. 
 
Huang, J., Wang, X., & Qiu, H. (2012). Small-scale farmers in China in the face of 
modernisation and globalisation. London/The Hague: IIED/HIVOS, 47 pp. 
 
Huang, J., Yang, J., & Rozelle, S. (2013). The political economy of food pricing policy in 
China. Helsinki, Findland: United Nations University World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), 26 pp. 
 
Huang, P. (2011). China's New-Age Small Farms and Their Vertical Integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2011). China: Enforced disappearances a growing threat.  
 
International Foundation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). 2009. Definition 
of Organic Agriculture, http://www.ifoam.org/en/organic-landmarks/definition-organic-
agriculture, Accessed February 1, 2014. 
 
Ilbery, B., Courtney, P., Kirwan, J., & Maye (2010). Marketing concentration and 
geographical dispersion: a survey of organic farms in England and Wales. British Food 
Journal, 112(9), 962-975. 
 
Ilbery, B., & Maye, D. (2005). Alternative (shorter) food supply chains and specialist 
livestock products in the Scottish-English borders. Environment and Planning A, 37, 823-844. 
 
Jacka, T. (2013). Chinese discourses on rurality, gender and development: a feminist 
critique. Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(6), 983-1007. 
 
Jacka, T. (2012). Migration, householding and the well-being of left-behind women in 
rural Ningzia. The China Journal, 67, 1-22. 
 
Jacka, T. (2009). Cultivating citizens: Suzhi (Quality) discourse in the PRC. Positions: 
East Asia Cultures Critique, 17(3), 523-535. 
 
Jaffee, D. (2007). Brewing Justice: Fair Trade Coffee, Sustainability and Survival. 
Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 346 pp. 
 
Jaffee, D., & Howard, P. (2010). Corporate cooptation of organic and fair trade 
standards. Agriculture and Human Values, 27, 387-399. 
 
James, C. (2010). Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2010, Brief No 
42. Ithica, NY: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 
(ISAAA). 
208 
 
 
Janssen, B. (2010). Local food, local engagement: community supported agriculture in 
eastern Iowa. Culture and Agriculture, 32(1), 4-16. 
 
Jarosz, L. (2008). The city in the country: growing alternative food networks in 
Metropolitan areas. Journal of Rural Studies, 24, 231-244. 
 
Jia, C., & Jukes, D. (2013). The national food safety control system of China - A 
systematic review. Food Control, 32, 236-245. 
 
Johnson, T. (2010). Environmentalism and NIMBYism in China: promoting a rules-
based approach to public participation. Environmental Politics, 19(3), 430-448.  
 
Johnston, J. (2008). The citizen-consumer hybrid: ideological tensions and the case of 
Whole Foods Market. Theory and Society, 37(3), 229-270. 
 
Jones, O., Kirwan, J., Morris, C., Buller, H., Dunn, R., Hopkins, A., Whittington, F., & 
Wood, J. (2010). On the alternativeness of alternative food networks: Sustainability and the co-
production of social and ecological wealth. In D. Fuller, A. Jonas & R. Lee (Eds.), 
Interrogating Alterity: Alternative Economic and Political Spaces, 95-109, Surrey: Ashgate. 
 
Kallander, I. (2008). Participatory Guarantee Systems. Stockholm: Swedish Society for 
Nature Conservation, 26 pp. 
 
Keith, M., Lash, S., Arnoldi, J., & Rooker, T. (2014). China Constructing Capitalism: 
Economic life and urban change. London and New York: Routledge, 330 pp. 
 
Kerkvliet, T. (2009). Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours). Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 36(1), 227-243. 
 
Khan, S., Cao, Q., Zheng, Y., Huang, Y., & Zhu, Y. (2008). Health risks of heavy metals 
in contaminated soils and food crops irrigated with waste water in Beijing, China. 
Environmental Pollution, 152(3), 686-692. 
 
King, F. (1911). Farmers of Forty Centuries. Pennsylvania: Rodale Press, 439 pp. 
 
Kipnis, A. (2006). Suzhi: a keyword approach. The China Quarterly. The China 
Quarterly, 186, 295-313. 
 
Kirwan, J. (2006). The interpersonal world of direct marketing: examining conventions 
of quality at UK farmers' markets. Journal of Rural Studies, 22, 301-312. 
 
Kirwan, J. (2004). Alternative strategies in the UK agro-food system: Interrogating the 
alterity of farmers' markets. Sociologia Ruralis, 44(4), 395-415. 
 
209 
 
Klein, J. (2013). Everyday approaches to food safety in Kunming. The China Quarterly, 
376-393. 
 
Klein, J. (2009). Creating ethical food consumers? Promoting organic foods in urban 
Southwest China. Social Anthropology, 17(1), 74-89. 
 
Kleinman, A., Yan, Y., Jun, J., Lee, S., Zhang, E., Pan, T., Wu, F., & Guo, J. (2011). 
Introduction: Remaking the moral person in a new China. In A. Kleinman, Y. Yan, J. Jun, S. 
Lee, E. Zhang, T. Pan, F. Wu & J. Guo (Eds.), Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, 1-
35). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Kneafsey, M., Cox, R., Holloway, L., Dowler, E., Venn, L., & Tuomainen, H. (2008). 
Reconnecting Consumers, Producers and Food. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Koc, M., MacRae, R., Desjardins, E., & Roberts, W. (2008). Getting civil about food: 
The interactions between civil society and the state to advance sustainable food systems in 
Canada. Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition, 3(2-3), 122-144. 
 
Koohafkan, P., Altieri, M., & Holt Gimenez, E. (2012). Green Agriculture: foundations 
for biodiverse, resilient and productive agriculture systems. International Journal of 
Agricultural Sustainability, 10(1), 61-75. 
 
KPMG (2011). China's 12th Five-year Plan: Overview. Beijing: KPMG Insight Services, 
KPMG Advisory, 4 pp. 
 
Lamine, C., Darolt, M., & Brandenburg, A. (2012). The civic and social dimensions of 
food production and distribution in alternative food networks in France and Southern Brazil. 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19(3), 383-401. 
 
Lamine, C. (2005). Settling shared uncertainties: local partnerships between producers 
and consumers. Sociologia Ruralis, 45(4), 324-345. 
 
Lawson, V. (2007). Geographies of care and responsibility. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 97, 1-11. 
 
Le Mons Walker, K. (2008). From covert to overt: everyday peasant politics in China 
and the implications for transnational agrarian movements. Journal of Agrarian Change, 8(2-
3), 462-488. 
 
Leitner, H., Sheppard, E., & Sziarto, K. (2008). The spatialities of contentious politics. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 33, 157-172. 
 
Lernoud, J., Willer, H., & Schlatter, B. (2014). Asia: Current statistics. In H. Willer & J. 
Lernoud (Eds.), The World of Organic Agriculture: Statistics and Emerging Trends 2014, 183-
192, Bonn: Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL), Frick, and International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). 
210 
 
 
Levkoe, C. (2011). Towards a transformative food politics. Local Environment, 16(7), 
687-705. 
 
Leyshon, A., & Lee, R. (2003). Introduction: alternative economic geographies. In L. 
Leyshon & C. Williams (Eds.), Alternative Economic Spaces, 1-26, London: Sage. 
 
Li, C. (2010). Characterizing China's middle class: Heterogeneous composition and 
multiple identities. In C. Li (Eds.), China's Emerging Middle Class, 135-157, Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Li, J. (2012). Fight silently: Everyday resistance in surviving state owned enterprises in 
contemporary China. Global Labour Journal, 3(2). 
 
Li, L. (2007). Fighting Famine in North China. Standford: Standford University Press, 
520 pp. 
 
Li, W., Liu, M., & Min, Q. (2011). China's Ecological Agriculture: Progress and 
Perspectives. Journal of Resource Ecology, 2(1), 1-7. 
 
Li, W. (2001). Agro-Ecological Farming Systems in China. New York: The Parthenon 
Publishing Group, 425 pp. 
 
Li, X. (2013). Socio-economic background, current trends. In G. Toth & L. Xiubin 
(Eds.), Threats to the Soil Resource Base of Food Security in China and Europe. A report from 
the Sino-EU Panel on Land and Soil, 3-5, Luxembourg: Office of the European Union. 
 
Li, Y., Miao, B., & Lang, G. (2011). The local environmental state in China: A study of 
county-level cities in Suzhou. The China Quarterly, 205, 115-132.  
 
Lim, K. (2013). 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics': Uneven development, 
variegated neoliberalization and the dialectical differentiation of state spatiality. Progress in 
Human Geography, 1-27. 
 
Lin, L., Zhou, D., & Ma, C. (2010). Green food industry in China: Development, 
problems and policies. Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems, 25(1), 69-80. 
 
Little, R., Maye, D., & Ilbery, B. (2010). Collective purchase: moving local and organic 
foods beyond the niche market. Environment and Planning A, 42(8), 1797-1797. 
 
Liu, J., & Yang, W. (2012). Water sustainability for China and beyond. Science, 
337(6095), 649-650. 
 
Liu, R., Pieniak, Z., & Verbeke, W. (2013). Consumers' attitudes and behaviour towards 
safe food in China: a review. Food Control, 33, 93-104. 
 
211 
 
Lockeretz, W. (2007). Organic Farming: An International History. Oallingford 
Oxfordshire: CABI, 275 pp. 
 
Lora-Wainwright, A. (2009). Of farming chemicals and cancer deaths: the politics of 
health in contemporary China. Social Anthropology, 17(1), 56-73. 
 
Lora-Wainwright, A., Zhang, Y., Wu, Y., & Van Rooij, B. (2012). Learning to live with 
pollution: the making of environmental subjects in a Chinese industrial village. The China 
Journal, 68, 106-124. 
 
Luttikholt, L. (2007). Principles of organic agriculture as formulated by the International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements. NJAS-Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 
54(4), 347-360. 
 
Lynch, D., Halberg, N., & Bhatta, G. (2012). Environmental impacts of organic 
agriculture in temperate regions. CAB Rev, 7(10), 1-17. 
 
Lynch, D., MacRae, R., & Martin, R. (2011). The carbon and global warming potential 
impacts of organic farming: Does it have a significant role in an energy constrained world? 
Sustainability, 3, 322-362. 
 
Lyons, J. (2008). Changes proposed to western Canadian barley marketing. First in 
Grain, 2-3. 
 
Lyson, T. (2005). Civic agriculture and community problem solving. Culture and 
Agriculture, 27(2), 92-98. 
 
Ma, Y., Chen, L., Zhao, X., Zheng, H., & Lu, Y. (2009). What motivates farmers to 
participate in sustainable agriculture? Evidence and policy implications. International Journal 
of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, 16(6), 374-380. 
 
Mariola, M. J. (2008). The local industrial complex? Questioning the link between local 
foods and energy use. Agriculture and Human Values, 25(2), 193-196.  
 
Marsden, T. (1989). Restructuring rurality: From order to disorder in agrarian political 
economy. Sociologia Ruralis, 29(3/4), 312-317. 
 
Marsden, T. (2012). Third natures? Reconstituting space through place-making strategies 
for sustainability. International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19(2), 257-274. 
 
Marsden, T., Banks, J., & Bristow, G. (2000). Food supply chain approaches: Exploring 
their role in rural development. Sociologia Ruralis, 40(4), 424-438. 
 
Marsden, T., & Franklin, A. (2013). Replacing neoliberalism: Theoretical implications of 
the rise of local food movements. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and 
Sustainability, 18(5), 636-641. 
212 
 
 
Marsden, T., & Smith, E. (2005). Ecological entrepreneurship: sustainable development 
in local communities through quality food production and local branding. Geoforum, 36(4), 
441-451. 
 
Martin, D., & Pierce, J. (2012). Reconceptualizing resistance: Residuals of the state and 
democratic radical pluralism. Antipode, 45(1), 61-79. 
 
Matusitz, J., & Leanza, K. (2009). Wal-Mart: An analysis of the glocalization of the 
Cathedral of Consumption in China. Globalizations, 6(2), 187-205. 
 
Maye, D. (2013). Moving alternative food networks beyond the niche. International 
Journal of sociology of Agriculture and Food, 20(3), 383-389. 
 
Maye, D., & Ilbery, B. (2006). Regional economics of local food production: tracing 
food chain links between 'specialist' producers and intermediaries in the Scottish-English 
borders. European Urban and Regional Studies, 13, 337-354. 
 
McBeath, J., & McBeath, G. (2010). Environmental Change and Food Security in China. 
Dodrecht: Springer, 340 pp. 
 
McCullough, E., Pingali, P., & Stamoulis, K. (2008). Small farms and the transformation 
of food systems: an overview. In E. McCullough, P. Pingali & K. Stamoulis (Eds.), The 
Transformation of Agri-Food Systems: Globalization, Supply Chains and Smallholder 
Farmers, 3-46, London: Earthscan. 
 
McKinnon, K. (2010). Diverse present(s), alternative futures. In D. Fuller, A. Jonas & R. 
Lee (Eds.), Interrogating Alterity: Alternative Economic and Political Spaces, 259-269, 
Surrey: Ashgate. 
 
Mei, Y., Jewison, M., & Greene, C. (2006). Organic Products Market in China. USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report, 4pp. 
 
Micheletti, M. (2003). Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism and 
Collective Action. London: Pelgrave, 322 pp. 
 
Morgan, K., Marsden, T., & Murdoch, J. (2006). Worlds of Food: Place, Power and 
Provinance in the Food Chain. Oxford University Press. 
 
Morton, K. (2012). Learning by Doing: China's Role in the Global Governance of Food 
Security. Working Paper, Indiana: Indiana University,  
 
Mount, P., & Andree, P. (2013). Visualising community-based food projects in Ontario. 
Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 18(5), 578-591. 
 
213 
 
Mullings, B. (1999). Insider or outsider, both or neither: some dilemmas of interviewing 
in a cross-cultural setting. Geoforum, 30, 337-350. 
 
Mutersbaugh, T. (2005). Fighting standards with standards: Harmonization, rents, and 
social accountability in certified organic agrofood networks. Environment and Planning A, 37, 
2033-2051. 
 
Nelson, E., Knezevic, I., & Landman, K. (2013). The uneven geographies of community 
food initiatives in southwestern Ontario. Local Environment: The International Journal of 
Justice and Sustainability, 18(5), 567-577. 
 
Nyiri, P. (2009). From Starbucks to Carrefour: Consumer boycotts, nationalism and taste 
in contemporary China. PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, 6(2), 1-
25. 
 
O'Brien, K. (2003). Neither transgressive nor contained: Boundary-spanning contention. 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 8(1), 51-
64. 
 
O'Brien, K., & Li, L. (2006). Rightful Resistance in Rural China. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 200 pp. 
 
OECD-FAO (2013). Agricultural Outlook 2013 - 2022. OECD-FAO, 93 pp. 
 
Oelofse, M., Hogh-Jensen, H., Abreu, L., Almeida, G., El-Araby, A., & Hui, Q., et al. 
(2011). Organic farm conventionalisation and farmer practices in China, Brazil and Egypt. 
Agronomy for Sustainable Development, 31(4), 689-698. 
 
Oostindie, H., Van der Ploeg, J., & Renting, H. (2002). Farmers' experiences with and 
views on rural development practices and processes: outcomes of a transnational European 
survey. In J. Van der Ploeg, A. Longs & J. Banks (Eds.), Rural Development Processes in 
Europe: The State of the Art, 214-230, Doetinchem: Elsevier. 
 
Pan, J., & Du, J. (2011). The social economy of new rural reconstruction. China Journal 
of Social Work, 4(3), 271-282. 
 
Park, C. (2008). Delights in farm guesthouses: nongjiale tourism, rural development and 
the regime of leisure-pleasure in post-Mao China. Doctoral Dissertation, University of 
California, US, 365 pp. 
 
Parrot, N., & Marsden, T. (2002). The Real Green Revolution: Organic and 
Agroecological Farming in the South. UK: Greenpeace Environmental Trust, 149 pp. 
 
Parrot, N., Olsen, J., & Hogh-Jensen, H. (2006). Certified and non-certified organic 
farming in the developing world. In H. Halberg, H. Alroe, M. Knudsen & E. Kristensen (Eds.), 
214 
 
Global Development of Organic Agriculture: Challenges and Prospects,154-176, UK: CABI 
Publishing. 
 
Paull, J. (2008). The Greening of China's Food: Green food, Organic food, and Eco-
labelling. Paper presented at the Sustainable Consumption and Alternative Agri-Food Systems 
Conference , Liege University, Arolon, Belgium, 14 pp. 
 
Paull, J. (2011). The making of an agricultural classic: farmers of forty centuries or 
permanent agriculture in China, Korea and Japan, 1911-2011. Agricultural Science, 2(3), 175-
180. 
 
Paull, J. (2007). China's organic revolution. Journal of Organic Systems, 1-11. 
 
Peace, R., & van Hoven, B. (2010). Computers, qualitative data, and geographic 
research. In I. Hay (Eds.), Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography (3 ed.; pp. 295-
313). Don Mills: Oxford University Press. 
 
Perry, E. (2008). Chinese conceptions of "rights": From Mencius to Mao - and now. 
Perspectives on Politics, 6, 37-50. 
 
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
 
Popkin, B. (2013). Synthesis and implications: China's nutrition transition in the context 
of changes across other low- and middle-income countries. Obesity Reviews, 15(1), 60-67. 
 
Poynter, R. (2010). The Handbook of Online and Social Media. Sussex, UK: John Wiley 
& Sons, 464 pp. 
 
Pratt, J. (2009). Incorporation and Resistance: Analytical Issues in the 
Conventionalization Debate and Alternative Food Chains. Journal of Agrarian Change, 9(2), 
155-174. 
 
Press, M.; Arnould, E. (2011). Legitimating community supported agriculture through 
American pastoralist ideology. Journal of Consumer  Culture 11(2), 168-194. 
 
Pretes, M., & Gibson, K. (2008). Openings in the body of ‘capitalism’: Capital flows and 
diverse economic possibilities in Kiribati. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 49(3), 381-391. 
 
Qazi, J., & Selfa, T. (2005). The politics of building alternative agro-food networks in the 
belly of the agro-industry. Food, Culture and Society, 8(1), 45-70. 
 
Quarter, J. (2010). Researching the social economy. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 335 pp. 
 
215 
 
Raynolds, L. (2000). Re-embedding global agriculture: The international organic and fair 
trade movements. Agriculture and Human Values, 17(3), 297-309. 
 
Reardon, T., Berdeque, J., & Timmer, C. (2005). Supermarketization of the 'emerging 
markets' of the Pacific Rim: Development and trade implications. Journal of Food Distribution 
Research, 36(1), 3-12. 
 
Reardon, T., Timmer, C., Barrett, C., & Berdegue, J. (2003). The rise of supermarkets in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85, 1140-1146. 
 
Reed, M. (2010). Rebels for the soil: The rise of the global organic food and farming 
movement. London: Earthscan, 159 pp. 
 
Renting, H., Marsden, T., & Banks, J. (2003). Understanding alternative food networks: 
exploring the role of short supply chains in rural development. Environment and Planning A, 
35(3), 393-411. 
 
Renting, H., Schermer, M., & Rossi, A. (2012). Building food democracy: Exploring 
civic food networks and newly emerging forms of food citizenship. International journal of 
Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19(3), 289-307. 
 
Robinson, F. (2010). After liberalism in world politics? Towards an international 
political theory of care. Ethics and Social Welfare, 4(2), 130-143. 
 
Rose, M. (2002). The seductions of resistance: Power, politics and a performative style 
of systems. Environment and Planning D, 20, 383-400. 
 
Ross, K. (2012). Faking it: Food quality in China. INAPS, 8(2), 33-54. 
 
Sage, C. (2003). Social embeddedness and relations of regard: alternative 'good food' 
networks in south-west Ireland. Journal of Rural Studies, 18, 47-60. 
 
Sanders, R. (2006). A market road to sustainable agriculture? Ecological agriculture, 
green food and organic agriculture. Development and Change, 37(1), 201-226. 
 
Sargeson, S. (2013). Violence as development: land expropriation and China's 
urbanization. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(6), 1063-1085. 
 
Schneider, M. (2011). Feeding China's Pigs: Implications for the Environment, China's 
Smallholder Farmers and Food Security. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 28 pp. 
 
Schumilas, T. (2011). The Feeders Meet the Eaters: Direct Marketing in Ontario's 
Organic Sector. Guelph, Ontario: The Organic Council of Ontario, 8 pp. 
 
Scoones, S. (2008). Organic Agriculture in China - Current Situation and Challenges. 
EU-China Trade Project, 65 pp. 
216 
 
 
Scott, J. (1992). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 269 pp. 
 
Scott, J. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 375 pp. 
 
Scott, S. (2006). Doing fieldwork in development geography: Research cultures and 
research spaces in Vietnam. Geographical Research, 44(1), 28-40; 
 
Scott, S., Si, Z., Schumilas, T., & Chen, A. (2014). Contradictions in state- and civil 
society-driven developments in China's ecological agriculture sector, Food Policy , 45(2), 158-
166. 
 
Seyfang, G. (2006). Ecological citizenship and sustainable consumption: Examining 
local organic food networks. Journal of Rural Studies, 22, 383-395. 
 
Shen, X., & Williams, R. (2005). A critique of China's utilitarian view of science and 
technology. Science Technology and Society, 10, 2. 
 
Sheng, J., Shen, L., Qiao, Y., Yu, M., & Fan, B. (2009). Market trends and accreditation 
systems for organic food in China. Trends in Food Science and Technology, 20, 396-401. 
 
Shi, T. (2004). Operationalizing sustainability: An emerging eco-philosophy in Chinese 
Ecological Agriculture. Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 24(4), 112-131. 
 
Shi, Y., Cheng, C., Lei, P., Wen, T., & Merrifield, C. (2011). Safe food, green food, good 
food: Chinese community supported agriculture and the rising middle class. International 
Journal of Agricultural Sustainability, 9(4), 551-558. 
 
Shirong, L. (2012). Setting the record straight: Confucius' notion of Ren. Dao, 11(1), 39-
52. 
 
Shiva, V. (2006). Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace. London: Zen 
Books, 224 pp. 
 
Si, Z., Schumilas, T., Scott, S. (forthcoming). Characterizing alternative food networks in 
China. Agriculture and Human Values 
 
Sia, R., Ling, J., Wu, B., Park, J., Shu, H., & Morrison, A., et al. (2013). Women's role in 
sustaining villages and rural tourism in China. Annals of Tourism Research, 43, 624-650. 
 
Sigley, G. (2009). Suzhi, the body, and the fortunes of technoscientific reasoning in 
contemporary China. Positions, 17(3), 537-566. 
 
217 
 
Simelton, E. (2011). Food self-sufficiency and natural hazards in China. Food Security, 
3, 35-52. 
 
Slee, B., & Kirwan, J. (2007). Exploring hybridity in food supply chains. Proceedings of 
the 105th Seminar of the European Association of Agricultural Economists Bologna, Italy: 
Avenue Media. 
 
Slocum, R. (2007). Whiteness, space and alternative food practice. Geoforum, 38(3), 
520-533. 
 
Smithers, J., Lamarche, J., & Joseph, A. (2008). Unpacking the terms of engagement 
with local food at the Farmers' Market: Insights from Ontario. Journal of Rural Studies, 24(3), 
337-350. 
 
Sonnino, R. (2010). Escaping the local trap: Insights on re-localization from school meal 
reform. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 12(1), 23-40. 
 
Sonnino, R. (2007). Embeddedness in action: Saffron and the making of the local in 
southern Tuscany. Agriculture and Human Values, 24, 61-74. 
 
Sonnino, R., & Marsden, T. (2006). Alternative food networks in the south west of 
England: Towards a new agrarian eco-economy. In T. Marsden & J. Murdock (Eds.), Between 
the Local and the Global. Research in Rural Sociology and Development, Volume 12 , 299-
322, Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. 
 
Spires, A. (2011). Contingent symbiosis and civil society in an authoritarian state: 
Understanding the survival of China's grassroots NGOs. American Journal of Sociology, 
117(1), 1-45. 
 
Spradley, J. (1979). The Enthnographic Interview. New York: Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Stern, R., & O'Brien, K. (2012). Politics at the boundary: Mixed signals and the Chinese 
state. Modern China, 175, 1-25. 
 
Su, B. (2011). Rural tourism in China. Tourism management, 32(6), 1438-1441. 
 
Suk-Ching, H. (2005). Evolution versus tradition in marketing systems: The Hong Kong 
food-retailing experience. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 24(1), 90-99. 
 
Sullivan, J., & Xie, L. (2009). Environmental activism, social networks and the internet. 
China Quarterly, 198(2), 422-432. 
 
Suzuki, L. (2007). The pond you fish in determines the fish you catch: Exploring 
strategies ofr qualitative data collection. The Counseling Psychologist, 35(2), 295-327. 
 
218 
 
Thiers, P. (2005). Using global organic markets to pay for ecologically based agricultural 
development in China. Agriculture and Human Values, 22(1), 3-15.  
 
Tilt, B. (2013). The politics of industrial pollution in rural China. , 40(6), 1147-1164. 
Tong, Y. (2011). Morality, benevolence and responsibility: Regime legitimacy in China 
from past to the present. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 16, 141-159. 
 
Tong, Y., & Lei, S. (2013). War of position and microblogging in China. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 22(80), 292-311. 
 
Toth, G. (2013). Soil degradation. In G. Toth & L. Xiubin (Eds.), Threats to the Soil 
Resource Base of Food Security in China and Europe. A report from the Sino-EU Panel on 
Land and Soil Luxembourg: Office of the EU. 
 
Tregear, A. (2011). Progressing knowledge in alternative and local food networks: 
Critical reflections and a research agenda. Journal of Rural Studies, 27(4), 419-430. 
 
Trichur, G. (2012). East Asian developmental path and land-use rights in China. Journal 
of World Systems Research, 18(1), 69-89. 
 
Tronto, J. (2006). Vicious circles of privatized caring. In M. Harrington & D. Miller 
(Eds.), Socializing Care: Feminist Ethics and Public Issues, 3-26, Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
 
Tronto, J. (1993). Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Turner, S. (2010). Challenges and dilemmas: fieldwork with upland minorities in 
socialist Vietnam, Laos and southwest China. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 51(2), 121-134. 
 
USITC (2011). China's Agricultural Trade: Competitive Conditions and Effects on U.S. 
Exports. Washington, DC: United States International Trade Commission. 
 
van der Ploeg, J. (2008). The New Peasantries: Struggles for Autonomy and 
Sustainability in an Era of Empire and globalization. London: Earthscan. 
 
van der Ploeg, J. (2007). The third agrarian crisis and the re-emergence of processes of 
repeasantization. Rivista di economica agrarian, 62(3), 325-332. 
 
van der Ploeg, J., Ye, J., & Schneider, S. (2012). Rural development through the 
construction of new, nested markets: Comparative perspectives from China, Brazil and the 
European Union. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(1), 133-173. 
  
van der Ploeg, J., Ye, J., & Schneider, S. (2010). Rural development reconsidered: 
Building on comparative perspectives from China, Brazil and the European Union. Rivista di 
Economia Agraria, 65(2), 163-177. 
219 
 
 
van der Ploeg, J., Ye, J., Wu, H., & Wang, C. (2014). Peasant-managed agricultural 
growth in China: Mechanisms of labour-driven intensification. International Journal of 
Sociology of Agricutlure and Food, 21(1), 155-171. 
 
Vandermeer, J., & Perfecto, I. (2012). Complex Traditions: Intersecting Theoretical 
Frameworks in Agroecological Research. Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 
37(1),76-89.  
 
Veek, A., Yu, H., & Burns, A. (2010). Consumer risks and new food systems in urban 
China. Journal of Macromarketing, 30(3), 222-237. 
 
Vietnam Organic (2013). PGS Vietnam. Retrieved April 7, 2014, from 
http://vietnamorganic.vn/?lang=eng 
 
Wai, O. (2014). Developments in Asia. In H. Willer & Lernoud, J. (Eds.), The World of 
Organic Agriculture. Statistics and Emerging Trends 2014, 163-170, Bonn: IFOAM. 
 
Wan, J. (2013). Ethical tradition and modernity: The problem of ethical culture in the 
context of modern China. Social Sciences in China, 34(2), 184-198. 
 
Wang, F. (2005).  Organizing Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System,  
Stanford University Press, pp.304 
 
Wang, F. (2010). Renovating the great floodgate: The reform of China's hukou system. 
In M. K. Whyte (Eds.), One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary 
China, 335-367, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Wang, H., Qin, L., Huang, L., & Zhang, L. (2007). Ecological Agriculture in China: 
Principles and Applications. Advances in Agronomy, 94, 181-208. 
 
Wang, J., & Huang, J. (2004). Water problems in the Fuyang River basin. Natural 
Resources Transaction, 19(4), 424-429. 
 
Wang, J., Huang, J., Rozelle, S., Huang, Q., & Zhang, L. (2009). Understanding the 
water crisis in northern China: What government and farmers are doing? International Journal 
of Water Resources Development, 25(1), 141-158. 
 
Wang, M. (2007). Emerging urban poverty and the effects of the ‘diabao’ program in 
alleviating poverty in China.  China and the World Economy 15: 74-88. 
 
Weis, T. (2010). The accelerating biophysical contradictions of industrial capitalist 
agriculture. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(3), 315-341. 
 
Welsh, J., & MacRae, R. (1998). Food citizenship and community food security: Lessons 
from Toronto, Canada. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 19(4), 237-255. 
220 
 
 
Wen, T. (2007). Deconstructing modernization. Chinese Sociology & Anthropology, 
39(4), 10-25.  
 
Wen, T., Lau, K., Cheng, C., He, H., & Qiu, J. (2012). Ecological civilization, 
indigenous culture and rural reconstruction in China. Monthly Review, 63(9), 29-44. 
 
Whatmore, S., Stassart, P., & Renting, H. (2003). What's alternative about alternative 
food networks? Environment and Planning A, 35, 389-391. 
 
Whyte, M. K. (2010). The paradoxes of rural-urban inequality in contemporary China. In 
M. K. Whyte (Eds.), One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary 
China, 1-29, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
Wilson, A. D. (2013). Beyond Alternative: Exploring the Potential for Autonomous Food 
Spaces. Antipode, 45(3), 719-737.  
 
Winter, M. (2003). Embeddedness, the new food economy and defensive localism. 
Journal of Rural Studies, 19(1), 23-23. 
 
Wong, J., & Huang, Y. (2012). China's food security and its global implications. China: 
An International Journal, 10(1), 13-124. 
 
Wright, T. (2010). Tenuous tolerance in China's countryside. In P. Gries & S. Rosen 
(Eds.), Chinese Politics: State, Society and the Market ,109-128, London: Routledge. 
 
Wu, F. (2008). China’s great transformation: Neoliberalization as establishing a market 
society. Geoforum, 39(3), 1093-1096.  
 
Wu, J. (2010). Rural migrant workers and China's differential citizenship: A Comparative 
institutional analysis. In M. K. Whyte (Eds.), One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban 
Inequality in Contemporary China, 55-84, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
Xie, B., Tingyou, L., & Yi, Q. (2010). Organic certification and the market: organic 
exports from and imports to China. British Food Journal, 113(10), 1200-1216. 
 
Xie, L. (2009). Environmental Activism in China. London: Routledge, 212 pp. 
 
Yan, Y. (2009). The good Samaritan's new trouble: A study of the changing moral 
landscape in contemporary China. Social Anthropology, 17(1), 9-24. 
 
Yan, Y. (2010). The Chinese path to individualization. Br J Sociol, 61(3), 489-512. 
 
Yan, Y. (2012). Food safety and social risk in contemporary China. The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 71(3), 705-729. 
 
221 
 
Yan, Y. (2011). The changing moral landscape. In A. Kleinman, Y. Yan, J. Jun, S. Lee, 
E. Zhang, P. Tianshu, W. Fei & G. Jinhua (Eds.), Deep China , 36-78, Longon, England: 
University of California Press. 
 
Yang, G. (2013). Contesting food safety in the Chinese media: Between hegemony and 
counter-hegemony. The China Quarterly, 214, 337-355. 
 
Yang, G. (2009). The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 317 pp. 
 
Yang, G. (2005). Environmental NGOs and institutional dynamics in China. The China 
Quarterly, 181, 46-66.  
 
Yang, Y. (2007). A China Environmental Health Project Factsheet: Pesticides and 
Environmental Health Trends in China. Retrieved June 20, 2011, from 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/pesticides_feb28.pdf 
 
Ye, J., Wang, C., Wu, H., He, C., & Liu, J. (2013). Internal migration and left-behind 
populations in China. Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(6), 1119-1146. 
 
Yeh, A., Xu, J., & Liu, K. (2011). China's post-reform urbanization: retrospect, policies 
and trends. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 45 pp. 
 
Yeh, E. , O'Brien, K., & Ye, J. (2013). Rural politics in contemporary China. Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 40(6), 915-928. 
 
Yin, R. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. (4 ed.). Thousand Oaks CA: 
Sage, 219 pp. 
 
Yu, J. (2010). Conflicts between officials and citizens are the key to mass incidents. 
China Report, 50-51. 
 
Zha, D., & Zhang, H. (2013). Food in China's international relations. The Pacific Review, 
26(5), 455-479. 
 
Zhai, F., Du, S., Wang, Z., Zhang, J., Du, W., & Popkin, B. (2014). Dynamics of the 
Chinese diet and the role of urbanicity, 1991-2011. Obesity Reviews, 15(1), 16-26. 
 
Zhang, D., Min, Q., Liu, M., & Cheng, S. (2012). Ecosystem service tradeoff between 
traditional and modern agriculture: A case study in Congjiang County, Guizhou Province, 
China. Frontiers in Environmental Science and Engineering, 6(5), 743-752. 
 
Zhang, D., Jim, C., Lin, G., He, S., Wang, J., & Lee, H.. (2006). Climatic change, war 
and dynastic cycles in China over the last millennium. Climatic Change, 76, 459-477. 
 
222 
 
Zhang, G., & Shen, R. (2013). Impact of high intensity land uses on soil and environment 
in China. In G. Toth & L. Xiubin (Eds.), Threats to the Soil Resource Base of Food Security in 
China and Europe. A report from the Sino-EU Panel on Land and Soil, 53-90, Luxemburg: 
Office of the European Union. 
 
Zhang, H. (2006). Environment, Market and Peasant Choice: The Ecological 
Relationships in the Jianghan Plain in the Qing and the Republic. Modern China, 32(1), 31-63. 
 
Zhang, Q., & Donaldson, J. (2008). The rise of agrarian capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics: Agricultural modernization, agribusiness and collective land rights. The China 
Journal, 60, 25-47. 
 
Zhang, Q., & Donaldson, J. (2010). From peasants to farmers: Peasant differentiation, 
labor regimes, and land-rights institutions in China's agrarian transition. Politics & Society, 
38(4), 458-489. 
 
Zhang, Q. & Pan, Z. (2013). The transformation of urban vegetable retail in China: Wet 
markets, supermarkets and informal markets in Shanghai. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
43(3), 497-518. 
 
 
 
 
  
223 
 
Appendix A - Instruments 
Interview Guide 
 
Tell me about your farm - where is it? How big is it? How long have you been 
farming? 
关于您农场的信息：地点、面积、经营多久了 
How do you practice ecological agriculture? Tell me a bit about some of the farming 
practices you use?  For example, how do you build fertility or control weeds? Do you use 
cover crops and rotations? How do you manage fertility? What are some of your farming 
challenges? What is your experience with the Chinese organic standards and the certification 
process?   
您如何开展生态农耕？能否告诉我一些您的耕种措施？例如，如何保肥控制野
草？您采用间作套种轮作吗？如何管理费里？ 
您遇到的挑战有哪些？您对中国有机标准和认证过程有什么看法？ 
Can you tell me about how you started selling directly to consumers like this? Why 
did you start selling food direct to consumers instead of through other traders and middlemen?  
Is this the only way you sell food - what other channels or ways to you sell your products? 
能否告诉我您是怎么开始与消费者建立直接销售关系的？为什么您开始直接销
售给消费者而不是通过其它的中间商？这是您唯一的销售方式吗？您还有什么其它渠道
或方式？ 
What are the benefits of selling directly to consumers and what are the challenges?  
Is this way of selling becoming more common among farmers? Why/ Why not?  Is this way of 
selling more or less profitable than other arrangements?   
直接销售给消费者有什么益处？面临哪些挑战？这种方式是不是正在农民中间
变得流行？为什么（不）？这种销售方式比起其它方式收益更高吗？ 
 
What is the place of CSAs in China’s food system overall?  What do other farmers 
you know think of this approach?  What do officials think of this approach? What reaction is 
there generally? 
社区支持农业在中国的食品系统中的整体地位如何？你认识的其它农户怎么看
待这种模式？政府官员们如何看待它？整体说来社会媒体对这种模式有什么反应？ 
Can you tell me a bit about the consumers/members who buy food from you? In your 
view, what do you think consumers are looking for - why do they buy from you instead of 
going to a supermarket?  What other opportunities do you see for yourself? 
能告诉我一些您的顾客的情况吗？在您看来，消费者们在寻找什么？他们为什
么从你这里购买食品而不是去超市？您还有哪些销售产品的方式或提高农场收益的方式
（比如旅游）？ 
 
What are the roles of the local and state governments in supporting producers? What 
are your opinions about government involvement in ecological agriculture? How is it helping 
you and how is it presenting difficulties? 
地方和中央政府在支持生产者上扮演了哪些角色？您对政府介入生态农业有什
么看法？这对您有哪些帮助或阻碍？ 
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How important is trust [or reputation?] in these food transactions? What would 
happen if the food in a buying club or CSA like this was found to be unsafe?  Have you 
thought about that before?  
在这些食品交易中信任或者名誉有多重要？如果类似的健康采购团或社区支持
农业的产品被发现是不安全的，意味着什么，怎么办？您以前考虑过这个问题吗？ 
What about competition - do you ever feel like you are lowering your prices because 
of other farmers - how do you determine your prices? Does this affect your production? 
竞争：您有没有因为其它农民的竞争想要降低价格？如果决定价格？竞争会影
响您的生产吗？ 
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CSA Survey 
农场调查问卷 
 
您好！我叫Theresa 
Schumilas，是一名加拿大滑铁卢大学在读博士研究生，与Steffanie 
Scott博士一起从事加拿大和中国CSA农场的研究。我本人也是一个CSA农民，在加拿大
滑铁卢市郊区拥有一个小农场。请问您能否帮我完成一个简短的问卷调查？当然，您有
权决定是否参与调查。您和其他参与调查的人所提供的信息都将是保密的。您的名字也
不会出现在我的论文、报告或此研究所发表的任何文章中。 
 
您的姓名(Name):__________________ 
 您农场的名字(Farm):________________________ 
 
您农场的地址(address):_____________________ 
您在农场的职位(position):__________________ 
 
您的农场是哪一年建立的？(establish year)___________    
 
您的农场有网站/博客吗(website or blog)？ 
若有，请提供名称______，我们希望能关注你们的网站/博客 
 
您的会员如何支付费用 (可多选)( How do people pay for their 
shares/produce?): 
提前预付季度定金(In advance) 按周付款(weekly)  
其他方式，请描述(other)： 
 
配送份额中的蔬菜种类如何确定？ (可多选)( Who chooses the foods that are in 
the share/delivery?): 
农场根据当季产出决定(based on what is available on the farm) 
消费者（会员）从农场提供的蔬菜种类列表中选择(Consumer chooses from a 
list provided)  
其他方式，请描述 (other)： 
 
您平均每周配送多少个份额？(number of shares)  夏季(summer)__________
 冬季(winter)___________ 
 
您的会员如何获取他们的份额？(How do members/consumers get their 
share?)（可多选） 
226 
 
他们到农场来取(pick up on the farm) 我们配送到家(home delivery)  
他们到其它地方（如市区的配送点）取 (at other locations) 
其它方式，请描述(other):  
 
What is the cost for different sizes of shares? (not translated - we have been getting 
this directly from websites) 
 
您会在配送份额中代售其它农场或农户的产品吗? (Do you buy products from 
off the farm?) 
从来没有(never)  偶尔，但不经常(Occasionally - but not usually)  
   
经常，请注明您常从别处购买的产品类型Often - specify products you usually 
buy from other farms： 
 
How many mu? 您的农场(farm)共有____亩(mu in 
total)，其中_____亩用作CSA（社区支持农业）生产(mu for 
CSA)，________亩大棚(greenhouse)  
 
您农场的产出有哪些？（可多选）(grow/raise on the farm) 
蔬菜(vegetables)水果（包括果树）(Fruits (including fruit 
trees)猪肉(pork)牛奶(cows for milk)牛肉(beef)羊肉(goats) 
鸡肉(chicken)鸡蛋(egg)谷类和豆类（小麦、大米、玉米、燕麦、小米、
大麦、黄豆等）(grain and beans) 
牲畜青饲料(Forage or pastures for animals)蜜蜂和蜂蜜(Bees and honey)
 其它，请注明(other): 
 
除了给会员配送以外，您还有别的销售渠道吗? （可多选）where else do you 
sell farm products? 
在农夫市集销售farmers markets  通过消费者采购团销售buying clubs 
在农场的商店销售in a store on the farm 卖给小商店或饭店 to small 
stores or restaurants 
卖给政府部门、企业、学校、医院等机关单位cafeterias in institutions 
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其它，例如other： 
 
农场还举办其它活动吗？（可多选）What other activities go on at the farm? 
把土地出租给消费者（劳动份额）(Plots for consumers to grow their own 
vegetables)开办农场餐厅(Restaurant) 
举办关于健康生活、食品、农业等的讲座Workshops
 举办娱乐活动Exercise activities 
其它，请注明:other 
 
您的农场通过了有机认证吗？certified organic or not? 
是的(yes)      没有，也不打算认证(no, and not 
planning to) 
没有，但是目前正处在有机转换期(No, but I am currently in transition to 
organic)我将来会做有机认证 (I am considering certification for the future) 
 
什么原因促使您建立了您现在的农场？（请选出对您而言最重要的三个原因）
(Why did you decide to begin a CSA farm?) 
我希望能帮助小规模农民们，提高他们的收入(to help small peasant farmers) 
我担心农民们的健康状况（由于农药的大量施用）(concern about farmers’ 
health) 
我担心消费者们的健康状况（由于农药残留）(concern about consumers’ 
health) 
我关心环境问题，例如水和土壤资源的退化和污染(environmental problems – 
like water and soil degradation and contamination) 
我担心自己的健康（食品安全或环境污染）(concern about my health because 
of food safety and environmental pollution) 
我希望能和志同道合的人建立更紧密的联系(to connect with others who shared 
my concerns) 
我认为这是一个很好的商业机会(a good business opportunity) 
朋友或同事说服我尝试开办农场(A friend/colleague convinced me to try it) 
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其它原因：(other reasons)  
 
 
 
On the paper survey we had people give us detailed information on workers – 
but it was really complicated and I don’t think will work over the phone. So we should 
just ask:  How many people are paid to work on the farm?  
 
 
 
您家庭收入的百分之多少来自于您的农场？what percentage of your household 
income comes from your CSA? 
不到25%  26 – 50%之间 
51 – 75%之间 76 – 99%之间 
100% - 农场收入是我家庭收入的唯一来源CSA is the only income source 
 
您如何描述您的农场和农产品类型？how they describe/label their practices 
有机农业organic agriculture绿色农业green agriculture生态农业ecological 
agriculture自然农法natural farming永续农业permaculture生物动力学农业biodynamic 
agriculture 
其它： other 
 
非常感谢您的参与！如果您想获得此次调查的结果，请留下您的名字和电子邮
箱： 
姓名name__________________  Email:_________________ 
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Farm Observation Checklist 
 
Farmstead and 
Landscape 
Hedgerows? Infrastructure? 
Insectaries? Equipment? Forests? 
Pastures? 
 
 
 
 
Crops and Cropping Crops grown? Inter planting? 
Cover crops?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soil and Soil Building Compost and/or manure use & 
sourcing? 
Other fertility management?  
Fermentation pits? 
 
 
 
 
Livestock management Grazing system? 
Feed source? 
Manure management? 
Heritage breeds? 
 
 
 
 
Seed Saving and 
Sourcing 
Use of untreated seeds? 
Seed saving? 
Heritage varieties? 
Sourcing? 
 
 
  
 
Water Management Rain collection? 
Irrigation systems? 
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Appendix B 
List of Bloggers 
 
10 Bloggers Followed for 4 months – December 2012 – March 2013 
*- individual was also interviewed 
 
Identifier Identity Description 
BCB1* 
 
Beijing consumer Posts are mainly about the vegetables they source 
for the buying club, sources of organic products, 
baby care and education experience and 
environment-related risks and environmentally-
friendly actions and products 
FS1  Shanghai peasant farmer Posts frequently relate to his feelings, thoughts 
and reflections on farming, including obstacles 
and restrictions 
FCSAJ1* Changzhou CSA operator Many re-posts, but few original posts – primarily 
news about the CSA 
OG1 Guangzhou CSA operator  Pioneer CSA entrepreneur in south China - posts 
frequently related to pollution and environmental 
issues, farm tourism, and new cow share business 
FCSAB4 * Beijing CSA Operator Pioneer CSA farm in Beijing – posts about the 
CSA farm, current events and issues,  
FCSAB6a Beijing CSA Operator Posts about the farm, shares, new projects and 
recruitment, current events, sharing info from 
other CSAs 
FCSAB6 * Beijing AFN initiator Posts with updates from CSAs outside of China, 
key documents, raises questions for discussion 
FMB Beijing consumer Updates on the farmers market  
FMB1* Beijing AFN initiator Shares news re: fair trade, and alternative food 
issues from outside China, initiates on-line 
discussions, debates, often about her own lifestyle 
choices 
IB1 Beijing CSA operator Advocate of organic agriculture, postings frequent 
relate to economics of the CSA farm 
 
 
 
